


The History & Development of Philosophy



Handbook of the History & Development of Philosophy

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London

Chapman & Hall, Ltd.

1916

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THE WESTMINSTER PRESS
411A HARROW ROAD
LONDON W

PREFACE

I PUT forth this work with many apologies for its shortcomings, but when the length and breadth and complexity of the subject are taken into account, one may well exclaim: Who is sufficient for these things? The task would have taxed even the energies of a student who should devote his whole attention to its accomplishment, but what excuses are not needed in the case of one who is oppressed with multifarious duties, and who, moreover, has suffered a life-long disability from defective sight!

It may be matter for surprise to some critics that a work of this character should be launched upon the world during the absorption caused by the clash of arms; and the well-worn proverb may be quoted with intent: *Inter arma, leges silent.*

Furthermore, the fate might be predicted for the author which befel an infinitely greater man—Archimedes—during the assault upon Syracuse of the soldiers of Marcellus, and the picture might be drawn of his brains being scattered over the proofs he was laboriously correcting in his quiet study by a ferocious-looking gentleman in a pickelhaube; but this last extremity has not been realized, although the revision has been accomplished to the accompaniment of the booming of heavy guns off the Flanders coast. Yet, in spite of the dangers and anxieties of the time, the

author inclines to the hope that, ere long, this titanic conflict will give place to a righteous and abiding peace. When this blessed consummation comes about, it is certain that serious and difficult problems will immediately obtrude themselves alike in the social, political, and religious spheres. Hence, it will be well, in every case, if these problems be tackled by wise and far-seeing men—*i.e.*, men whose minds have been formed, informed, reformed—by conscientious and intelligent study of the thought, practice, and ~~experi-~~ experience of protagonists of past time, who were called upon to face and resolve similar problems in their day and generation.

With these words I desire to commend this venture to the generous judgment of my readers.

I must not conclude without stating my obligations to the Rev. R. V. Tremills for his goodness in assisting me to revise the proofs.

J. O. BEVAN.

CHILLENDEEN,
CANTERBURY.

September, 1916.

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
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Section A

LIST OF WRITERS ON PHILOSOPHICAL
SUBJECTS—IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER



SECTION A

LIST OF WRITERS ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS—IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

B.C.

	Orpheus (?)
665-585	Periander.
652-569	Pittacus.
638-558	Solon.
636-546	Thales.
610-547	Anaximander.
<i>fl</i> 590	Chilo.
<i>fl</i> 580	Cleobulus.
<i>fl</i> 550	Bias.
<i>fl</i> 544	Anaximenes.
540-500	Xenophanes.
Uncertain.	Leucippus.
<i>fl</i> 540-510	Pythagoras.
530-470	Heraclitus.
b 513	Parmenides.
500-428	Anaxagoras.
<i>fl</i> 488	Zeno of Elea.
485-380	Gorgias.
480-411	Protagoras.
<i>fl</i> 444	Empedocles.
469-399	Socrates.
460-361	Democritus.
450-357	Xenophon.
<i>fl</i> 400	Euclides.
429-347	Plato.
407-399	Speusippus.

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B.C.	
396-314	Xenocrates.
<i>fl</i> 375	Æschines.
<i>fl</i> 350	Anaxarchus.
384-322	Aristotle.
375-285	Pyrrho.
370-287	Theophrastus.
<i>fl</i> 370	Aristippus.
<i>fl</i> 320	Crates.
369-264	Zeno.
367-283	Euclid.
<i>fl</i> 356-323	Onesicritus.
351-277	Menedemus.
342-270	Epicurus.
<i>fl</i> 294	Stilpo.
316-241	Arcesilaus.
<i>fl</i> 260	Ariston.
<i>fl</i> 155	Critolaus.
213-129	Carneades.
<i>d before 111</i>	Panaetius.
<i>fl</i> 79	Antiochus of Ascalon.
<i>d</i> 70	Philo of Larissa.
<i>fl</i> 60	Menippus.
106-43	Cicero.
95-55	Lucretius.
95-46	Cato Uticensis.
<i>d B.C.</i> 7	Dionysius of Halicarnassus.
B.C. A.D.	
20-40	Philo Judaeus.
3-65	Seneca.
A.D.	
<i>fl</i> 1st cent.	Epictetus.
46-120	Plutarch.
103-167	Justin Martyr.
121-180	Marcus Aurelius.

List of Writers

	Maximus Tyrius. (In time of the Antonines.)
	Numenius (In time of the Antonines).
150-220	Clemens Alexandrinus.
160-240	Tertullian.
160-243	Ammonius Saccas.
<i>f</i> 244	Herennius (Modestinus).
185-253	Origen.
205-270	Plotinus.
213-273	Longinus.
233-305	Porphyry.
240-330	Lactantius.
<i>d</i> 333	Jamblichus
264-349	Eusebius.
296-373	Athanasius.
329-390	Gregory Nazianzen.
331-363	Julian the Apostate.
340-397	Ambrose.
354-430	Augustine of Hippo.
<i>d</i> 430	Plutarchus.
<i>f</i> 400-460	Syrianus.
412-485	Proclus.
376-444	Cyril of Alexandria.
5 th cent.	Dionysius the Areopagite (?).
431-484	Apollinaris Sidonius.
475-524	Boethius.
<i>f</i> 500-550	Olympiodorus
544-604	Gregory the Great.
570-636	Isidore of Seville.
<i>f</i> 875	John Scotus Erigena.
825-885	Methodius.
1005-1089	Lanfranc.
1033-1109	Anselm.
1040-1120	Roscelin.
1070-1121	William of Champeaux.

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1079-1142	Abelard.
1091-1153	Bernard of Clairvaux.
1097-1141	Hugo de S. Victor.
1100-1155	Arnold of Brescia.
1100-1164	Peter Lombard.
<i>d</i> 1173	Richard of S. Victor.
1193-1280	Albertus Magnus.
1214-1292	Roger Bacon.
1221-1274	Bonaventura.
1227-1274	Thomas Aquinas.
1250-1327	Eckhart.
1266-1308	Duns Scotus.
<i>d</i> 1338	Buridan.
1270-1347	William of Occam, or Ockham.
1300-1361	Tauler.
1363-1429	Gerson.
1380-1471	Thomas à Kempis.
1452-1498	Savonarola.
1483-1541	Carlstadt. (Andreas Bodenstein.)
1483-1546	Luther.
1486-1543	John Eck.
1491-1556	Ignatius Loyola.
1493-1541	Paracelsus.
1497-1560	Melancthon.
1501-1576	Cardanus.
1508-1588	Telesius.
1509-1564	Calvin.
1515-1572	Ramus.
1533-1592	Montaigne.
1550-1600	Bruno.
1553-1600	Hooker.
1555-1621	Arndt.
1560-1609	Arminius.
1561-1629	Francis Bacon.
1564-1642	Galileo.

List of Writers

1568-1639	Campanella.
1575-1624	Boehme.
1582-1637	Gerhard.
1583-1645	Grotius.
1585-1638	Jansen.
1587-1663	Sanderson.
1588-1648	Mersenne.
1588-1679	Hobbes.
1592-1655	Gassendi.
1596-1650	Descartes.
1602-1644	Chillingworth.
1613-1667	Jeremy Taylor.
1614-1687	More.
1617-1688	Cudworth.
1625-1698	Pordage.
1627-1691	Boyle.
1627-1696	Molinos.
1632-1677	Spinoza.
1632-1704	Locke.
1632-1718	Cumberland.
1642-1727	Newton.
1646-1716	Leibnitz.
1646-1729	Poiret.
1647-1706	Bayle.
1648-1717	Madame de Guyon.
1650-1729	Archbishop King.
1657-1733	Tindal.
1659-1724	Wollaston.
1669-1722	Toland.
1669-1734	Lord Chancellor King.
1670-1733	Mandeville.
1671-1713	Shaftesbury.
1674-1737	Hutchinson.
1675-1729	Samuel Clarke.
1676-1729	Collins.

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1682-1718	Ephraim Gerhard.
1684-1753	Berkeley.
1686-1761	William Law.
1689-1755	Montesquieu.
1689-1772	Swedenborg.
1692-1752	Bishop Butler.
1694-1747	Hutcheson.
1694-1778	Voltaire.
1703-1787	Edmund Law.
1705-1757	Hartley.
1705-1774	Abraham Tucker.
1710-1796	Reid.
1711-1776	David Hume.
1711-1799	Josiah Tucker.
1712-1778	Rousseau.
1713-1784	Diderot.
1715-1771	Helvetius.
1715-1780	Condillac.
1723-1789	Von Holbach.
1723-1790	Adam Smith.
1723-1791	Price.
1723-1816	Ferguson.
1724-1804	Kant.
1729-1797	Burke.
1733-1804	Priestley.
1735-1793	Beccaria. (Cesare Bonesana.)
1735-1803	James Beattie.
1737-1809	Thomas Paine.
1740-1807	De Lolme.
1743-1805	Paley.
1748-1832	Bentham.
1749-1827	Laplace.
1749-1832	Goethe.
1752-1827	Eichhorn.
1753-1828	Dugald Stewart.

List of Writers

- 1756-1836 Godwin.
1758-1835 Thomas Taylor.
1759-1829 Dumont.
1760-1825 Saint Simon.
1762-1814 Fichte.
1765-1832 Sir J. Mackintosh.
1768-1790 James Hay Beattie.
1768-1834 Schleiermacher.
1770-1831 Hegel.
1772-1823 Ricardo.
1772-1834 S. T. Coleridge.
1773-1836 James Mill.
1775-1854 Schelling.
1776-1841 Herbart.
1777-1855 Joseph Hume.
1778-1868 Brougham.
1785-1859 De Quincey.
1787-1865 Isaac Taylor.
1788-1856 Sir W. Hamilton.
1788-1860 Schopenhauer.
1790-1859 Austin.
1792-1867 Cousin.
1794-1866 Whewell.
1795-1881 Carlyle.
1798-1857 Comte.
1802-1876 Harriet Martineau.
1803-1882 Emerson.
1805-1872 F. D. Maurice.
1805-1900 James Martineau.
1806-1844 Sterling.
1806-1871 De Morgan
1806-1873 J. S. Mill.
1809-1882 Charles Darwin.
1810-1883 Birks.
1811-1894 McCosh.

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1813-1866	John Grote.
1814-1848	W. Archer Butler.
1817-1878	G. H. Lewes.
1817-1881	Rudolf Hermann Lotze.
1818-1903	Alexander Bain.
1819-1900	Ruskin.
1820-1871	Mansel.
1820-1903	H. Spencer.
1822-1913	A. R. Wallace.
1825-1895	T. H. Huxley.
1826-1871	Ueberweg.
1826-1877	Bagehot.
1826-1897	Hutton.
1828-1875	Lange.
1829-1894	John Veitch.
1830-1897	Calderwood.
1834-1896	W. Morris.
1835-1908	Edward Caird.
1836-1882	T. H. Green.
1838-1900	H. Sidgwick.
1842	Hartmann.
1842-1892	G. Croom Robertson.
1843	James Ward.
1844	P. H. Wicksteed.
1846	John McCunn.
1846	Bradley.
1846	Rudolf Eucken.
1848	A. J. Balfour.
1848	Bosanquet.
1852	Keynes.
1855	Sorley.
1856	Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison.
1859	Bergson.
1866	McTaggart.

Section B

BRIEF NOTICES OF PROMINENT MEN AS-
SOCIATED WITH PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT,
ARRANGED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER

SECTION B

BRIEF NOTICES OF PROMINENT MEN ASSOCIATED WITH PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT, ARRANGED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER

ABELARD (1079-1142)

Born near Nantes; opened a school of theology, philosophy, and rhetoric at Paris; was violently enamoured of Héloïse; became a monk in the Abbey of St. Denis; resumed his lectures, but was persecuted and condemned by the Councils of Soissons and Sens; died in the Priory of St. Marcel, near Chalons-sur-Saône. As the first who applied philosophical criticism to theology, his name is one of the most important in the history of the development of modern thought. He is classed as a Nominalist.

ÆSCHINES (B.C. 389-314)

- An Athenian philosopher and rhetorician; a disciple of Socrates.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS (1193-1280)

- Born in Swabia; studied in Paris; entered the Dominican Order, became teacher of philosophy at Cologne; taught in the University of Paris; was elected Archbishop of Ratisbon; was, perhaps, the most learned man of his time, and was accused of magical arts, as might have been expected from the spirit of the age. Thomas Aquinas was one of his scholars.

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AMBROSE (340-397)

Probably born at Trèves ; educated at Rome ; practised law at Milan. On the death of Auxentius, Bishop of Milan, in 374, Ambrose was elected to succeed him. He opposed the Arians. The best edition of his works is by the Benedictines.

AMMONIUS SACCAS, OF ALEXANDRIA (160-243)

Originally a Christian, he probably apostatized ; at all events, he combined the study of philosophy with Christianity ; is regarded by those who allege his apostasy as the founder of the later Platonic School. Among his pupils were Longinus, Herennius, Plotinus, and Origen.

ANAXAGORAS (B.C. 500-428)

In him are recognized the beginnings of Idealism.

ANAXARCHUS, OF ABDERA (*fl* 350 B.C.)

Of the School of Democritus. Nicocreon, King of Cyprus, had him pounded to death in a stone mortar.

ANAXIMANDER (B.C. 610-547)

A native of Miletus. He was one of the earliest philosophers of the Ionic School, and the immediate successor of Thales, its founder. He was the first to use the word '*arché*' to denote the origin of things, or, rather, the material out of which they were formed.

ANAXIMENES (*fl* B.C. 544)

He considered "air" to be the first cause of all things.

Biographical Notes

ANSELM (1033-1109)

Born at Aosta ; Abbot of Bec ; in 1093 Archbishop of Canterbury : the first of a long series of scholastic metaphysicians. He endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to lay the basis of a system of religious philosophy.

ANTIOCHUS OF ASCALON (*d.* B.C. 79)

Founder of the Fifth Academy ; a teacher of Cicero during his studies at Athens ; had also a school at Alexandria ; as well as in Syria, in which latter province he appears to have ended his life.

APOLLINARIS SIDONIUS (431-484)

Born at Lyons ; in 456 accompanied his father-in-law to Rome ; made a count by Majorian ; in 472 (although not a priest) elected to the bishopric of Clermont in Auvergne ; his writings are characterized by great subtlety of thought, expressed in phraseology abounding in harsh and violent metaphors.

ARCESILAUS (B.C. 316-241)

Founder of the Middle Academy.

ARISTIPPUS (*d.* B.C. 370)

Of the Cyrenaic School.

ARISTON OF CHIOS (*d.* B.C. 260)

A stoic philosopher and disciple of Zeno ; differed from his teacher in some points, and founded a small school.

ARISTOTLE (B.C. 384-322)

Instructor of Alexander the Great. Founder of the School afterwards called Peripatetic. He lays it

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down that four separate causes are necessary before anything exists, viz., the *material*, the *formal*, the *moving*, and the *final* cause. The first is that which gives matter its individuality ; the moving cause is that which causes matter to assume its individual forms ; and the final cause is that which makes matter retain the form imposed upon it by the moving cause. He was a most voluminous author on Dialectics, Logic, Metaphysics, Mathematics, Physics, Ethics, Politics, Economics, Poetry, and Rhetoric. He advocated *the mean* in the regulation of conduct.

JACOB ARMINIUS, OR HARMENSEN (1560-1609)

Born in Holland ; studied at Leyden and Geneva, where Beza was then teaching ; visited Basle and Rome ; became pastor at Amsterdam ; when Professor of Theology at Leyden, he propounded the doctrines afterwards distinctive of his sect, which involved him particularly in controversy with his fellow-professor Gomar. His system was a protest against the rigid Calvinistic doctrines of grace and predestination.

JOHANN ARNDT (1555-1621)

Born in Anhalt ; superintendent of the churches of Luxemburg ; made himself known by a work *On True Christianity*, a protest against the prevailing laxity in morals. He was a mystic.

ARNOLD OF BRESCIA (1100-1155)

An Italian monk. After an exile from Italy, during which he preached in France and Switzerland, he took the lead in a revolt of the Roman people, and for 10 years held his ground as master of the city.

Biographical Notes

Finally he was surrendered to his enemies, who burnt his body and cast his ashes into the Tiber. He was a pupil of Abélard, and was fiercely opposed by St. Bernard.

ATHANASIUS (296-373)

Born at Alexandria ; in 316 elected archbishop of that city, on the death of Alexander. The history of his episcopate is full of stirring incidents and strange vicissitudes of fortune. He composed several works in defence of his position, amongst others *Discourses against the Arians*.

AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO (354-430)

Born at Tagaste, in Numidia. Studied rhetoric at Carthage, where he embraced the Manichæan heresy, to which he adhered for nine years. In 383 went to Italy ; was converted and baptised by Ambrose ; ordained priest in 391 ; in 393 consecrated bishop of Hippo, where he ultimately died. The first 10 books of his *De Civitate Dei* contain a refutation of the various systems of false religion, the last 12 present a systematic view of true religion. He is best known by his *Confessions*.

AUSTIN (1790-1859)

Served two years in the army ; called to the Bar in 1818 ; gave up practice after a severe struggle ; professor of Jurisprudence at London University, but the profound expositions he gave were not appreciated ; Commissioner at Malta ; fell sick, and on his return rapidly grew worse ; died at Weybridge in December, 1859. His chief work, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, was first published in 1832.

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ROGER BACON (1214-1292)

Born near Ilchester ; studied at Oxford and Paris ; entered the Franciscan Order ; was bent on the discovery of truth, and fearless in his enquiries and teachings ; for a time prohibited from lecturing ; about 1267 he sent his *Opus Majus*, *Opus Minus* (an abridgement), and *Opus Tertium* (a preamble), to Pope Clement IV ; was imprisoned, but released ; returned to Oxford, where he died. The first-mentioned work may be considered the Encyclopædia and Novum Organum of the thirteenth century.

FRANCIS BACON (1561-1629)

Born in London ; educated at Cambridge ; called to the Bar ; in 1593 entered Parliament ; in 1617 was made Lord Chancellor, Baron Verulam, and Viscount St. Albans ; was disgraced ; continued to pursue his favourite studies, his great aim being to reform the method of philosophy from that of the Scholastics, and to recall men from blindly following authority to the observation and examination of Nature. His chief works are : *Novum Organum*, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, *Essays*, *Wisdom of the Ancients*, *History of Henry VII*, *Felicities of Queen Elizabeth*, *Of the State of Europe*.

WALTER BAGEHOT (1826-1877)

Educated at Bristol and University College, London ; called to the Bar ; entered his father's ship-owning and banking business ; contributed to *Prospective Review*, *National Review*, and *Economist* ; published *The English Constitution* ; *Physics and Politics*, and numerous works on economic subjects.

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ALEXANDER BAIN (1818-1903)

Born at Aberdeen ; at 11 left school to work for his living ; obtained a bursary at Marischal College ; in 1842 visited London and became acquainted with J. S. Mill, George Grote, G. H. Lewes, Edwin Chadwick, and Carlyle ; Professor of Logic and English in the United University of Aberdeen ; G. Croom Robertson was his pupil and close friend ; he was an ardent promoter of education and a conspicuous exponent of the *a posteriori* school of philosophy, whose foundations were laid by Hobbes and Locke, while its tenets were carried to their extreme consequences by David Hume ; his system of philosophy has been termed materialistic ; in Ethics he was a Utilitarian. He wrote : *The Study of Character ; The Senses and the Intellect ; The Emotions and the Will ; Mental and Moral Science ; Logic ; Mind and Body ; Education as a Science ; Autobiography*. He was a frequent contributor to " Mind " and other philosophical publications.

A. J. BALFOUR (b 1848)

Philosopher and Politician ! Has he devoted to politics what was meant for philosophy ?

PIERRE BAYLE (1647-1706)

Born at Carlat ; educated at Puylaurens and Toulouse, and for a short period professed the Roman Catholic faith ; Professor of Philosophy at Sedan, then at Rotterdam ; in 1695 published his great work, *Dictionnaire Critique et Historique*, followed by *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*.

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JAMES BEATTIE (1735-1803)

Son of a small farmer ; schoolmaster and parish clerk ; master at Aberdeen Grammar School ; Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Marischal College, in the latter city ; published sundry poems ; also *Evidences of the Christian Religion* and *Elements of Moral Science*.

JAMES HAY BEATTIE (1768-1790)

Son of James Beattie ; educated at Marischal College ; ultimately succeeded his father in the chair of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Aberdeen.

CESARE BONESANA, Marquis of Beccaria (1735-1793)

Italian political philosopher. Chiefly known as the author of the celebrated "Treatise on Crimes and Punishments," which advocated great reforms in criminal legislation.

JEREMY BENTHAM (1748-1832)

Educated at Westminster and Queen's College, Oxford ; called to the Bar, but directed his mind to physical science and speculations on politics and jurisprudence. In his numerous works he sought to compass the whole field of ethics, jurisprudence, logic, and political economy. To the last-named subject his contributions are of small account, and to the literature of Logic he made no very valuable additions ; his nephew George Bentham's *Outlines of a New System of Logic* containing his ideas on that subject. His influence on Ethics and Jurisprudence can hardly be overestimated. He distinguishes four sanctions of conduct. His *Introduction to Principles of Morals*

Biographical Notes

and *Legislation* expounded many schemes, which since his time have been applied to the amendment of the administration of justice. In the history of Ethics he stands out as one of the ablest champions of Utilitarianism and Hedonism, and was followed by J. Mill and J. S. Mill. His works are *Government, Criticism of Blackstone's Commentaries, Defence of Usury*. Letters suggesting a Panopticon. *Protest against Law Taxes, Supply without Burden, Chrestomathia, The Church of England and its Catechism, Not Paul but Christ, A Catechism of Parliamentary Reform, Petition for Justice and Pannomial Fragments.*

HENRI BERGSON (b 1859)

Educated at the Lycée Condorcet, and Ecole Normale; professor successively at Angers, Clermont, Collège Rollin, Lycée Henry IV, Ecole Normale Supérieure, and the Collège de France. Publications: *Essai sur les données immédiates de la Conscience; Matière et Mémoire, Le Rire, L'Evolution Créatrice, Gifford Lectures.*

GEORGE BERKELEY (1684-1753)

Born in Kilkenny, educated at Trinity College, Dublin; Dean of Dromore; Dean of Derry; Bishop of Cloyne; in 1752 removed to Oxford and died there. He was founder of the modern idealist philosophy, which had its roots in Locke's theory of Ideas; his *Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge* contains a complete exposition of his system, in which he sought by his protest against the current doctrine of matter to cut the ground from under the feet of the freethinker.

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Criticizing Locke, he objects that that writer reduces all qualities to the same level. He wrote numerous works, amongst others *Siris*, in praise of tar water !

BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX (1091-1153)

Born of a noble family of Burgundy ; studied at Paris ; entered the recently founded monastery of Citeaux ; died at Clairvaux. Was the vehement opponent of Arnold of Brescia ; successfully attacked the doctrines of several so-called heretics. His character and writings have earned for him the title of the Last of the Fathers.

BIAS OF PRIENE (fl B.C. 550)

One of the Seven Sages. His motto was " Most men are bad."

THOMAS RAWSON BIRKS (1810-1883)

Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge ; Vicar of Trinity Church in that town (1866-1877) ; in 1872 elected to the Knightbridge Professorship of Moral Philosophy ; published *The Bible and Modern Thought* and *Modern Utilitarianism*.

JACOB BOEHME (1575-1624)

German theosophist and mystic ; originally apprenticed to a shoemaker ; carried on his trade at Gorlitz ; of a serious and truthful disposition, he studied the Scriptures, acquired some notions of chemistry and natural science ; saw visions, as he believed ; and in his numerous writings gave utterance to many spiritual truths, mixed with much that was eccentric and extravagant. In England his views were adopted in part by the

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mystics, John Pordage, Henry More, and William Law.

BOETHIUS (475-524)

Probably studied under Proclus, at Athens ; became Consul in 510, and was treated with great distinction by Theodoric the Great ; but (having incurred that monarch's displeasure) was put to death. During his imprisonment he wrote his celebrated work *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, in five books. It is composed alternately in prose and verse. He was the last Roman of any note who understood the language and studied the literature of Greece.

S. BONAVENTURA, DOCTOR SERAPHICUS (1221-1274)

Born in Tuscany ; entered the Franciscan Order ; studied at Paris ; in 1256 made General of his Order ; created Cardinal by Gregory X ; at length, dissatisfied with speculation and philosophy, he became a mystic. His writings were highly esteemed by Luther. He died while attending the Council of Lyons.

BERNARD BOSANQUET (b 1848)

Born at Alnwick ; educated at Harrow and Balliol College ; professor of moral philosophy at St. Andrew's, 1903-1908. Publications : *Logic, or Morphology of Knowledge* ; *History of Æsthetic ; Knowledge and Reality* ; *Civilization of Christendom* ; *Essentials of Logic* ; *Aspects of Social Problems* ; *Psychology of Moral Self* ; *Philosophical Theory of the State*.

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ROBERT BOYLE (1627-1691)

Brother of the Earl of Orrery. Born at Lismore ; educated at Eton ; travelled on the Continent, and studied several years at Geneva. One of the first members of the association which was incorporated as the Royal Society. By his will he founded the endowment for the "Boyle" Lectures.

FRANCIS HERBERT BRADLEY (b 1846)

Son of Rev. Charles Bradley, Vicar of Glasbury, and half-brother of the late Dean of Westminster ; educated at Cheltenham and Marlborough ; Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Publications : *Pre-suppositions of Critical History* ; *Ethical Studies* ; *Principles of Logic* ; *Appearance and Reality* ; *Essays on Truth and Reality*. He differs from Berkeley. By him, the ultimate Reality or Absolute is defined to be experience.

HENRY PETER BROUGHAM (1778-1868)

Educated at Edinburgh ; advocate ; in 1802 joined the founders of *Edinburgh Review* ; in 1810 became M.P. for Camelford ; advocated retrenchment and a sound commercial policy ; drew attention to importance of popular education ; instituted enquiry into charity abuses ; in 1828 brought forward scheme for law reform, which was the occasion of vast improvement in the system of common law procedure ; in 1830 was made Lord Chancellor and a peer, under the title of Baron Brougham and Vaux. His critical, historical, and miscellaneous writings were published under his own direction in a collected form. He wrote *Historical Sketches of Statesmen in the Time of George III* ; *Translation of Demosthenes "On the Crown"* ; *Life and Times of Lord Brougham*.

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GIORDANO BRUNO (1550-1600)

Born at Nola ; became a Dominican monk ; embraced the doctrines of Calvin at Geneva ; went to Paris, where he gave offence by his opposition to the Scholastic system ; spent two years in England ; in 1585 renewed lectures in Paris ; travelled widely ; was arrested in Venice by order of the Inquisition ; removed to Rome, where he was ultimately burnt as a heretic. He was a man of powerful imagination. His theory of the world was pantheistic. He was well versed in astronomy, and believed in astrology. His works in Latin and Italian are numerous, and abound in noble thought and rich eloquence. Spinoza was indebted to him for some of his theories.

JOHN BURIDAN (*d* 1338).

Expelled from Paris ; instrumental in founding the University of Vienna ; wrote commentaries on logic, and on the ethics and metaphysics of Aristotle.

EDMUND BURKE (1729-1797)

Educated at Trinity College, Dublin ; entered the Middle Temple, London ; in 1765 elected M.P. for Wendover ; led a varied political life. Distinguished as an orator and a writer. His works include *Vindication of Natural Society*, *On the Sublime and Beautiful*. He contributed to *The Annual Register*, and wrote *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*, *Letters on a Regicide Peace*, etc.

BISHOP BUTLER (1692-1752)

Born at Wantage. His father was a presbyterian, and sent him to a dissenting Academy at Gloucester ; he soon conformed to the Church of England ;

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studied at Oxford, and in 1718 became preacher at the Rolls; Rector of Stanhope; Bishop of Bristol; Dean of St. Paul's; Bishop of Durham. His great work, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, published in 1736, had been foreshadowed in his volume of *Sermons*.

WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER (1814-1848)

Brought up a Romanist; conformed in early life; educated at Clonmel School and Trinity College, Dublin; appointed first professor of Moral Philosophy at Trinity; Rector of Raymoghly. Wrote: *Letters on Romanism*, in reply to Newman's *Essay on Development*; *Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy*.

EDWARD CAIRD (1835-1908)

Born at Greenock; educated at Greenock Academy, Glasgow, and St. Andrew's University. Entered at Balliol College; had amongst his friends Nichol, Luke, D. B. Monro, James Bryce, A. V. Dicey, T. H. Green, and Swinburne. He was a Radical in politics, religion, and philosophy. In 1866 professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow; amongst the candidates were Nichol, H. Calderwood, J. Cunningham, R. Flint, S. S. Lawrie, J. C. Shairp, and J. H. Sterling. In 1893 Master of Balliol. With him the philosophic controversy was not as to the existence but as to the nature of that all-embracing Unity on which every philosophic experience must rest; and, on the other hand, as to the character of the differences which it equally involves. He wrote: *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant, Hegel and*

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Comte ; The Evolution of Religion ; The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophy ; Lay Sermons ; Idealism, and the Theory of Knowledge.

HENRY CALDERWOOD (1830-1897)

Educated at Edinburgh University ; Minister of Grey Friars Church, Glasgow ; Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh ; published *Philosophy of the Infinite, Criticism of the Agnostic Tendencies of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, Evolution, and Man's Place in Nature.*

JEAN CALVIN (1509-1564)

Born at Noyon ; studied at Paris, Orleans, and Bourges ; in 1534 went to Basle, where he published his great work, the *Institutes of the Christian Religion* ; in 1536 went to Geneva ; he and Farel being afterwards expelled ; he was recalled three years later, and proved a stern tutor there until his death. He was the friend of Beza and Knox. After the Conference at Poissy, differences between Lutherans and Calvinists increased. He published commentaries, sermons, tractates and letters.

TOMMASO CAMPANELLA (1568-1639)

Born in Calabria ; entered the Dominican Order ; became an opponent of the Scholastic System ; attracted by writings of Telesio ; was persecuted and imprisoned from 1599 to 1626. Afterwards, visited Rome and Paris, where he died. Like Bacon, he aimed at such a reform of philosophy as should embrace the necessity of a fresh study of Nature. He wrote various works, the revised edition of which appeared in 1637, at about the same time as Descartes' *Discours de la Méthode*, which practically rendered Campanella's work obsolete.

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JEROME CARDANUS (1501-1576)

Born and educated at Paris ; held chairs of mathematics and medicine at Pavia, Milan and Bologna ; in 1571 settled at Rome. He wrote an immense number of books ; and accepted an un-Aristotelian theory of the Universe.

ANDREAS BODENSTEIN, called CARLSTADT, from the place of his birth (1483-1541)

Settled at Wittenberg in 1504, with Luth̄r, Reuchlin, and Huttōn ; held office of Rector of the University five times. From his hands Luther received the degree of doctor. In 1517 became Luther's supporter ; in 1519 held disputations with Eck at Leipsic. Began to entertain violent views. Disputed with Luther as to the Lord's Supper. Pastor at Alstellen by Zwingli's influence. Professor of Theology at Basle, where he died, leaving numerous theological writings.

THOMAS CARLYLE (1795-1881)

Son of a mason at Ecclefechan, Dumfries ; educated at the parish school at Annan and Edinburgh University ; visited various places and tried several spheres of work ; in 1826 married and settled in Edinburgh ; in 1834 removed to Cheyne Row, Chelsea ; in 1866 his wife died ; his remains were interred at Ecclefechan. He belonged to a new school of thought. His numerous and important works include *Life of Schiller*, *Geometry* (translation) *Sartor Resartus*, *French Revolution* (the MS. of the first volume of which was accidentally burnt by J. S. Mill), *Hero Worship*, *Past and Present*, *Oliver Cromwell*, *Life of Sterling*, *Frederick the Great*, *Reminiscences*.

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CARNEADES, of CYRENE (B.C. 213-129)

The Founder of the Third, or New, Academy, at Athens. He was a strenuous opponent of the Stoics, and maintained that neither our senses nor our understanding supply us with a sure criterion of truth.

CATO UTICENSIS (B.C. 95-46)

Great-grandson of Cato the Censor. In early years he discovered a stern and unbending character. He applied himself with great zeal to the study of oratory and philosophy, becoming a devoted adherent of the Stoic School. He committed suicide at Utica, in Africa, rather than fall into the hands of Julius Cæsar.

WILLIAM CHILLINGWORTH (1602-1644)

Born at Oxford; godson of Laud; fellow of Trinity College; Fisher converted him to Romanism; entered College at Douai; became a Protestant again; replied to the Jesuit Knott in controversy with Dr. Potter in the work entitled *The Religion of Protestants, a Safe Way to Salvation*; scrupled at signing the Thirty-Nine Articles, but did so, and became Chancellor of Salisbury; warmly espoused the Royal cause; captured at Arundel: died at the episcopal palace at Chichester.

CHILO OF SPARTA (fl B.C. 590)

One of the Seven Sages. His motto was "Consider the end."

CICERO (B.C. 106-43)

An Eclectic; a celebrated lawyer, statesman, philosopher and rhetorician; author of numerous works on Theology, Rhetoric, and Philosophy; left also Orations and Epistles.

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SAMUEL CLARKE (1675-1729)

Educated at Christ's College, Cambridge; a disciple of Isaac Newton; wrote against Henry Dodwell (theologian and non-juror); held a philosophical correspondence with Leibnitz; founder of the "Intellectual" School, which deduced the moral law from a logical necessity. Wrote *The Being and Attributes of God*; *Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*.

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS (150-220)

Embraced Christianity through the teaching of Pantænus, at Alexandria; was ordained presbyter about 190; his three principal works form parts of a whole, his object being to delineate the perfect *Christian*, after he had been instructed by the *Teacher*, and thus prepared by sublime speculations in philosophy and theology.

CLEOBULUS OF LINDOS (fl B.C. 580)

One of the Seven Sages.

"The Golden Mean," or "Avoid extremes."

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE (1772-1834)

Educated at Christ's Hospital and Jesus College, Cambridge; read desultorily; spent much time in conversation; adopted extreme views in politics and religion; in 1793 went back to London; enlisted in the 15th Dragoons as Silas Tomkyn Cumberbatch; joined Southey, Lovell, and other "pantisocrats" in their scheme to found a communistic colony on the Susquehanna, Pennsylvania; in 1796 contracted the laudanum habit; in 1798 went to Shrewsbury as Unitarian minister, and there met William

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Hazlitt ; in 1800 settled at Keswick ; in 1807 met Thomas de Quincey at Bridgwater ; in 1828, after many wanderings, went to Germany ; afterwards took a leading part in the introduction of English thinkers to the results of German rationalistic thought. Wrote *Fall of Robespierre* ; *Poems* ; *Lyrical Ballads* ; *Christabel* ; *Kubla Khan* ; " *Remorse* " ; *Biographia Literaria* ; *Aids to Reflection*, etc., etc. He may be considered to be an Eclectic. He regarded the Christian faith as true, because the human spirit bears witness to it.

ANTHONY COLLINS (1676-1729)

Born at Histon ; studied at Cambridge and the Temple ; formed friendship with Locke ; had a controversy with Dr. Samuel Clarke ; wrote *Priestcraft in Perfection* ; *Essay on the Thirty-nine Articles* ; *Discourse on Free-Thinking* (which was savagely attacked by Bentley).

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857)

Born at Montpellier ; educated at Paris ; joined the band of followers of Saint Simon ; professor of mathematics in the Ecole Polytechnique ; elaborated an original system of scientific thought, the *Positive Philosophy*. Wrote *Cours de Philosophie Positive* ; *Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme* ; *Culte Systématique de l'Humanité*. He was amongst the first to grasp the true principle of the co-ordination of the sciences ; but his system had no true spiritual basis. His theories affected J. S. Mill.

CONDILLAC (1715-1780)

Born at Grenoble ; adopted the system of Locke.

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He wrote : *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines ; Traité des Sensations ; Cours d'Etude du Prince de Parme.*

ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER. See Shaftesbury, Earl of.

VICTOR COUSIN (1792-1867)

Born at Paris ; educated at l'Ecole Normale ; appointed Maître de Conférences de Philosophie at that school ; professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne ; admitted to the Academy of Sciences, and made a peer of France ; Minister of Public Instruction ; after 1848 he retired into private life. His works are : "*Proclus*" ; "*Plato*" ; *Works of Descartes ; Fragments Philosophiques ; Petri Abaelardi Opera, Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, Cours de la Philosophie, Philosophie Scholastique.* In philosophy he was an Eclectic.

CRATES (*fl* B.C. 320)

Of Thebes, a pupil of Diogenes, and one of the most distinguished of the Cynic philosophers. He received the name of the "Door-opener" because it was his practice to visit every house at Athens and rebuke its inmates. He himself disregarded all rational pleasures and restricted himself to the barest necessities.

CRITOLAUS (*fl* B.C. 155)

Of Phaselis, in Lydia ; studied philosophy at Athens, under Ariston of Ceos, whom he succeeded as head of the Peripatetic School.

CUDWORTH (1617-1688)

Born in Somersetshire. A Platonist and one of

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the most eminent of the latitudinarian divines, Fellow of Emmanuel, Cambridge; Regius Professor of Hebrew; Master of Christ's College; Prebendary of Gloucester. His works are *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, *Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality*, etc. Ralph Cudworth was the most distinguished of the little group of thinkers at Cambridge in the seventeenth century, commonly known as the "Cambridge Platonists," who, embracing what they conceived to be Platonic principles, but also strongly influenced by the new thought of Descartes, endeavoured to blend natural theology with religious philosophy.

RICHARD CUMBERLAND (1632-1718)

Born in London; educated at Cambridge; in 1689 made Bishop of Peterborough; author (amongst other works) of a treatise called *De Legibus Naturae*, written in opposition to the philosophy of Hobbes.

CYRILLUS

Bishop of Alexandria (412-444), of which city he was a native. He was the author of a large number of works, many of which are extant. From a literary point of view, however, they are valueless.

CHARLES DARWIN (1809-1882)

Born at Shrewsbury; educated at the Grammar School there; also at Edinburgh and Cambridge Universities; in 1831 sailed in the "Beagle" for the survey of South America and the circumnavigation of the globe; returned to England in

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1836. His *Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection* was published in 1859 ; and *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* in 1874. Amongst other works may be mentioned *Journal of the "Beagle"* ; *Zoology of the Voyage of the "Beagle"* & *The Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs* ; *Fertilization of Orchids* ; *Domesticated Animals and Cultivated Plants* ; *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. His researches and theories have profoundly affected every physical science, as well as philosophy and theology.

DEMOCRITUS, the Laughing Philosopher (B.C. 460-361)

His diligence was incredible ; he lived exclusively for his studies, and his disinterestedness, modesty, and simplicity are attested by many stories related of him. The disposition of his mind (which prompted him to look, in all circumstances, at the cheerful side of things) caused later writers to take it to mean that he always laughed at the follies of men.

RENE DESCARTES (1596-1650)

Born in Touraine ; educated at the Jesuits' College of La Flèche ; removed to Paris ; served in the Dutch and Bavarian armies ; settled in Holland and brought out several voluminous treatises, the *Principia Philosophiæ*, *Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire la Raison et chercher la Vérité dans les Sciences*. His philosophy forms one of the great landmarks in the history of free-thought ; it gave the death-blow to scholasticism, raised a stout opposition to the merely experimental method,

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and introduced new life and vigour into the sphere of thought and speculative research. Starting from doubt, he finds the first certainty in self-consciousness ; *cogito, ergo sum*. On this statement he attempts to found and build up a system capable of demonstration. It forms the starting point for most of the systems that have subsequently appeared. He is the greatest representative of Parallelism, or Dualism. In his system of Ontology he regarded the lower animals as automata. His system was opposed by Hume and Kant.

DIDEROT (1713-1784)

Born at Langres ; devoted himself to literature ; projected the famous *Encyclopædia*, and carried it on for 14 years ; was a friend of d'Alembert and Rousseau, and one of the band of daring doubters who met at the suppers of Baron d'Holbach.

DIONYSIUS (d B.C. 7)

Of Halicarnassus, a celebrated rhetorician, who came to Rome about B.C. 29, for the purpose of making himself acquainted with the Latin language and literature. He remained in the city until his death.

DIONYSIUS

Surnamed Areopagitica, because he was one of the Council of the Areopagus ; converted by S. Paul's preaching at Athens. Under his name are extant several works, which, however, from internal evidence, could scarcely have been written before the fifth century of our era.

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DUMONT (1759-1829)

A native of Geneva, where he became pastor ; visited Paris and gained the friendship of Mirabeau ; on his return he became the friend and assistant of Bentham in the preparation for the press of his works on Legislation. Returned to Geneva in 1814 and became a senator.

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, DOCTOR SUBTILIS (1266-1308)

A native of the British Isles. Appears to have studied at Oxford ; became fellow of Merton College ; professor of theology ; entered the Franciscan Order ; taught at Paris ; defended doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin ; opposed Thomas Aquinas. His works form 12 volumes, folio. The Scotists were Realists.

JOHANN ECK, or ECKIUS, or MAYER (1486-1543)

Born at Eck, in Swabia ; Professor at University of Ingoldstadt ; at first friendly to Luther ; afterwards attacked him in his *Obelisci*. Hence, the famous disputations at Leipsig, Carlstadt having been drawn into the controversy. Appointed papal nuncio to execute a Bull promulgated against Luther. Among his numerous writings the most celebrated is his *Manual of Controversies*.

JOHANNES ECKHART (1250-1327)

Born in Germany, probably at Strasburg ; became a Dominican monk ; taught at Paris ; was at once a learned schoolman and a popular preacher : his aim was to find a speculative basis for his doctrines of the Church, and to make them intelligible to the many. Not long before his death

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he was cited before the Inquisition, but the particulars of the trial are obscure.

JOHANN GOTTFRIED EICHHORN (1752-1827)

German Orientalist and biblical critic of the Rationalist School ; Professor at Jena and Göttingen ; published numerous works on Oriental literature, biblical history, archæology, and general history.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON (1803-1882)

Born at Boston ; graduated at Harvard ; having turned his attention to theology, he was appointed minister of the Second Unitarian Church of Boston ; soon after abandoned his profession and retired to Concord, where he devoted himself to the study of man and his relation to the universe. He did not pretend to reason, but to discover ; he announced, but did not argue. In 1848 travelled to England and delivered lectures on *The Mind and Manners of the Nineteenth Century* ; in 1850 published *Representative Men, i.e.,* Plato, Swedenborg, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Napoleon, and Goethe, each of whom he regarded as the type of a class. Other works of his are : *Man thinking ; Literary Ethics ; Nature ; The Method of Nature ; Man the Reformer ; Essays ; Poems ; Memoirs of Margaret Fuller ; English Traits ; The Conduct of Life ; Society and Solitude ; Parnassus*. He belongs to the new school, and represents interesting vistas of thought.

EMPEDOCLES (fl B.C. 444).

Of Agrigentum in Sicily ; he was a brilliant orator and a busy man of affairs. He was styled a

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magician by reason of his wonderful deeds. It is said that he threw himself into the flames of Mt. Aetna, that, by his sudden disappearance, he might be believed to be a god, but that the volcano threw up one of his sandals. Gorgias was his pupil. His works are in verse. Aristotle mentions him among the Ionic physiologists and places him in very close relation to the atomistic philosophers and to Anaxagoras. He first propounded the number of four elements. .

EPICTETUS OF HIERAPOLIS (fl 1st cent. A.D.)

A celebrated stoic philosopher, a freedman of Epaphroditus, who was himself a freedman of Nero.

EPICURUS (B.C. 342-270).

A materialist. In Ethics, an Egoistic Hedonist ; although it is but fair to say that pleasure, with him, was not a mere momentary and transitory sensation, but something lasting and imperishable, consisting in a true insight into life, in pure and noble mental enjoyments, in freedom from pain and all influences which disturb the peace of the mind, and thereby destroy happiness.

RUDOLF CHRISTOPHER EUCKEN (b 1846)

Professor at Jena. Works partly historical, showing the necessary connection between philosophical concepts and the period to which they belong ; partly constructive, applying a vital religious inspiration to the practical problems of society. (Activism). Wrote *The Problem of Human Life*. *The Life of the Spirit*.

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EUCLIDES, OF MEGARA (*fl.* B.C. 400)

One of the chief of the disciples of Socrates ; before becoming such he had studied the doctrines, and especially the dialectics, of the Eleatics ; on the death of Socrates, he took refuge in Megara, and there established a school which distinguished itself chiefly by the cultivation of dialectics. This school was sometimes called the Megaric, sometimes the Dialectic or Eristic.

EUCLID (*fl.* 323-283 B.C.)

Best beloved of schoolboys ! The place of his birth is uncertain, and next to nothing is known of his personal history. He lived in Alexandria at the time of the first Ptolemy, and became the founder of the mathematical school there. In philosophy he belonged to the Platonic sect, being well-read in its doctrines. Besides his Geometry, he wrote on Music, Astronomy, Optics and Catoptrics.

EUSEBIUS (264-349)

Surnamed Pamphili to commemorate his devoted friendship for Pamphilus, bishop of Cæsarea. He was born in Palestine, and became Bishop of Cæsarea. He had a strong leaning towards the Arians, though he signed the Creed of the Council of Nicaea. He was a man of great learning, and his doctrinal and spiritual works are of the greatest value to the ecclesiastical historian.

ADAM FERGUSON (1723-1816)

Educated at St. Andrew's and Edinburgh ; in 1754 abandoned the clerical profession ; at various times held professorship of Natural Philosophy,

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Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy and Mathematics ; published *Essay on Civil Society* (which was unfavourably regarded by Hume) ; also *Institutes of Moral Philosophy* ; *History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* ; *Principles of Moral and Political Science*.

FICHTE (1762-1814)

Born at Rammenau, in Upper Lusatia ; educated at Pforta and the University of Jena ; in 1788 went to Zurich ; in 1793 married Johanna, the daughter of Hartmann Rahn ; studied the philosophy of Kant, which took him "into a new world" ; professor of philosophy at Jena. Among his friends were Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, and Schlegel ; being charged with atheism he left Jena and settled in Prussia ; professor at Erlangen ; in 1807 entrusted with the task of organizing the new University at Berlin ; among his fellow-teachers were Humboldt, De Wette, Schleiermacher, and Neander ; in his *Wissenschaftslehre* he expounded his system of Transcendental Idealism ; he is accounted as one of the greatest philosophers of modern times.

GALILEO GALILEI (1564-1642)

Born at Pisa ; appointed Mathematical Professor in his native town ; went to Padua ; returned to Pisa ; then taught at Florence. The result of his astronomical discoveries was a conviction of the truth of the Copernican system ; in 1616 visited Rome ; at first well received, but afterwards silenced, and finally brought to trial, when he abjured his "heresies." The latter years of his life were spent at his country house at Arcetri,

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near Florence, where, in 1639, Milton visited him. His greatest work is the *Dialogue on the Copernican and Ptolemaic Systems*.

PIERRE GASSENDI (1592-1655)

Born in Provence ; in 1645 appointed Professor of Philosophy at Aix ; afterwards Professor of Mathematics at the Collège Royal, Paris. He combated the metaphysics of Descartes. In his *De Vita et Moribus Epicuri* and *Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri* he vindicates the moral teaching of that philosopher ; and in *Syntagma Philosophicum* he expounds his own system.

JOHANN GERHARD (1582-1637)

A German Protestant divine, who was a mystic, and the author of *Aphorisma*.

EPHRAIM GERHARD (1682-1718)

A native of Altdorf. Author of *Delineatio Philosophiæ*.

JEAN CHARLIER OF GERSON (1363-1429)

Educated at Paris ; Chancellor of the University and Canon of Nôtre Dame. His writings are numerous and have frequently been reprinted. He was a mystic. *The Imitation of Jesus Christ* was long attributed to him, but the real author is still unknown.

GODWIN (1756-1836)

Born at Wisbeach ; son of a dissenting minister ; commenced as a preacher, but abandoned the pulpit in 1783 and went to London as a literary adventurer. After the trial of his friends Hardy,

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Thelwall, and Horne Tooke, he published a pamphlet containing strictures on Judge Eyre's charge to the jury. In 1797 married Mary Woolstonecraft, who died a few months after, leaving a daughter, who became the wife of the poet Shelley. As a novelist and political writer he combines depth of thought, independence, and energy. His writings are numerous, including: *Sketches of History*; *Caleb Williams*; *the Enquirer*; *St. Leon*; *Fleetwood*; *Mandeville*; *Life of Geoffrey Chaucer*; *A History of the Commonwealth of England*; *Thoughts of Man*.

GOETHE (1749-1832)

Born at Frankfort-on-the-Main; attended the University of Leipsig, and that of Strasburg; in 1771 took the degree of doctor and went to Wetzlar; president of the Council of Saxe-Weimar; in 1786 commenced to travel widely. His keen and profound insight into human life and character, his encyclopædic knowledge, his sublime imagination, his exquisite sensibility and play of thought, and his consummate style place him in the highest circle of intellectual and literary glory. His compositions are mainly imaginative, but Goethe deserves a place in the ranks of those who direct philosophic thought. He advanced the idea of the *Übermensch*, afterwards elaborated by Nietzsche.

GORGAS (B.C. 485-380)

A sophist.

THOMAS HILL GREEN (1836-1882)

Educated at Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford; in 1878 elected Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy; an "ethical-idealist" philosopher; his works were

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edited by R. L. Nettleship, an important element among them being his *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN (329-390)

A native of Cappadocia ; studied at Athens, performed the duties of Presbyter and Assistant-bishop at Nazianzen ; in 380 was appointed Bishop of Constantinople by Theodosius, but resigned in 381 and retired into private life. His extant works are Oration, Letters, and Poems. He is more earnest than Chrysostom, but not so rhetorical.

GREGORY I, THE GREAT (544-604)

Born of a noble family of Rome. Prefect of Rome ; embraced a monastic life ; enthroned as Pope in 590 ; despatched St. Augustine to England. His works are now comprized in four volumes.

JOHN GROTE (1813-1866)

Brother of George and Arthur Grote ; Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and incumbent of Trumpington ; Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy ; preceded in the chair by Whewell, and succeeded by F. D. Maurice. Published *Exploratio Philosophica ; Examination of Utilitarian Philosophy ; Treatise on Moral Ideals*.

HUGO GROTIUS, or DE GROOT (1583-1645)

Born at Delft ; became an Advocate ; in 1613 was appointed Syndic of Rotterdam, declared himself on the side of Barneveldt ; by his pen and influence supported him and the cause of the Arminians ; imprisoned, but escaped in a box ; went to France ; returned to Holland ; was again banished ; passed the remnant of his life in the

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diplomatic service of Sweden and died at Rostock. He was a profound theologian, a distinguished scholar, an acute philosopher, a keen jurist, and an erudite historian. His chief works are *Treatise on the Truth of the Christian Religion* ; *De Jure Belli et Pacis* ; *De Antiquitate Reipublicæ Bataviæ* ; *History of the Goths*.

JEANNE MARIE BOUVIER DE LA MOTHE (MADAME GUYON) (1648-1717)

Born at Montargis ; in 1664 married M. Guyon, but three years after was left a widow with three children. She provided for their maintenance, but (being moved by "divine impulse") she wandered from place to place, preaching, teaching, and writing. She excited opposition on the part of Bossuet and others, and was confined to a convent, and afterwards in the Bastille. She was a Quietist, advocating complete renunciation of self, silence of the soul, and annihilation of all earthly cares and emotions. Being liberated from the Bastille in 1702, she retired to Blois and there passed the remainder of her life in seclusion.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON (1788-1856)

Born at Glasgow ; educated at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Balliol College ; called to the Scotch Bar ; Professor of Civil History at Edinburgh ; in 1836 elected to Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the same University. His doctrine of *the quantification of the predicate* was attacked by De Morgan, and that of *the unknowability of the Infinite* by Calderwood. He contributed to psychology and logic the doctrine of Common Sense, the Theory of the Conditioned, the theories of *the association of ideas*, of *the possible contrast*

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between the right and the good, of unconscious mental modifications, and the inverse relation of perception and sensation. Edited Reid's works, and contributed largely to magazines.

DAVID HARTLEY (1705-1757)

Born at Illingworth; Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge; practised as a physician at Newark, Bury St. Edmunds, London, and Bath; in 1748 published the work on which his reputation is chiefly founded, *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations*. In it he developed the hints and enquiries of Locke, but on materialistic principles. The association of ideas he made the foundation of all intellectual energy, and derived it from certain vibrations of the nerves. Coleridge was an admirer of his and named his son after him.

KARL ROBERT EDUARD VON HARTMANN.

(b 1842.)

Left army through accident; lived at Berlin, elaborating his system of philosophy, which is a synthesis of Hegel's and Schopenhauer's. Useful helps to the study of his system are furnished by Kœber's condensation.

HEGEL (1770-1831)

Born at Stuttgart; Professor at Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin; at first the disciple of Schelling, but afterwards rejected his intellectual intuition, though he continued to maintain the unity of the subjective or ideal, and the objective or real, and in this idea endeavoured to establish that absolute cognition and absolute truth which, according to

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this school, can satisfy the demands of the philosophical spirit, although difficult to be understood. He maintained the theory of Absolute Idealism. His system has for long been the centre of nearly all philosophical interest in Germany. He published : *Phenomenology of the Mind* ; *Logic* ; *Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences* ; *Outlines of the Philosophy of Law*.

HELVÉTIUS (1715-1771)

Born at Paris ; became Farmer-General ; Maître d'hôtel to the Queen ; in 1758 published *De l'Esprit*, the materialistic doctrine of which drew upon him many attacks, it being condemned by the Parliament of Paris. A posthumous work, *De l'Homme* is a continuation of the former treatise, at the same time unfolding many new ideas relating to education.

HERACLITUS, OF EPHEBUS, The Obscure (B.C. 530-470)

He considered *fire* to be the primary form of all matter ; but by *fire* he meant only to describe a clear, light fluid, self-kindled, and self-extinguished, not differing, therefore, materially from the " air " of Anaximenes. He regarded *movement* as the sign of reality.

HERBART (1776-1841)

Born at Oldenburg in 1776 ; studied at Jena under Fichte ; introduced to Pestalozzi ; taught at Göttingen and Königsberg. He rejected the method of psychology, and aimed at a science of mind based on Mathematics, maintaining that philosophy is not a science or explanation of any

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one subject, but a certain method of treating any subject, a development and elaboration of notions and conceptions. He wrote several works on education and philosophy.

MODESTINUS HERENNIUS (fl 222-244)

The latest of the great Roman jurists and the most distinguished. He was a pupil of Ulpian, and flourished in the reign of Alexander Severus, Maximinus, and the Gordians.

THOMAS HOBBS (1588-1679)

Born at Malmesbury ; educated at Oxford ; was appointed tutor to the son of the Earl of Devonshire ; became acquainted with Galileo, Bacon, Ben Jonson, and Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who took the exactly opposite course in philosophy to Hobbes, Gassendi, Father Mersenne, and Descartes ; in 1647 Hobbes was appointed tutor to the Prince of Wales ; spent the later years of his life at Chatsworth. He holds an important place in the development of free-thought ; being one of the first of the great English writers on government. He conceived of the state of nature as a state of war ; advocated absolute monarchy ; wrote *De Cive* ; *Leviathan, or the Matter and Form of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastic and Civil* ; *Human Nature*, etc., etc. The *Leviathan* is the complete exposition of his system, and is one of the most thoroughly thought-out works of the speculative kind in all literature. In philosophy Hobbes was a follower of Bacon, and the father of the school of thought traceable through Locke to Bolingbroke and Voltaire, and through Berkeley to Hume and J. S. Mill. In metaphysics, he was a

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thorough-going Nominalist : his political philosophy (chiefly in his *Leviathan*) arguing that the body politic has been formed as the only alternative to a natural state of war. It was attacked by Sir Robert Filmer (*d.* 1653), but mentioned with respect in Harrington's (1611-1677) *Oceana*. His views influenced Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Rousseau, and were revived in England by the Utilitarians. The chief critics of his metaphysical views were Clarendon, Archbishop Tenison, the Cambridge Platonists, and Samuel Clarke.

BARON VON HOLBACH (1723-1789)

Born in the Palatinate ; educated at Paris, where he spent the greater part of his life ; allied himself with the leaders of French free-thought ; in philosophy he was a pure materialist, and wrote numerous works, the chief of which is the *Système de la Nature*.

HOOKE (1553-1600) -

Born in Devonshire. Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford ; in 1585 Master of the Temple, where he became involved in controversy with Walter Travers, which duel led him to conceive the plan of his great work, *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. This composition is at once theological, philosophical, and political. Its aim is to give the full theory of the Church of England, to show the ideal principles on which it is founded, and to vindicate its substantial agreement therewith. It is the first great work in English ecclesiastical literature, and still remains the greatest of its kind.

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HUGO or HUGH DE S. VICTOR (1097-1141).

Probably a native of Flanders. One of the great mystics of the twelfth century ; in 1118 went to the Abbey of St. Victor, at Marseilles ; afterwards to the Abbey of the same name at Paris ; by his writings attained the highest celebrity. He adhered fully to the system of St. Augustine and acquired the title of the Second Augustine.

DAVID HUME (1711-1776)

Studied law ; lived in France for three years ; keeper of Advocates' Library, Edinburgh ; attacked for sceptical views ; accompanied Lord Hertford to Paris ; became Secretary to the Embassy there ; well received at French Court ; brought home Rousseau, and procured for him a pension, but afterwards quarrelled with him in consequence of the Frenchman's jealous nature ; himself received a pension and invitation from the King to continue his *History of England*. His thorough-going empiricism formed a landmark in the history of metaphysics. There may be noted amongst his numerous works : *Treatise of Human Nature* ; *Essays, Moral and Political* ; *Philosophical Essays* (including that on *Miracles* touched on by Paley) ; *Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals* ; *Political Discourses* ; *Four Dissertations* ; *Science and Immortality* ; *Dialogues on Natural Religion* ; *Autobiography*. He opposed the system of Berkeley.

JOSEPH HUME (1777-1855)

Born at Montrose ; educated at Edinburgh, where he was admitted a Member of the College of Surgeons in 1796 ; entered service of East India

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Company ; returned to England in 1811 ; travelled widely ; sat in Parliament, successively for Weymouth, Aberdeen, Middlesex, and Kilkenny. Religious Toleration, Parliamentary Reform, University Education, Free Trade, Finance, and every scheme of popular improvement found in him a strong advocate. He devoted himself particularly to questions of public expenditure, and added "retrenchment" to the watchwords of the Radical Party.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON (1694-1747)

Sometimes considered as the founder of the Scottish School ; son of a dissenting minister in Ireland ; studied at Glasgow ; officiated for some time in North Ireland ; in 1729 elected Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow. He published an *Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, and *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*. He greatly influenced the "common-sense" school of philosophy, and upheld the ethical principles of Shaftesbury against those of Hobbes and Mandeville. His son, Dr. Francis Hutcheson, printed from his papers "A System of Moral Philosophy."

JOHN HUTCHINSON (1674-1737)

Born in Yorkshire ; opponent on Scriptural grounds of the Newtonian system ; held that the Old Testament contained not only the revelation of religious truth, but a complete system of natural philosophy, and that interpretation of it must be not literal but allegorical. Author of *Hutchinsonianism*.

RICHARD HOLT HUTTON (1826-1897)

Educated at University College, London ; studied

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at Heidelberg and Berlin ; Principal of University Hall, London ; contributed to various magazines ; abandoned Unitarianism and accepted the principles of the Church of England. His publications include *Essays on some Modern Guides of English Thought ; Criticisms on Contemporary Thoughts and Thinkers.*

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY (1825-1895)

Born at Ealing ; studied medicine at Charing Cross Hospital ; in 1846 appointed Assistant Surgeon to the " Rattlesnake " ; in 1854 Professor of Natural History at the Royal School of Mines ; in 1870 elected Member of London School Board ; he has written *Oceanic Hydrozoa ; Man's Place in Nature ; Comparative Anatomy ; Introduction to the Classification of Animals ; Lay Sermons ; The Anatomy of Vertebrated Animals ; Critiques and Addresses.* His polemics touched on Philosophy and Theology.

ISIDORE (570-636)

Bishop of Seville, 600-636. One of the most learned men of his age ; an ardent cultivator of ancient literature. His *Encyclopædia of Arts and Sciences* treats of all subjects in literature, science, and religion, which were studied at the time.

- JAMBLICHUS (fl A.D. 330)

A Neo-Platonic philosopher, who was a native of Chalcis in Coele-Syria. He was of the school of Anatolius and Porphyry, from whom he learnt the Plotinian system of Philosophy.

CORNELIUS JANSEN (1585-1638)

Born in Holland ; studied at Louvain ; the

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Spanish King made him Bishop of Ypres ; he devoted his last years to the composition of a treatise entitled *Augustinus*, a kind of epitome of the views of the celebrated Bishop of Hippo. This book appeared after his death, and was the occasion of the acute controversy between the Jansenists and the Jesuits as to subjects relating to grace and predestination. He is sometimes called an early Methodist.

JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA (Æ 875)

Born in Ireland ; resided many years at the Court of Charles the Bald of France ; translated the pretended works of Dionysius the Areopagite into Latin ; displeased the authorities of the Church ; went to England and, according to tradition, was placed by Alfred at the head of his newly-founded school at Oxford. Retired to the Abbey of Malmesbury. His chief philosophical work is the *De Divisione Naturæ*. By his deliverances on theology he acquired the reputation of a heretic.

JULIAN THE APOSTATE (331-363)

Born at Constantinople, nephew of Constantine the Great ; brought up in the Christian religion ; studied Greek literature and philosophy at Athens, among his fellow students being Gregory Nazianzen and Basil. On the death of Constantine he became sole Emperor, and then avowed himself a pagan. In the course of a campaign against the Persians, he was mortally wounded by an arrow. He wrote a large number of works, many of which are extant. The treatise *Against the Christians*, is lost, but some extracts are preserved in a reply by Cyril.

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JUSTIN MARTYR (103-167)

Born at Flavia Neapolis, the Shechem of the Old Testament. One of the earliest of Christian writers and apologists. He was brought up a heathen ; in his youth studied Greek philosophy with ardour ; being converted to Christianity, he still retained the garb of a philosopher, whilst preaching the faith he had embraced. He was put to death at Rome in the persecution under M. Antoninus.

EMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

Born at Königsberg ; educated at the Franciscan College ; Professor and Rector of Königsberg University. For a long time his studies were chiefly of physical science, astronomy, mechanics, etc., but in 1781 he published his *Critical Enquiry into the Nature of Pure Reason*. He continues, develops, and improves Locke's records. His method was fundamentally an investigation of the faculty of knowledge in man, and he carefully distinguished that part of knowledge which answers truly to objects from that which merely pertains to the thinking mind or subject. Kant is the great founder of the critical philosophy, and it is difficult to over-estimate the influence he has exercised on the development of philosophic speculation. He discussed the Categorical and Hypothetical Imperative, and published *Critique of the Practical Reason* ; *Critique of the Understanding* ; *Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason* ; *Metaphysics of Ethics*. He checked Materialism, overthrew the authority of the Rationalists, opposed Dogmatism and Scepticism, distinguished pure Reason from practical Reason, advocated the Autonomy of the Will or Voluntarism (the opposite to this being

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Heteronomy). The real spirit of the illumination remains in him. He considered the highest good—the transcendental—to be the union of virtue and happiness, and the truly good thing to be a good will.

JOHN NEVILLE KEYNES (b 1852)

Born at Salisbury; educated at Amersham Hall School, University College, London, and Pembroke College, Cambridge; Chairman of special Boards for Moral Science, Economics, and Politics; University Lecturer in Moral Science, 1884-1891. Publications: *Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic*; *Scope and Method of Political Economy*.

WILLIAM KING (1650-1729)

Born in Antrim; educated at Trinity College, Dublin; made Dean of St. Patrick's, and in 1702 Archbishop of Dublin. In his treatise *De Origine Mali*, he endeavoured to show how the several kinds of evil with which the world abounds are yet consistent with the goodness of God.

PETER KING (1669-1734)

Lord King; Lord Chancellor of England; nephew of John Locke. He was no less remarkable for his ecclesiastical than for his legal learning. He wrote *History of the Apostles' Creed* and *An Enquiry into the Constitution of the Primitive Church*.

LACTANTIUS (240-330)

Born probably in Italy; studied in Africa, at Sicca, under Arnobius; settled at Nicomedia and became a Christian. His style (formed upon

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the great Roman writer) gained for him the appellation of the *Christian Cicero*.

LANFRANC (1005-1089)

Born at Paris, of a noble family ; in 1046 became Prior of Bec ; in 1066 Abbot of Caen ; in 1070 Archbishop of Canterbury ; the author of a treatise *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini Nostri*.

FRIEDRICH ALBERT LANGE (1828-1875)

Born at Wald, near Solingen ; spent his early years at Duisburg, Zurich, Bonn and Cologne ; in 1870 called to the Chair of Philosophy at Zurich ; and not long after at Marburg. He was called by his fellow citizens " a light of science, a standard-bearer of freedom and progress, and a character of the most blameless purity." He published numerous philosophical works. He contended—as afterwards W. James—that bodily signs lead to emotional experiences and expressions.

PIERRE SIMON, Marquis de Laplace (1749-1827)

Born at Beaumont-en-Auge, where he became Professor of Mathematics at the military school ; removed to Paris ; Minister of the Interior ; President of the Senate ; he was a mathematician and astronomer. In 1796 appeared his famous work, *Exposition du Système du Monde*. He left numerous works, of which the most important is the *Traité de Mécanique Céleste*. His labours led up to the evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century.

WILLIAM LAW (1686-1761)

Born at King's Cliffe ; educated at Emmanuel College ; took Orders ; became tutor in the family

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of Gibbon's father at Putney; formed a community at King's Cliffe and there dwelt for the last 20 years of his life; took part in the Bangorian controversy; wrote against Mandeville and Tindal. His masterpiece is the *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*. It is unique amongst religious works for its combination of logical acuteness and force with intense moral earnestness. About 1733 he had begun to study the works of Jacob Boehmen, and his later writings are chiefly expository of Boehmen's thought.

EDMUND LAW (1703-1787)

Bishop of Carlisle. Born at Cartmel, in Lancashire; educated at Cambridge. Published *Considerations on the Theory of Religion; Reflections on the Life and Character of Christ; An Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, etc.* He also wrote a life of Locke and edited his works.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ (1646-1716)

Born at Leipsig; had a mind extraordinarily alert; resided at Altdorf, Nuremberg, and Frankfurt; in 1672 visited Paris and London, thus becoming acquainted with Newton, Boyle, Oldenburg, Huyghens, Malebranche, and Cassini. He passed the last years of his life at Hanover, where he died, being buried at Leipsig. His writings are voluminous. In the *Essai de Théodicée* he built up his system of Optimism, maintaining that the world, as it is constituted, is the best of all possible worlds; in *Monadologie* he demonstrated the theory of *Monads*, the central point of his system of philosophy; in *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain* he answered Locke's essay on the

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same subject. His aim was to apply to philosophy the method of demonstration, and to reconcile philosophy and theology; he maintained the doctrine of continuity and of pre-established harmony, the existence of innate ideas and necessary truths, and our capacity for discovering them; though he did not perfect his system as a whole, he became the founder of a new school, and gave an extraordinary stimulus to metaphysical studies. He took a middle position between Descartes and Locke.

LEUCIPPUS

The founder of the atomic theory of the ancient philosophy, which was more fully developed by Democritus. Exactly when and where he lived is uncertain. He is called the teacher of Democritus, the disciple of Parmenides, or, according to other accounts, of Zeno, of Melissus, nay, even, of Pythagoras himself.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES (1817-1878)

Tried various employments, amongst them that of actor; co-operated with Thornton Leigh Hunt in the "Leader"; took Miss Evans (George Eliot) into his household. He was a miscellaneous writer; produced a play, two novels, some serious works, as: *Biographical History of Philosophy*; *Life of Goethe*; *Seaside Studies*; *Physiology of Common Life*; *Studies in Animal Life*; *Aristotle and Problems of Life and Mind*.

JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704)

Born at Wrington; educated at Westminster School and Christ Church, Oxford; closely

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associated in England and during his banishment with Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury. After the Revolution returned to England ; held various public appointments ; resided the last few years of his life with the Mashams, at Oates, in Essex, where he died and was buried hard by in the church of High Laver. He opposed Descartes. As philosopher, he stands at the head of what is called the " Sensational " or Subjective Idealistic School in England, and opposed the Cartesian theory. His great work is the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, in which he endeavours to show that all our ideas are derived from experience (*i.e.*, through the senses) and reflection on what they reveal to us, so that the mind originally would be a *tabula rasa*. He also investigates the general character of ideas, the association of ideas, the reality, limits, and uses of knowledge, the influence of language, and the abuses to which it is liable. He declares that *substance* is unknowable. Other works of his are : *On Civil Government* ; *On Toleration* ; *Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity*. Since Descartes and Locke, the importance of a preliminary doctrine of *Ideas* has been constantly recognized. He opposed the idea of innate ideas and faculties, just as modern psychology insists on the unity of the mind as against the notion of separate faculties. He was followed by Hume.

JOHN LOUIS DE LOLME (1740-1807)

Born at Geneva ; in 1796 came to England ; subsequently elected member of the Geneva Council of Two Hundred ; became sous-préfet, under Napoleon. Wrote *The Constitution of England*

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(the theory of which led Disraeli to call its author the "English Montesquieu"); *The History of the Flagellants*; *The British Empire in Europe*.

PETER LOMBARD, MAGISTER SENTENT-IARUM (1100-1164)

Disciple of Abélard; studied at Bologna, Rheims, and Paris; in 1159 was consecrated Bishop of Paris; his principal work, *Libri Sententiarum*, is a compilation from the works of the Fathers.

LONGINUS (213-273)

He was brought up by his uncle, who taught Rhetoric at Athens. Visited many countries, and on his return to Athens opened a school for the teaching of the Platonic Philosophy. Finally he went to the East, and became the adviser of Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra. Acting under his advice, she threw off her allegiance to the Romans, and, on her capture by Aurelian in 273, Longinus was put to death by the Emperor. He was the most distinguished grammarian and philosopher of his age. He wrote many works, both rhetorical and philosophical, most of which have perished.

HERMANN LOTZE (1817-1881)

Succeeded Herbart as professor at Göttingen. Taught a teleological Idealism, largely based on ethical considerations. Wrote *Microcosmus*; *System of Philosophy*.

IGNATIUS LOYOLA (1491-1556)

Born in the province of Guipuscoa, in Spain. Severely wounded in the siege of Pampeluna; religiously impressed; made a pilgrimage to

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Jerusalem ; in 1526 went to the University of Alcalá ; imprisoned by the Inquisition until 1528, when he went to Paris to continue his studies ; he and Favre, Xavier, Lainez, Salmeron, Bobadilla, and Rodriguez pledged themselves to the establishment of an Order of preachers. In 1541 Loyola became Head of this—the Order of Jesus.

T. LUCRETIUS CARUS (B.C. 95-55)

Roman poet and Epicurean. In his remarkable didactic poem *De Rerum Natura*, he adopted the atomic theory of Leucippus, according to which the material universe was not created by a Supreme Being, but was formed by the union of elemental particles which had existed from all eternity, and was governed by certain simple laws.

LUTHER (1483-1546)

Born at Eisleben, in Lower Saxony. Educated at Magdeburg, Eisenach, and Erfurt ; in 1505 became an Augustinian Friar ; in 1507 was ordained Priest and in 1508 made Professor of Philosophy in the new University of Wittenberg ; affixed his 95 propositions to the Church door of Wittenberg on October 31st, 1517 ; attended the Diet of Worms, 1521 ; was conveyed to the Castle of Wartburg for safety ; in 1534 published translation of the whole Bible : his works are very numerous. The *Table-Talk* holds a conspicuous place.

SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH (1765-1832)

Educated at Aberdeen and Edinburgh Universities ; admitted to the Bar ; Recorder of Bombay ; M.P. for Nairn, and then Knaresborough ;

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Professor of Law and General Politics at Haileybury. Published *Vindiciæ Gallicæ* (in answer to Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*); also *The Law of Nature and Nations*; *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*; *History of England* in Lardner's *Encyclopædia*; *History of the Revolution of 1688*.

BERNARD MANDEVILLE (1670-1733)

Born at Dort; settled in London; wrote *The Virgin Unmasked*; *The Fables of the Bees*; *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*; *Free Thoughts on Religion*; *Essay on Charity Schools*, etc. He professed himself a disciple of Hobbes; his views were controverted by Law, Berkeley, and Hutcheson.

HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL (1820-1871)

Educated at Merchant Taylors' School and St. John's College, Oxford; ordained; a strong Tory and high churchman; Bampton Lecturer; held controversies with Maurice, Goldwin Smith and J. S. Mill; made Dean of St. Paul's; followed Sir William Hamilton, and, with Veitch, edited his lectures. Wrote *The Gnostic Heresies*, *Phronterion*; *Prolegomena Logica*; *The Limits of Demonstrative Science*; *Man's Conception of Eternity*; contributed to *The Speaker's Commentary* and *Aids to Faith*.

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS (121-180)

Born at Rome; adopted by Antoninus Pius; succeeded to the throne in 141; died in the middle of a campaign in Pannonia. He continued throughout his life a warm adherent to, and a bright

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ornament of, the Stoic philosophy ; his *Meditations*, in 12 books, forms a sort of commonplace-book, in which were registered from time to time the thoughts and feelings of the author upon moral and religious topics, without any attempt at order or arrangement. Strange to say, he was a persecutor of the Christians, during his reign, in 166, Polycarp being martyred, and, in 177, Irenaeus.

HARRIET MARTINEAU (1802-1876)

Daughter of Norwich manufacturer ; suffered from feeble health and deafness ; later on, tried mesmerism and recovered ; travelled widely and formed large and interesting acquaintance. Wrote *Political Economy ; Poor Law and Paupers Illustrated ; Illustrations of Taxation ; Society in America, Retrospect of Western Travel ; "Deerbrook," a Novel ; The "Playfellow" Series ; Eastern Life ; History of England during the Thirty Years' Peace ;* published Atkinson's *Letters on the Laws of Man's Social Nature and Development* (containing strong anti-theological views) ; brought out translation of Comte's *Philosophie Positive*, etc.

JAMES MARTINEAU (1805-1900)

Educated at Norwich and Bristol ; apprenticed to civil engineer ; studied divinity at Manchester College, York ; acted as Unitarian Minister at various places ; Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Manchester New College (removed in 1853 from Manchester to University Hall, Gordon Square, London). His publications include : *Rationale of Religious Enquiry ; Ideal*

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Substitutes for God ; Study of Spinoza ; Types of Ethical Theory ; Study of Religion ; Seat of Authority in Religion.

FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE (1805—1872)

Educated at Trinity Hall, Cambridge ; with Sterling founded the Apostles' Club ; in 1830 went up to Oxford to take Orders ; for 10 years Chaplain to Guy's Hospital ; Professor of English Literature and History at King's College, London ; Boyle Lecturer ; Warburton Lecturer ; Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn ; helped to found Queen's College, London ; cleared himself of charge of heterodoxy brought by the Principal of King's College ; was asked to retire by the Council after the publication of his Theological Essays ; inaugurated the Working Men's College in Red Lion Square, London ; accepted the Chaplaincy at St. Peter's, Vere Street, London ; Professor of Moral Philosophy, Cambridge ; Incumbent of St. Edward's in that town. Published *Subscription, no Bondage ; Letters to a Quaker* ; contributed largely to various periodicals.

JAMES McCOSH (1811-1894)

Born in Ayrshire ; educated at Glasgow and Edinburgh ; licensed by the presbytery of Ayrshire ; appointed to Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast ; President of Princetown College, New Jersey. He wrote *Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated*, and a multitude of other works, but it cannot be said that his philosophy had any appreciable influence on English thought, inasmuch as his early training had included no systematic study of transcendentalism.

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JOHN McCUNN (b 1846)

Educated at Glasgow and Oxford. Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Liverpool University. Wrote *The Ethics of Citizenship* ; *The Ethics of Social Work* ; *The Making of Character* ; *Six Radical Thinkers* ; *Political Philosophy of Burke*.

JOHN M. E. McTAGGART (b 1866)

Educated at Clifton College and Trinity College, Cambridge. Lecturer at his College ; has published *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* ; *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology* ; *Some Dogmas of Religion* ; *Commentary on Hegel's Logic*.

MAXIMUS TYRIUS

A celebrated philosopher of the second century, A.D., who flourished under the Antonines. He appears to have adopted the principles of the Platonic School ; left forty-one dissertations on philosophical topics.

MELANCTHON, or Schwartzerde (1497-1560)

Born at Bretten, in the palatinate of the Rhine ; studied at Pfortsheim, and became acquainted with Johann Reuchlin ; went to Heidelberg and Tübingen ; Professor of Greek at Wittenberg, where he formed an association with Luther. In 1530 drew up the *Confession of Augsburg*. His life was written by his friend Camerarius. He is esteemed to be one of the greatest and wisest men of the Reformation period.

MENEDEMUS (B.C. 351-277)

A cynic philosopher and native of Eretria ; though of noble birth was poor, and worked for a livelihood

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either as a builder or tent-maker. According to one story, he and his friend Asclepiades got their livelihood as millers, working during the night that they might have leisure for the study of philosophy during the day. He became a disciple of Stilpo, of Megara, and founded the Eretrian School.

MENIPPUS (fl B.C. 60)

A cynic philosopher, and originally a slave ; was a native of Gadara, in Coele-Syria. He amassed great wealth as a usurer, but was cheated out of it all and committed suicide.

MARIN MERSENNE (1588-1648)

Born in Maine ; studied at the College of La Flèche at the same time as Descartes ; entered the Society of Minims ; became teacher of philosophy and theology in the Convent of Nevers. His best known work is the *Harmonie Universelle*.

METHODIUS (825-885)

Apostle of the Slavonian tribes, and Archbishop of Moravia ; was a native of Thessalonica and the brother of the monk Cyrillus (Constantine Cypharus). They both were sent to preach to the Chazars and the Slavonians of Moravia. They did not please the Roman authorities ; Methodius went to Rome in 881, and at that time disappears from history.

JAMES MILL (1773-1836)

Educated at Edinburgh ; came to London ; met Bentham ; promulgated Benthamism in England ; took active part in the Bell and Lancaster controversy ; at the same time formed an association

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to set up a Chrestomathic school for superior education, the outcome of this being the formation of the London University, 1825; employed in India Office; encouraged Ricardo to publish his *Political Economy*. He belonged to the Hedonistic and Utilitarian School. His writings include: *Commerce defended*; *History of India*; *Elements of Political Economy*; *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*; *Fragments of Mackintosh*.

JOHN STUART MILL. (1806-1873)

Educated solely by his father, James Mill; visited France; admitted as Clerk in India House; formed the Utilitarian Society; edited Bentham's *Treatise upon Evidence*; retired from the India Office on the dissolution of the East India Company; elected M.P. for Westminster. Among his works may be noted; *Logic*; *Political Economy*; *Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform*; *Representative Government*; *Utilitarianism*; *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*; *Auguste Comte and Positivism*; *the Subjection of Women*; *Chapters and Speeches on the Irish Land Question*; *Autobiography*; *Three Essays on Religion*. He largely employed the inductive method, and, in a sense, was agnostic and materialistic.

MICHAEL, or MIGUEL, MOLINOS (1627-1696)

Born near Saragossa; passed the greater part of his life at Rome; in 1675 published his *Spiritual Guide*, which was condemned by the Inquisition ten years after its appearance, the author being sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. His followers were called Quietists, because they maintained that religion consists in an abstraction of the mind from external and finite objects.

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MICHEL, SEIGNEUR DE MONTAIGNE (1533-1592)

Born at Perigord ; sent to College of Guienne, at Bordeaux ; in 1554 was appointed judge in the Parliament of Bordeaux ; after 1530 travelled in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy ; was Mayor of Bordeaux for four years. His "Essays" rank among the few great books of the world. They are distinguished by philosophical scepticism, masculine good sense, abundance of learning, knowledge of men and the world, clearness and simplicity of style, and complete sincerity.

CHARLES DE SECONDAT, Baron de MONTESQUIEU (1689-1755)

Born near Bordeaux ; in 1716 became President of the Parliament of Bordeaux. Published *Persian Letters* ; *On the Causes of the Grandeur and Declension of the Romans* ; *Spirit of Laws* ; *Temple of Cnidus* ; *Lysimachus* ; *Essay on Taste*.

HENRY MORE (1614-1687)

Born at Grantham. Educated at Eton and Cambridge ; adopted the system of Plato ; was a man of great genius and erudition, his opinions being deeply tinged with enthusiasm. His works are : *Psychozoia, or the Life of the Soul* ; *Enchiridium Ethicum* ; *Divine Dialogues*.

AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN (1806-1871)

Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge ; Professor of Mathematics at University College, London ; as a philosophic thinker followed Berkeley ; wrote *Formal Logic* ; *Essay on Probabilities* ; *Trigonometry and Double Algebra* ; *Budget of Paradoxes*.

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WILLIAM MORRIS (1834-1896)

Educated at Marlborough and Exeter College, Oxford; helped to found manufacturing and decorating firm of Morris, Marshall, Faulkner and Co., Oxford Street, of which Rossetti, Burne-Jones, Madox-Brown, and Philip Webb were also partners; travelled widely; wrote extensively; in 1883 joined the Democratic Federation and became head of a secession; in 1890 started, at Hammersmith, the Kelmscott Press. His published works are largely composed of poems. He may be called equally poet, artist, manufacturer, socialist, and philosopher.

NEWTON (1642-1727)

Born at Woolsthorpe, Lincolnshire; educated at Grantham and at Trinity, Cambridge, where he had Isaac Barrow as tutor; studied the works of Oughtred, Descartes, Kepler, and Grimaldi; succeeded Barrow in the Professorship, which he afterwards relinquished to Whiston; member of the Convention Parliament; Warden and Master of the Mint; President of the Royal Society. Published *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia*; *Mathematica*; *Optics*; and numerous papers of supreme interest. He was also a persistent student of Holy Scripture.

NUMENIUS

Of Apamea, in Syria; a Pythagoreo-Platonic philosopher, who was highly esteemed by Plotinus and his school, as well as by Origen. He probably belongs to the age of the Antonines. His object was to trace the doctrines of Plato up to Pythagoras, and at the same time to show that they

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were not at variance with the dogmas and mysteries of the Brahmins, Jews, Magi and Egyptians.

OLYMPIODORUS (500-550)

The last philosopher of celebrity in the Neo-Platonic School of Alexandria. He lived in the first half of the sixth century after Christ, in the reign of Justinian. His *Life of Plato* and *Commentaries* on certain of the *Dialogues* are still extant.

ONESICRITUS (*fl* B.C. 330)

A Greek historical writer, who accompanied Alexander in his campaigns in Asia, and wrote a history of them, which is frequently cited by later writers.

ORIGEN (185-253)

Born at Alexandria ; became a pupil of Clement of Alexandria and a catechist ; led a troubled and persecuted life ; put to the torture in the Decian persecution ; soon after, died at Tyre. A voluminous author. Few writers have exercised greater influence by the force of intellect, or the variety of attainments, or again have been the occasion of longer continued or more acrimonious disputes.

ORPHEUS

A mythical personage, regarded by the Greeks as the most celebrated of the early poets who lived before the time of Homer. Many poems ascribed to him were current at the time of the Pisistratids, and they are often quoted by Plato.

THOMAS PAINE (1737-1809)

Born at Thetford in Norfolk, of a Quaker father ;

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became an exciseman ; introduced to Dr. Franklin, who persuaded him to go to America ; spent a great part of his life there and in France ; in 1802 left France for Baltimore, where he died and was buried on his own farm. Published : *Common Sense ; The Crisis ; The Rights of Man ; The Age of Reason* ; to which latter work Bishop Watson's *Apology for the Bible* was written as a reply.

PALEY (1743-1805)

Born at Peterborough ; educated at Christ's College, Cambridge ; became a Fellow ; in 1776 obtained the Vicarages of Dalston, in Cumberland, and Appleby, in Westmoreland ; in 1782 Archdeacon of Carlisle ; successively became Vicar of Stanwin, near Carlisle ; prebend of St. Pancras ; Sub-dean of Lincoln ; Vicar of Bishop Wearmouth. Published *Elements of Moral and Religious Philosophy ; Horæ Paulinæ ; View of the Evidences of Christianity ; Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity*, in which last book use is made of a work of the Dutch mathematician Nieuwenhyt.

PANAETIUS (d before 111 B.C.)

A native of Rhodes. A celebrated Stoic philosopher ; studied first at Pergamum, under the grammarian Crates, and subsequently at Athens, under the Stoic Diogenes, of Babylon, and his disciple Antipater of Tarsus. He succeeded the latter as head of the Stoic School and died at Athens. From one of his treatises, Cicero took the greater part of his work *De Officiis*.

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PARACELSUS HOHENHEIM (1493-1541)

Born at Einsiedeln, near Zurich; theosophist, physician, chemist, and quack! In 1526 he was appointed Professor of Physic and Surgery at the University of Basle, where he lectured in the vulgar tongue: he led a roving life, owing to his drunken habits. Notwithstanding his faults, errors and absurdities, he gave a new direction to medical science by the doctrine that the true use of chemistry was not to make gold, but to prepare medicine. He made great use of the Cabalistic writers; adopted the grossest pantheism; and boasted of his own divine inspiration. His works have been published in 10 volumes, folio.

PARMENIDES (b B.C. 513)

A native of Elea, in Italy; visited Athens in 448 and made the acquaintance of Socrates. He was esteemed by Plato and Aristotle. He maintained that the phenomena of sense were delusive, and that it was only by mental abstraction that a person could attain to a knowledge of the only reality. Nevertheless, he adopted two elements, warmth and cold, and light and darkness.

PERIANDER OF CORINTH (B.C. 665-585)

One of the Seven Sages of Greece. His motto was: "Nothing is impossible to industry."

PHILO OF LARISSA (d B.C. 70)

Followed Plato, Arcesilaus, and Carneades; Founder of the Fourth Academy.

PHILO JUDAEUS OF ALEXANDRIA (B.C. 20-A.D. 40)

Precursor of the Neo-Platonic philosophy; his

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great object being to reconcile the Sacred Scriptures with the doctrines of Greek philosophy, and to point out the conformity between the two. He maintained that the fundamental truths of Greek philosophy were derived from the Mosaic revelation ; and (in order to make the latter agree more perfectly with the former) had recourse to an allegorical interpretation of the books of Moses.

PITTACUS OF MITYLENE (B.C. 652-569)

One of the Seven Sages. His motto was : " Seize Time by the forelock."

PLATO (B.C. 429-347)

His works include treatises on Physics, Dialectics and Ethics. His doctrine of " ideas " was one of the most prominent parts of his system. He was opposed to Idealism, and maintained that the existence of things, cognizable only by means of conception, is their true Essence, their *Idea*. Hence, he asserted, to deny the reality of *ideas* is to destroy all scientific research. He departed, however, from the original meaning of the word *idea* (namely, that of *form* and *figure*), inasmuch as he understood by it Nativism and the unities which lie at the basis of the visible, the changeable, which can only be reached by pure thinking, e.g., he regarded the universal idea of " horse " to have a real existence, apart from particular horses.

PLOTINUS (205-270)

Born at Lycopolis, in Egypt ; died at Puteoli ; taught at Antioch and Rome. Porphyry spent six years with him at the latter city. His philosophical

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system is founded upon Plato's writings, with the addition of various tenets drawn from Oriental philosophy and religion ; but he endeavours to find all under the veil of the Greek mythology. He is not guilty of a commixture and falsification of the Oriental mythology and mysticism which is found in Jamblichus, Proclus, and others of the Neo-Platonic School.

PLUTARCH (46-120)

Born at Chaeronea, in Bœotia. Biographer and philosopher. Pure speculation was not his province ; his best writings are practical ; their merit consists in the soundness of his views on the ordinary events of human life, and in the benevolence of his temper.

PLUTARCHUS (d 430 A.D.)

An Athenian, son of Nestorius. He presided with distinction over the Neo-Platonic School at Athens, and was surnamed the Great. He numbered amongst his pupils Syrianus of Alexandria (who succeeded him as head of the School), and Proclus of Lycia.

PETER POIRET (1646-1719)

Mystical enthusiast ; author of *Divine Economy*.

JOHN PORDAGE (1625-1698)

Astrologer and alchymist.

PORPHYRY (233-305)

Born in Palestine ; after studying under Origen at Cæsarea, and under Apollonius and Longinus at Athens, he settled at Rome, and became a disciple of Plotinus ; he wrote a treatise against

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Christianity, which has not come down to us, having been destroyed by order of the Emperor Theodosius. This was answered by about 30 writers, amongst whom were Methodius, Apollinaris, and Eusebius ; Porphyry travelled far, then settled at Rome, where he taught until his death.

RICHARD PRICE (1723-1791)

Born at Tynton in Glamorganshire ; educated at Talgarth ; became pastor of a Nonconformist congregation of semi-arian principles at Hackney, where he spent his life ; in 1778 had a friendly controversy with Dr. Priestley on Materialism and Necessity. Besides many papers in the Transactions of the Royal Society, of which he was a Fellow, he published sermons and pamphlets.

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY (1733-1804)

Educated at Batley, Heckmondike, and Daventry ; after holding several posts in succession as Unitarian Minister, and finding that his opinions rendered life uncomfortable in England, he emigrated to America ; settled at Northumberland, Pennsylvania, where he died. A distinguished man of science ; considered to be the discoverer of oxygen. Wrote *Essay on Government ; Examination of Scottish Philosophy ; History of the Corruptions of Christianity ; History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ ; General History of the Christian Church.*

PROCLUS (412-485)

Born at Byzantium ; brought up at Xanthus, in Lycia ; studied at Alexandria under Olympiodorus, afterwards at Athens under Plutarchus

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and Syrianus; called the *Successor*, from his being regarded as the genuine successor of Plato in doctrine. Proclus became one of the most celebrated teachers of the Neo-Platonic School, and attempted, in his works, to blend together the ideas of Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, also those of Aristotle and the Neo-Platonic mystics.

PROTAGORAS (B.C. 480-411).

A Sophist.

PYRRHO (B.C. 375-285)

The founder of the Sceptical School; was attracted to philosophy by the books of Democritus; attended the lectures of Bryson, a disciple of Stilpon; also attached himself closely to Axarchus. He asserted that *certain* knowledge on any subject was unattainable; and that the great object of man ought to be to lead a virtuous life.

PYTHAGORAS (fl B.C. 540-510)

He resembled the philosophers of the Ionic School, who undertook to solve, by means of a single primordial principle, the vague problem of the origin and constitution of the Universe as a whole. He traced the origin of all things to *number*, and also taught the transmigration of souls.

THOMAS DE QUINCEY (1785-1859)

Educated at Bath and Winkfield, Wiltshire, and Manchester; rambled about, and finally found himself in London, where he led a Bohemian life, and met the "Ann" of his Confessions; in 1803 matriculated at Worcester College, Oxford, and contracted the habit of opium eating; read

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German metaphysics, and drew up a *Prolegomena of all Future Systems of Political Economy*, on the lines of Ricardo. He aimed at popularising German philosophy, and at reviving the English prose style of the seventeenth century. He wrote *Confessions of an English Opium Eater* ; *Murder as one of the Fine Arts* ; *Klosterheim* ; *The Logic of Political Economy*.

PETER RAMUS (1515-1572)

Born in a village of the Vermandois ; servant in the College of Navarre ; became a great scholar ; attacked the doctrines of Aristotle ; his *Animadversiones in Dialecticum Aristotelis* were at first suppressed ; he became a Protestant and lost his life in the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. His works on mathematics, philosophy, and logic are numerous.

THOMAS REID (1710-1796)

Born at Strachan in Kincardineshire ; educated at the Marischal College, Aberdeen ; accepted Chair of Moral Philosophy there ; in 1764 succeeded Adam Smith in his Professorship at Glasgow ; he was the first writer in Scotland who attacked the scepticism of Hume ; he endeavoured to refute his theory by an appeal to what he called Common Sense. His principal works are : *An Enquiry into the Human Mind* ; *Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers of Man*. His life was written by Dugald Stewart and Sir W. Hamilton. He is the leading representative of the School of *Common Sense*, by which phrase he meant, not vulgar opinion, but the beliefs common to rational beings, as such. His most important

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doctrine was that belief in an eternal world is intuitive or immediate.

DAVID RICARDO (1772-1823)

Son of a Dutch Jew, who early in life made a fortune on the London Stock Exchange; through perusal of the "*Wealth of Nations*," David became interested in the scientific treatment of economic questions; in his *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, he elaborated his theory of rent, exhibited the relation between rent, profit, and wages, and traced the incidence of taxation. Though an independent thinker, he generally supported the Radical party in Parliament. He was the principal founder of the classical school of Political Economy.

RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR (d 1173)

A native of Scotland; went to complete his studies in Paris; entered the Abbey of St. Victor, where Hugh was then teacher of theology; in 1162 was elected Prior. His writings consist of Commentaries on the Scriptures, treatises on Morals and Dogmatic Theology, and of Sermons.

GEORGE CROOM ROBERTSON (1842-1892)

Educated at Marischal College, Aberdeen; Professor of Mental Philosophy and Mind at University College, London; Editor of "*Mind*"; his affinities were chiefly with the School represented by the Mills and Bain.

ROSCELIN (1040-1120)

At one time Canon of Compiègne. The first great interpreter, in modern times, if not the author, of

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the philosophic system of Nominalism ; in 1092, having been condemned by the Council of Soissons, he came to England, and found an adversary in Anselm, who wrote against him treatises on the *Trinity* and the *Incarnation*. At Touraine he had as a pupil Abélard, who afterwards became his opponent. He left no written works, save an invective against Abélard, and our knowledge of his opinions is chiefly derived from the evidence of Anselm.

ROUSSEAU (1712-1778)

Son of a watchmaker of Geneva ; placed first with an attorney, afterwards with an engraver, but deserted both ; a kind priest sent him to Annecy, to be under the care of a Madame de Warens ; in 1740 he quitted her house and went to Paris to try his fortune as a musician. He again embraced Protestantism ; went to Paris, to the house of Madame D'Epinay, with his mistress, Thérèse Levasseur, and her mother. Obligated to flee from France and Switzerland, he took refuge in Neuchâtel ; went from place to place, amongst others to England to visit Hume ; in 1770 was permitted to return to Paris. He died in obscurity at Ermenonville. Amongst his numerous works may be cited : *Devin du Village* ; *Letter on French Music* ; *Sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes* ; "*Julie*" ; *Emile, ou de l'Education* ; *Contrat-Social* ; *Confessions*. He advocated the living our lives according to Nature.

JOHN RUSKIN (1819-1900)

Son of John James Ruskin, wine merchant, of London ; educated by Dr. Andrews (father of

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Coventry Patmore's first wife); studied at King's College, London, and at Christ Church, Oxford; travelled much and wrote freely; defended the pre-Raphaelites in letters to the *Times*; in 1870 elected as first holder of the Slade Professorship of Art at Oxford; devoted himself to economic studies, and published various letters and pamphlets, advocating a system of national education, the organization of labour, and other social measures; suffered at times from brain fever after 1878; in 1871 removed to Brantwood, Coniston, where he died and was buried. His works include *Modern Painters*; *Architecture and Painting*; *Seven Lamps of Architecture*; *Stones of Venice*; *Notes on the Royal Academy*; *Elements of Drawing and Perspective*; *Unto this Last*; *Munera Pulveris*; *Gold*; *Time and Tide*; *Sesame and Lilies*; *The Crown of Wild Olive*; *The Ethics of the Dust*; *Fors Clavigera*; *Præterita*; *Autobiography*. He was equally an author, an artist, a social philosopher, and reformer.

CLAUDE HENRI, COUNT OF SAINT SIMON (1760-1825)

Born at Paris; studied under d'Alembert; served in the army; imprisoned during the Reign of Terror; soon after, with the conviction that Society must be fundamentally reformed, and that he was the man to do it, he devoted himself for 10 years to a laborious course of preparation for his self-chosen task. Years elapsed before his theories attracted attention; but, about 1814, several distinguished men became his disciples. Among these were Olinde Rodrigues, Augustin Thierry, Auguste Comte, Bazard, and Père Enfantin. The leading

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idea of Saint Simonianism is the supremacy of industry as the grand definitive aim of human society. He recognised religion as a necessity for man. His works are numerous and important.

BISHOP SANDERSON (1587-1663)

Born at Rotherham in Yorkshire ; became Fellow of Lincoln College ; Chaplain to Charles I ; Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford ; was ejected in 1648 ; appointed Bishop of Lincoln ; author of *Cases of Conscience Resolved* ; *De Juramenti Obligatione*.

FRA GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA (1452-1498)

Born at Ferrara ; entered the Dominican Order ; preached at Florence, San Geminiano, and Brescia ; in 1498 prohibited by the Pope from preaching ; hanged, and his body burned at Florence. Among his disciples were the painters, Fra Bartolomeo and Lorenzo di Credi, and the sculptor, Luca della Robbia. Among his works are *The Triumph of the Cross* and *Compendium Revelationis*.

SCHELLING (1775-1854)

Born at Leonberg in Würtemberg. The last of that famous band of German philosophers of which Kant, Jacobi, Herbart, Fichte, and Hegel are the other chiefs ; studied at Tübingen, Leipsig, and Jena ; succeeded Fichte in the Professorship of Philosophy ; migrated to Würzburg, Munich, and Berlin. His place is determined to be between Fichte and Hegel. His metaphysical theory is generally known by the name of the System of Identity. It rests on the principle that the two

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elements of thought, the objects respectively of understanding and reason, called by the various names of *matter* and *spirit*, *objective* and *subjective*, *real* and *ideal*, are only relatively opposed to one another as different forms of the *absolute* or *infinite*, hence sometimes called the two *poles* of the absolute.

SCHLEIERMACHER (1768-1834)

Born at Breslau ; studied at Halle ; in 1809 called to Berlin as preacher ; in 1810 received the Chair of Theology in the University. He was alike a theologian, philologist, orator, and translator. His translation of Plato is unrivalled in excellence. As a theologian, he held a place in Germany comparable to that of Coleridge in England, *i.e.*, midway between orthodoxy and doubt.

SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860)

Born at Dantzig ; early associated with the Schlegels, Klopstock, Goethe and Wieland ; studied at Göttingen, Berlin, Weimar, and Dresden ; in 1831 settled at Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he lived a secluded life. The practical upshot of his system of philosophy, which makes Will the one sole reality, is intolerably melancholy, taking from Man all that constitutes his goodness, his greatness, and his bliss. God—futuraity—the soul—are mere names—illusions ; the world of men is bad, intolerably bad, being so made.

L. A. SENECA (3 B.C.-65 A.D.)

Born at Corduba. Prætor, and tutor of the young Domitian, afterwards the Emperor Nero, by whom he was ultimately condemned to death. A voluminous author. His philosophy was based upon the

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Stoical, but was rather an eclectism than pure Stoicism.

ANDREW J. SETH (PRINGLE PATTISON) (b 1860)

Born at Edinburgh ; educated at George Watson's College, University of Edinburgh, Leipsig, Jena, Berlin ; Professor at Halifax, N.S. ; Brown University, U.S.A. ; Cornell University ; and in the University of Edinburgh. Works : *Study of Ethical Principles ; English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy.*

ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713)

In 1693, after the usual course of education and foreign travel, he was elected M.P. for Poole ; his public career was stopped by the delicacy of his health, and from 1698 he chiefly resided abroad, devoting himself to study and corresponding with Boyle, Le Clerc, and other literati. He was the author of several works, the principal of which is *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times.*

HENRY SIDGWICK (1838-1900)

Educated at Rugby and Trinity College, Cambridge ; Fellow of his College ; Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy ; held various important offices within the University and also without ; as a philosopher, influenced by J. S. Mill. Published *Ethics of Conformity and Subscription ; Methods of Ethics ; Principles of Political Economy ; Scope and Method of Economic Science ; Outlines of History of Ethics ; Elements of Politics.*

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His system may be described as Philosophism plus Ethical Hedonism.

ADAM SMITH (1723-1790)

Educated at Glasgow University and Balliol College; Professor of Logic at Glasgow, and afterwards of Moral Philosophy; lecturer on Theology, Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Political Institutions; travelled; in 1847 settled at Kirkcaldy under a pension from the Duke of Buccleuch; acquired from the "physiocrats" a perception that "a scheme of distribution" was necessary; having previously worked out his theory upon the division of labour, money, prices and differences of wages, he published in 1766 his monumental work, entitled *The Wealth of Nations*, which originated the study of political economy as a separate science. Edited the autobiography of David Hume, whom he attended in his last illness. As a philosopher he largely employed the idea of sympathy.

SOCRATES (B.C. 469-399)

A man of sublime character; identified with the method of questioning called by his name. He laid stress on virtue as knowledge. Though he left no writings, he may be esteemed the greatest moral teacher of antiquity.

SOLON OF ATHENS (B.C. 638-558)

One of the Seven Sages, whose motto was :
"Know Thyself."

WILLIAM RITCHIE SORLEY (b 1855)

Born at Selkirk; educated at Edinburgh and Trinity College, Cambridge; Professor at University College, London, Aberdeen, and Cam-

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bridge. Has written : *On the Ethics of Naturalism ; Development of Modern Philosophy ; Recent Tendencies in Ethics ; Development of Greek Philosophy ; The Interpretation of Evolution ; The Moral Life.*

HERBERT SPENCER (1820-1903)

Born at Derby ; educated with his uncle at Hinton Charterhouse, near Bath ; in 1837 launched on the career of civil engineer ; in 1844 sub-editor to the *Pilot* at Birmingham ; in 1848 sub-editor of the *Economist* ; retained the post until 1853 ; in 1857 entertained idea of writing a system of philosophy founded on the idea of evolution. He published : *First Principles ; Principles of Biology ; Principles of Sociology ; Principles of Ethics, Education ; The Data of Ethics.* His place in the history of thought must be ranked high. He contributed the best synthesis of the knowledge of his times. The central doctrines of his teaching were, on its social side, individualism and opposition to war ; on its scientific side, evolutionary ethics and the explanation of phenomena from the materialistic and hedonistic standpoint.

SPEUSIPPUS (B.C. 407-339)

A native of Athens ; nephew of Plato ; succeeded his uncle as President of the Academy ; wrote several works, all of which are lost, in which he developed the doctrines of his great master.

BENEDICT SPINOZA (1632-1677)

Born at Amsterdam ; renounced Judaism ; perplexed by doubts ; attracted by the philosophy of Descartes ; excommunicated ; found a refuge at Leyden and the Hague, where he died. His system has been variously estimated—he has been

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styled an atheist, whilst, on the other hand, he has been compared with the unknown author of the *Imitation*! Apparently, to his thought, God is the only being, the only substance, infinite, eternal, before whom all things else have but a phenomenal existence. His aim was to build up, on the knowledge of God as foundation, a system of morals by a rigorous mathematical method. With some reason he has been called the father of modern Pantheism. The works of Spinoza are very numerous, the most important being the *Ethica*. His Theism was midway between Pantheism and Deism.

JOHN STERLING (1806-1844)

Educated at Trinity College and Trinity Hall, Cambridge; an "Apostle" and speaker at the Union; intimately associated with Julius Charles Hare, Coleridge, Wordsworth, F. D. Maurice, Trench, Carlyle, and other literary men; in 1834 curate to Hare at Hurstmonceaux. His life was written by Carlyle in 1851. He studied philosophy in Germany, and was a writer of distinction.

DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828)

Son of Matthew Stewart, the mathematician. Born at Edinburgh; received education at the High School, Edinburgh, and at Glasgow University, under Reid; at Edinburgh Professor of Mathematics, and then of Moral Philosophy, after Ferguson. His teaching was a protest against the extreme results of the "Sensualist" philosophy. He wrote: *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*; *Essays*; *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*; *Biographies* of Adam Smith, Reid, and Robertson. At Edinburgh, Palmerston, Russell

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and Lansdowne were among his pupils, and Scott and Burns among his acquaintance. Whilst approximating to the Empirical School, he disavowed its developments and retained Intuitionism. He opposed much of Kant's system.

STILPO, OF MEGARA (*fl* B.C. 294)

He made the idea of *virtue* the especial object of his consideration, maintaining that the wise man ought not only to overcome every evil, but not even to be affected by any.

EMANUEL SWEDENBORG (1689-1772)

Born at Stockholm; studied at Upsala; visited the Universities of England, Holland, France, and Germany; was ennobled by Queen Ulrica Eleonora; continued his scientific studies with an ardour that placed him in the first rank of European philosophers, until, in 1743, a new era of his life commenced, and, as he affirms, he was permitted to hold intercourse with the inhabitants of the invisible world. This change took place in London. New light has been thrown upon it by the "Book of Dreams," which was discovered in MS. in Stockholm in 1858. Henceforth, living alternately in Sweden and England, he devoted himself to the publication of his numerous works, which are all singularly clear, logical, and free from enthusiasm, showing no traces of the mental aberration from which he had suffered. He is the true type of the mystic, and is the originator of the sect which bears his name.

SYRIANUS (*fl* 400-460)

A Greek philosopher of the Neo-Platonic School;

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a native of Alexandria ; studied at Athens under Plutarchus, whom he succeeded as head of the Neo-Platonic School in the early part of the fifth century. The most distinguished of his disciples was Proclus.

JOHN TAULER (1300-1361)

A mystic ; born at Strasburg ; became a monk of the Dominican Order ; studied at Paris ; came under influence of Eckhart, and subsequently of Nicholas of Basle ; he was afterwards burnt at Vienne. He was well versed in the scholastic philosophy, and was one of the most famous preachers and devotional writers of his day.

BISHOP JEREMY TAYLOR (1613-1667)

Born at Cambridge and educated there. Settled at Oxford, and obtained a Fellowship. Rector of Uppingham ; adhered to the Royal Cause ; imprisoned during the Commonwealth ; in 1658 removed to Ireland ; Bishop of Down and Connor ; Vice-Chancellor of Dublin University. Works are *Discourses on the Liberty of Prophecy-ing ; Holy Living and Holy Dying ; Life of Christ ;* and the famous *Ductor Dubitantium, or Rule of Conscience in all her General Measures*, which, according to some critics, is the most extensive and learned work on Casuistry which has ever appeared in the English language.

THOMAS TAYLOR (1758-1835)

Clerk in Lubbock's Bank ; devoted himself to the translation and exposition of Greek Philosophers, the Neo-Platonists, and Pythagoreans ; defective in critical scholarship ; but translated the Orphic

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Hymns, some of the works of Plato, Aristotle, Proclus, Porphyry, Apuleius, Pausanius, and other ancient writers.

ISAAC TAYLOR (1787-1865)

Artist, author, and inventor; early turned his attention to literature; and wrote a large number of works; regarded by some as the greatest lay-theologian since Coleridge; his attention specially drawn to problems presented by the corruptions of the Christian Church. Wrote *The Elements of Thought*; *Natural History of Enthusiasm*; *Fanaticism*; *Spiritual Despotism*; *Ancient Christianity and the Doctrine of the Oxford Tracts*; *The Restoration of Belief*.

BERNARDINO TELESIIUS (1508-1588)

Born at Cosenza, in the kingdom of Naples; educated at Padua; Professor of Natural Philosophy at Naples; is distinguished as one of the first philosophers who ventured to attack the scholastic system and the authority of Aristotle. In 1564 published *De Natura, juxta propria Principia*; the general spirit of which almost makes him a precursor of Bacon.

TERTULLIAN (160-240)

A native of Carthage; son of a pro-consular centurion; a man of varied learning. He became a presbyter, and remained orthodox until he had reached middle life, when (in consequence of the envy and ill-treatment he experienced on the part of the Roman clergy) he went over to the Montanists, and wrote several books in defence of the views of those heretics.

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THALES OF MILETUS (B.C. 636-546)

One of the Seven Sages, whose motto was : " Who-so hateth suretyship is sure."

THEOPHRASTUS (B.C. 372-287)

He was a native of Eresus, in Lesbos, and studied philosophy at Athens, first under Plato, then under Aristotle. He became the favourite pupil of the latter, whom he succeeded in the presidency of the Lyceum. He presided over the Academy about 35 years. He wrote a great number of books, with the object of developing the Aristotelian philosophy.

THOMAS AQUINAS, THE ANGELIC DOCTOR, and ANGEL OF THE SCHOOLS (1227-1274)

Born near Monte Cassino, in Italy ; educated at the University of Naples ; entered the Dominican Order ; studied under Albertus Magnus, at Cologne ; went to Paris ; in 1272 was called to teach at Naples. The great aim of his teaching was to show the accord between reason and the doctrines of Christianity. His great work is the *Summa Theologiæ*. One of the leading thoughts of Aquinas and the Thomists (as his followers were called) is that of grace and predestination. They were Nominalists. His position was controverted by Duns Scotus and the Scotists.

THOMAS À KEMPIS (1380-1471)

Born at Kempen, in the diocese of Cologne. Entered the Monastery of Mount St. Agnes, where he was engaged in making copies of the Bible and of religious treatises. In a collection of his beautiful manuscripts was found *The Imitation of Christ*,

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which was afterwards commonly attributed to him as author. His few genuine writings are of little value. The *Imitation* is the most universally translated book in the world, after the Bible. It was first printed in Augsburg in 1486, without the author's name. The MS. itself is—or was!—one of the treasures of the Royal Library, Brussels.

DR. MATTHEW TINDAL (1657-1733)

Born at Beer-Ferris ; educated at Oxford ; Fellow of All Souls ; went over to Rome, but returned to the Church of England ; spent the greater part of his life in London in literary labour ; filled a large place in the view of his contemporaries as a deist and polemical theologian. His *Christianity as old as The Creation, or, the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature*, was replied to by Waterland, Leland, Conybeare, James Foster, and others. He died in London.

JOHN TOLAND (1670-1722)

Born in Derry ; studied at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Leyden. He renounced Roman Catholicism and read for the dissenting ministry. He became acquainted with Leclerc and Leibnitz. He is distinguished as a free-thinker and miscellaneous writer. The first work he published, *Christianity not Mysterious*, excited much ill-feeling, and was burnt by the common hangman at Dublin—the first act of warfare between the deists and the orthodox. He led a wandering life, and interested himself in politics. He wrote incessantly until the last : *Nazarenus ; Tetradymus ; Pantheisticon*, etc. He died at Putney.

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ABRAHAM TUCKER (1705-1774)

Born in London ; educated at Merton College ; read law at the Inner Temple ; in 1727 became owner of a large estate at Betchworth, Surrey ; in 1774 began the preparation of the work on which his reputation chiefly rests, *The Light of Nature Pursued, or Free-will, Fore-knowledge, and Fate*. It is unsystematic, prolix, full of repetition, practical and not scientific in its aim, grounding everything in morals on expediency. The interest and charm of the book are nevertheless considerable. Paley praised it and acknowledged his obligation to it.

JOSIAH TUCKER (1711-1799)

Born in Carmarthenshire ; educated at St. John's College, Oxford ; ultimately Dean of Gloucester. By his able tracts on commerce, he preceded Adam Smith in the advocacy of Free Trade.

FRIEDRICH UEBERWEG (1826-1871)

Born in Rhenish Prussia ; studied at Elberfeld, Göttingen, and Berlin ; taught at Bonn and Königsberg ; Among his works are : *Investigations on the Genuineness and Order of the Platonic Writings* ; *Translation of Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge."*

JOHN VEITCH (1829-1894)

Educated at Peebles and Edinburgh University ; assisted Sir William Hamilton in his professorship, and edited some of his writings ; Professor of Logic at St. Andrew's, then at Glasgow ; published *Memoirs of Dugald Stewart* ; *Dualism and Monism* ; *Critique of Scottish Border Poetry*.

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FRANCOIS MARIE AROUET DE VOLTAIRE
(1694-1778)

Born at Paris ; his family name was Arouet ; why he took the name of Voltaire is uncertain. Educated by the Jesuits at the College of Louis le Grand ; early introduced to the Salon of Ninon de l'Enclos ; his life was full of action, incident, and vicissitude ; he was sent twice to the Bastille ; spent three years in England ; in 1735 retired to the estate of the Marquis du Chatelet ; met with Frederick the Great ; passed the last 20 years of his life at Ferney, near the Genevese territory ; at the close of his life visited Paris and was vociferously welcomed ; exhausted by excitement and loss of sleep, took opiates, and (after great sufferings) fell into a lethargy and so died. He was a poet, historian, and philosopher, and bitterly opposed to the Christian religion of his time. His works in the most complete edition fill 70 vols. 8vo., and range over most subjects. Amongst them are : *Essai sur les Mœurs et l'Esprit des Nations* ; *Elemens de la Philosophie de Newton* ; *Dictionnaire Philosophique*.

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE (1822-1913)

Born at Usk ; educated at Hertford ; articled to an elder brother as land surveyor and architect, but gave up this profession in order to travel and to study Nature. In 1848 he visited the Amazon with Mr. Bates. Returning in 1852, he published his *Travels on the Amazon and the Negro* ; in 1854 visited the Malay Islands, where he remained eight years ; his works include : *Palm Trees of the Amazon and their uses* ; *The Malay Archipelago* ; *Contributions to the Theory of Natural*

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Selection, a theory he elaborated independently of Darwin and promulgated contemporaneously.

JAMES WARD (b 1843).

Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Professor of Mental Philosophy. Opponent of Singularism.

WILLIAM WHEWELL (1794-1866)

Educated at Lancaster Grammar School and Trinity College, Cambridge, of which he ultimately became Master; learned German thoroughly and helped to introduce the analytical methods of continental mathematicians; Professor of Mineralogy, Cambridge. In 1830 wrote *Astronomy and General Physics Considered with Reference to Natural Theology* (the first to be published of the Bridgewater Treatises); engaged in controversy with Sir William Hamilton, as to the value of mathematical training; Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy; secured institution of Moral Sciences and Natural Sciences Triposes at his University. He championed the old-fashioned form of intuitionism against J. S. Mill. Published largely, amongst other works: *Mechanics*, *Architectural Notes on German Churches*, *History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, *Plurality of Worlds*; made numerous contributions to transactions of learned Societies. It was said of him that his *forte* was *moral science*, but his *foible* was *omniscience*.

PHILIP HENRY WICKSTEED (b 1844)

Educated at Ruthin, University College School, University College, Manchester New College; in 1867 entered the Unitarian ministry. Has

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written : *Alphabet of Economic Science ; Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution ; The Common Sense of Political Economy.*

WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX (1070-1121)

Studied at Paris ; had amongst his teachers Roscelin and Anselm ; placed at the head of all the schools of Paris ; a distinguished teacher of Rhetoric, Dialectic, and Theology in the School of Nôtre Dame. Abélard was his disciple, but became his opponent. In 1108, William founded the Abbey of St. Victor of Paris ; was consecrated Bishop of Chalons-sur-Marne. Entered the Cistercian Order. In philosophy he was a Realist.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, in Surrey (1270-1347)

Entered the Franciscan Order. Studied at Paris under Duns Scotus ; became Fellow of Merton College ; the greatest dialectician of his age ; styled the "Invincible Doctor." As a philosopher, he opposed the doctrines of his former teacher, Duns Scotus, became the head of the so-called Nominalists, and struck fatal blows at the foundations of scholasticism.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON (1659-1724)

Born at Cotton Clanford ; educated at Sidney Sussex College ; took Orders, but devoted his time to literary researches. His principal work is *The Religion of Nature Delineated.*

XENOCRATES, OF CHALCEDON (B.C. 396-314)

Attached himself first to Aeschines, the Socratic, and afterwards to Plato ; became President of

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the Academy, even before the death of Speusippus (who was long bowed down by sickness); occupied that post for 25 years. Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote upon his doctrines, and Panætius and Cicero referred to him and entertained a high regard for his character.

XENOPHANES (B.C. 540-500)

Represented the Eleatic School. (Name derived from *Elea*, a Greek city of Lower Italy).

XENOPHON (B.C. 450-357)

A successful leader of men and a voluminous author. He wrote the *Memorabilia*, to defend the memory of Socrates against the charge of irreligion and corruption of the Athenian youth. His mind was not adapted for pure philosophical speculation; he looked on the practical in all things; the basis of his philosophy was a strong belief in a divine mediation in the government of the world.

ZENO (*fl* B.C. 488)

Of the Eleatic School. Influenced Plato.

ZENO (B.C. 369-264)

Founder of the Stoic School of Philosophy.

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Section C

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THE VARIOUS
PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS, WITH CONCISE
DEFINITIONS OF THE SAME.

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DEFINITIONS OF THE SAME.

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM.

Cf. PERSONAL IDEALISM

ACTIVISM

A theory treated of by Eucken.

ÆSTHETICISM

A theory appertaining to the appreciation of the beautiful, or of the things that appeal to what is considered to be good taste.

AGNOSTICISM

A theory which holds that nothing is known, or is likely to be known, of the existence of a God, or of anything beyond material phenomena. *Cf.* Phenomenalism.

ALTRUISM

This may be defined as regard for others as a principle of action. Opposed to Egoism.

ANALYSIS

The resolution of a proposition into simple elements.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM

The attribution to God of human qualities, such as will, love, wrath, regret, etc.

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ATHEISM

The expression of disbelief in the existence of a personal God.

CAUSATION

A doctrine that all things have behind them influences to which the effect is due.

CONCEPTUALISM

The doctrine that Universals exist as mental concepts (only); and that the mind can form ideas corresponding to abstract terms.

CREATIONISM

The theory that God creates a soul for every human being at birth; also the theory that attributes origin of matter and species to special creation. Opposed to Evolution.

CRITICISM

Acts of judgment passed upon any apparent facts, or series of facts—any apparent inferences, or series of inferences.

CYNICISM

A doctrine involving an ostentatious contempt for pleasure. Its votaries would put to shame by their own abstinence the indulgence of others.

CYRENAISM

A principle involved in the hedonistic teaching of Aristippus, of Cyrene.

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DEISM

A belief in the existence of a God, without accepting revelation, but relying solely on natural religion.

DETERMINISM, or NECESSARIANISM, or NECESSITARIANISM

A theory that human action is not free, but *determined* by motives regarded as external forces acting on the will. *Cf.* Indeterminism, Self-determinism.

DIALECTIC

The art of investigating the truth of opinions ; the testing of truth by discussion ; the use of logical disputation ; criticism dealing with metaphysical contradictions and their solutions.

DUALISM

A theory recognising in the Universe two independent principles—mind and matter—good and evil. *Cf.* Idealism and Materialism.

ECLECTICISM

The selection of such doctrines as the student may please from every school ; or the borrowing freely from various sources, not exclusive in opinion, taste, etc. *Cf.* Syncretism.

EMPIRICISM

The theory that suggests one should act on observation and experiment, not on theory.

EPICUREANISM

A theory advanced by Epicurus to the effect that the highest good was pleasure, *i.e.* (according to his definition), the practice of virtue.

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ETHICAL IDEALISM

In this doctrine an attempt is made to do justice both to the problem of the source of the moral imperative, and the problem of the goal of human life and conduct.

ETHICS

The science which investigates individual conduct. It enquires into moral sentiments, intentions, and motives ; the meaning of "ought" or obligation : the good and the right ; the criteria of right and wrong ; conscience ; the *summum bonum*, or highest good ; the will and its freedom ; etc., etc. Herbert Spencer has developed in great detail a body of theory called Evolutional Ethics.

EUDAEMONISM

A system of Ethics basing moral obligation on the tendency of actions to produce happiness.

EVOLUTION

The theory of Evolution teaches that the embryo is not created by fecundation, but developed from a pre-existing form ; and that species originate by development from earlier forms, not by special creation. Opposed to Involution. Cf. Creationism.

FATALISM

The opinion that the experiences and acts of men are all pre-determined by an immoveable fate. Logically, it means that the actions of men, whether good or bad, make no difference to the course of things, which has, as it were, been arranged over their heads.

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FREE THOUGHT

A mode of thought that dispenses with all trammels whatsoever—authority, tradition, revelation, and the like.

HEDONISM

A doctrine that claims pleasure to be the chief good.

IDEA. ABSOLUTE IDEA. ABSTRACT IDEA

(1) This word is often used to describe a mental image, *e.g.*, the revival of a past sight or sound, or any other kind of sensation. Thus, "Idea," or "Image," is opposed to actual sensation and perception.

(2) A concept or conception is also often called an "Idea."

(3) The ultimate reality in an idealistic philosophy is sometimes styled "the absolute Idea."

IDEALISM. SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM.

A representation of things in ideal form ; a system of thought in which the object of external perception is held to consist of ideas. *Cf.* Realism and Idea. As a theory of knowledge, Idealism is the doctrine that all we can know is our own mental states. This is called Subjective Idealism, and is opposed to Realism.

INDETERMINISM

A theory that human action is not wholly determined by motives.

INDIVIDUALISM

A self-centred feeling, or conduct ; egoism ; a

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social theory, favouring the free action of individuals. *Cf.* Socialism.

INTELLECTUALISM

A doctrine that knowledge is wholly or mainly derived from mere reason. Opposed to Voluntarism.

INTUITIONISM

(1) A doctrine that, in perception, external objects are known immediately, without intervention of vicarious phenomena.

(2) Intuitionists are those who make the basis of faith not an external revelation (whether through the Church or through the Scriptures), but by intuitions, or instincts, of the soul; in other words, nothing is to be believed which imposes the acceptance of an external authority.

INTUITIONALISM

The doctrine that the perception of truth is by intuition.

INTUITIVISM

The doctrine that ethical principles are matters of intuition.

MANICHÆISM

A doctrine propounded by Manes, a native of Persia (a belief greatly in vogue from the third to the fifth century), holding that Satan was co-eternal with God.

MATERIALISM

A doctrine which teaches that nothing exists but

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matter, and its movements and modifications ; also that consciousness and will are wholly due to material agency.

MENTALISM

A term employed by Sidgwick to include all those theories of the relation between Mind and Matter, which interpret Matter in terms of Mind. These theories are :

(1) Phenomenalism, or Relativity, which, although it leaves an unknowable* object still standing in opposition to Mind, yet reduces all we can know to mental elements.

(2) Sensationalism.

(3) Idealism, not including Subjective Idealism, which is the same as Sensationalism, while the latter reduces the world to Feelings, or Sensations. Idealism, in Sidgwick's sense, reduces it to Thought.

METAPHYSICS

This is the enquiry into the ultimate nature of Being. It seeks to discover what lies within or behind Nature, to penetrate the world of appearances, and to seize a principle explicable of human experience on all its sides. The disciples of Aristotle thought that *matter* or *nature* should be studied before *mind*. The Greek for *matter*, or *nature*, is *physis* and the science of its causes and effects is styled *physics* ; *i.e.*, the science which is the inevitable consequent and solvent of physics. *Meta-physics* is the Greek for "after-physics." It is the consideration of things in the abstract, *i.e.*, devoid of accidents, relation, or matter.

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MODERNISM

Present-day views or methods of thought, which may, or may not, lead to rationalistic views of religion.

MONISM

The doctrine that only one being exists. It embraces any of the theories that deny the duality of matter and mind.

MYSTICISM.

This teaches that the Divine Being is apprehended by direct insight or intuition. In the experience of the mystic the finite soul is overwhelmed and absorbed in the infinite, this consummation of the mystical experience seeming almost to be a lapse into unconsciousness. There may be said to be three kinds of mystics, (a) those who resign themselves to an imagined Divine manifestation, (b) those who form a theory of God based on their own inspiration, and (c) those who claim converse with spirits.

NATIVISM

The doctrine of innate ideas.

NATURALISM

A view of the world that excludes the supernatural, or spiritual, *i.e.*, that bases a moral or religious system on a purely natural basis.

NOMINALISTS

A sect founded by Roscelin, Canon of Compiègne (1040-1120). He maintained that if the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are *one God*, they cannot be

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three distinct *persons*, but must be simply three names of the same being ; just as father, son, and husband are three distinct names of one and the same man under different conditions. Abélard, William Occam, Buridan, Hobbes, Locke, Bishop Berkeley, Condillac, and Dugald Stewart are the most celebrated disciples of Roscelin.

NOMINALISM

A doctrine that universals, or abstract concepts, are mere names. Opposed to Realism.

NEO-PLATONISM

A third-century mixture of Platonic ideas with Oriental mysticism. Revived with great success in much later times by such men as Descartes, Henry More, Cudworth, and Cumberland.

OBJECTIVISM

A tendency to lay stress on the objective ; a doctrine that knowledge of the *non-ego* is prior and superior to that of the *ego*.

OCCASIONALISM

A doctrine of some Cartesians that volition and sensation are connected with the following and preceding material phenomena, not causally, but as separate productions of God on the same occasion. On its extreme side, that there is perpetual miraculous interference.

ONTOLOGY

The department of metaphysics concerned with the *essence of things*, or *being*, in the abstract.

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OPPORTUNISM

In determining policy the allowing of due or undue weight to circumstances of the moment.

OPTIMISM

The doctrine that the actual world is the best possible. The philosophy of Leibnitz reaches the position that a number of worlds is possible. To account for the actual world, he introduces the idea of Good, and maintains that the goodness of God led Him to actualize the best possible world. This does not imply a perfect creation, but *the best possible under the self-limitations in action.*

PANTHEISM

A doctrine that God is everything and that everything is God ; or, the heathen worship of all gods.

PARALLELISM, PSYCHO-PHYSICAL

The view that psychical process and nervous process vary together.

PARALOGISM

A term applied to illogical reasoning, especially when the reasoner is unconscious of the defect, or of the fallacious conclusions. Cf. Sophism.*

PARTICULARISM

The doctrine of *particular* election, or redemption ; or the principle of leaving political independence to each State in an empire.

PERSONAL IDEALISM

This is a form of Idealism, which lays special emphasis on the Authority of the will and the

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initiative of the self in experience, as opposed to the tendency of Absolute Realism to minimize the spontaneity of the individual soul. It is much the same as Pragmatism, Humanism, and Voluntarism.

PESSIMISM

A tendency to look at the worst aspect of things ; or, a doctrine that this world is the worst possible ; or that all things tend to evil. Opposed to Optimism.

PHENOMENALISM, or RELATIVITY

The doctrine of Agnosticism is sometimes called by this name. It indicates that the mind cannot penetrate to that which lies behind phenomena.

PHILOSOPHY

This embraces the love of wisdom or knowledge, especially that which deals with ultimate reality, or with the most general causes and principles of things. Moral Philosophy is the study of principles of human action or conduct.

PLURALISM

A system that recognizes more than one ultimate principle. *Cf.* Monism.

POSITIVISM

A system recognizing only positive facts and observable phenomena.

PRAGMATISM

A doctrine that estimates any assertion solely by its practical bearing upon human interests. Ably sustained by W. James and others.

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RATIONALISM

The practice of explaining the supernatural in religion in a way consonant with reason ; or of treating reason as the ultimate authority in religion, as elsewhere ; or, the theory that reason is the foundation of certainty in knowledge. Opposed to Empiricism and Sensationalism.

REALISM

A doctrine of the Schoolmen, based on a more or less true reading of Plato that the universal essence of (*e.g.*) a horse, a man, a house, has a real existence, apart from particular horses, men, or houses. Also (2) the metaphysical view opposed to Idealism, that there exists some reality independent of Thought and Sensation. Universals, or Ideas, are the only real existences, inasmuch as all visible things grow, change, and perish. *Cf.* the theories associated with the names of Aristotle, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, William of Champeaux.

SCEPTICISM

The ancient, or modern, doctrine of Pyrrhonism ; a doctrine casting doubt on the truth of the Christian, or of all religious, doctrine. A sceptic is a person of a super-critical turn of mind, or one unconvinced of the truth of particular fact or theory, or who takes cynical views. *Cf.* Agnosticism, Atheism, Free-Thinking.

SCHOLASTICISM

The philosophy of the Middle Ages, especially from the ninth to the sixteenth century. Philosophy was pursued less for its own sake than for the sake of religion. The Scholastics reasoned and

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disputed along the lines laid down in the logical works of Aristotle, whose influence in mediæval theology grew more marked as time went on. Scholasticism was an attempt to give a rational basis to Christianity. The scope of thought was limited, inasmuch as Revelation and Tradition were not critically approached ; yet, within their limits, the Scholastics developed remarkable bodies of doctrine. Their discussions were apt, however, to develop into verbal subtilty ; both Man and Nature were lost to view through their preoccupation with merely formal learning and formal disputation. One of their great problems was that of Universals. Some followed Plato, and ascribed reality to universal or general ideas alone ; these were called Realists. Others saw no more in a general idea than a mere name. These were called Nominalists. Yet others took a middle course, in a doctrine that Universals were real *in* the individual things ; not—as the Realists taught—*outside* the individual things.

SELF-DETERMINISM

A doctrine referring to Free-will as opposed to Fatalism.

SENSATIONALISM, or SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

A theory that ideas are derived solely from sensation. *Cf.* the theories of Locke, Hume, Condillac.

SOPHISM

A false argument, probably intended to deceive. *Cf.* Paralogism.

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SPIRITISM

The doctrine that spirit exists as distinct from matter, or that spirit is the only reality. *Cf.* Materialism.

SPIRITUALISM

The belief that departed spirits communicate with, or shew themselves to, men, especially at séances, by means of spirit-rapping, hand-writing, etc.

STOICISM

A system making virtue the highest good ; concentrating attention on Ethics ; inculcating control of the passions, and indifference alike to pleasure and pain.

SUBJECTIVISM

A doctrine that knowledge is merely subjective, and that there is no external or objective test of truth. *Vide* Subjective Idealism.

TELEOLOGY

The doctrine of final causes.

THEISM

Belief in the existence of a God supernaturally revealed to man, and sustaining a personal relation to His creatures. *Cf.* Deism, Pantheism.

THEODICY

This involves an attempt to prove God's existence, and especially to defend His goodness against the argument that if there be a God He is guilty of the evil and sin of the world. Thus the book of Job is a literary Theodicy.

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THEOLOGY, under various heads.

The science of religion. Thus we have such as Natural, Positive, Revealed, Dogmatic, Speculative, Systematic, etc.

THEOSOPHY

The opinions entertained by various ancient and modern philosophers, professing to attain to a knowledge of God by spiritual ecstasy, direct intuition, or special individual relations.

TRANSCENDENTALISM

In Scholastic Philosophy, that which is *Transcendent* is *higher than* (not included under any of) certain categories, ten in number. In Kantian Philosophy that which is not realizable in experience (especially noted of God) ; existing apart from, not subject to limitations of, the material universe. In this Philosophy, *transcendental* is of an *a priori* character, pre-supposed in, and necessary to, experience. This philosophy was taught by Schelling and his followers, especially by Emerson.

SYNCRETISM

This involves an unmethodical union of elements drawn from different systems of philosophy. It differs from Eclecticism (which it resembles in some points) by the uncritical character of its procedure. Eclecticism makes some attempt at adjustment of the matter which it borrows from diverse philosophies ; Syncretism, on the contrary, combining incompatible ideas, appears to be heedless of self-contradiction. The Neo-Platonists offer an illustration of this method. Cf. Eclecticism and Neo-Platonism.

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UNIVERSALISM

A doctrine implying that all men ultimately will be saved.

UTILITARIANISM

A doctrine that actions are right, because they are useful ; or that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be the sole end of public action.

VITALISM.

A theory sustained by Bergson.

VOLUNTARISM

This is opposed to Intellectualism. It begins with Kant's assertion of "the primacy of the practical reason," a doctrine which teaches the absolute worth of the good will, and places the *practical reason* on a higher level than the *pure reason* in respect of their power to apprehend ultimate reality. Cf. Personal Idealism.

INTRODUCTION

MY interest in formal Philosophy may be said to date from Cambridge days, when I sat at the feet of F. D. Maurice, who was appointed to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1866, in succession to John Grote. It is an interesting reminiscence that Charles Kingsley (himself at that time Professor of Modern History) was my near companion at Maurice's Inaugural Lecture—with the perusal of which I have recently (with great delight) refreshed my memory.

William Whewell, the omniscient Master of Trinity, had occupied the Chair of Philosophy from 1838 to 1855. In 1866 he was killed by a fall from his horse, and I can recall the anxious days passed by the University as he lay between life and death. During his residence at the University he did much to advance philosophic study, and it was due to his initiative that the Moral Sciences Tripos was established.

The literature relating to the history and development of Philosophy is abundant and far-reaching, branching out, as the science does, in various directions, and touching more or less directly and completely on very varied conceptions. Thus we have embraced in its purview the concrete and the abstract alike in respect of Religion, Morals, Economics, and Physical and Mental Science.

During the whole course of my studies on this subject, I have persistently felt the need of some manual that should form a handy conspectus and bring

Introduction

into view respectively the chief exponents of the science, the developments and modifications of the theories successively propounded, and furthermore mark the crucial periods and circumstances under which old ideas were dropped and new pronouncements introduced.

As I went on, I endeavoured to formulate for myself a brochure embracing all these requisites, and the encouragement rendered by certain friends whose opinion I value has led me to publish the completed form, in the hope that it may prove useful to students who, like myself, cannot afford to make metaphysics the leading subject of their lives, but who, nevertheless, desire to follow out the salient lines of philosophic history and to familiarize themselves with the conclusions that have become crystallized in the course of time in such wise as to furnish material for succeeding generations of men with philosophic minds.

In this—my book—there is set out in chronological order a list of names of thinkers who have distinguished themselves by original speculation in the avenues opened up in respect of the various departments to which the subject lends itself. This list has been extremely difficult to formulate and to keep within due limits, but I trust I have exercised all due discrimination.

This is followed by the same names in alphabetical order, with a few biographical facts dealing with their origin, their surroundings, their education, their writings, and the special part they played in their day and generation. Significant dates are appended to the several names, so that cross-reference may be readily effected. The correlation of individuals thus brought

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together presents remarkable, and, in some cases, amusing contrasts—thus we have Orpheus and Paley, Proclus and Priestley, Socrates and Adam Smith—but that is by the way, and need not exercise any lingering disturbance on the mind of the philosophic reader.

The student will next find an alphabetical synopsis of the various metaphysical systems, with concise definitions of the same. Then follow various chapters dealing successively with :

The definition of Philosophy and references to its historical development.

The inception of the Idea.

The correlation of Thought to produce new combinations.

The conception of the Absolute.

Problems relating to Determinism or Free Will.

The origin, development, and effects of so-called Evil.

The influence on Philosophy exerted by modern thought.

The effect on the mind of the study of Philosophy.

Casuistry—a department of Philosophy.

It is needless to say that I have read as widely as possible the classic originals of philosophy, but it is obvious that great part of a book of this character must be of the nature of a compilation, and I feel bound to express my obligation to standard works of Biography and History too numerous to mention. Particularly do I desire to record my indebtedness to the survey of Ethics (by H. Sidgwick) and of Casuistry in the ninth edition

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of the *Encyclopædia Britannica** and to the articles on Philosophy and kindred subjects in divers *Cyclopædias*.

At various intervals I copied extracts from such works into a common-place book, oftentimes with abbreviation, transposition and variation. Frequently, too, owing to the lapse of time, the name of the source has escaped my memory. Hence I have realized the impossibility, in the majority of cases, definitely to mark off such extracts as are incorporated in the present work. I trust, however, the authorities from whose publications I have quoted will accept a general acknowledgment, which I tender with great cordiality and gratitude.

The later chapters, relating to the residual sum and substance of philosophic enquiry as exhibited in the present day, consist almost entirely of original work.

Certain of my friends have made suggestions, or furnished material, which will be found noted in the Appendices under appropriate heads.

The output of the literature relating to philosophy is still so persistent and overpowering that it is all but impossible even for the professional student to keep pace with it.

For many years the Teutonic element has been well to the fore in respect to every department into which the subject may be divided. Such men as Lotze, Haeckel, and Eucken have made important contributions; whilst, alas! a lurid and sinister light has been thrown


* This Article first appeared in the Ninth Edition, and was expanded and brought up-to-date in the Eleventh. My sincere thanks are given to the proprietors of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* for permission to make various extracts from these Articles.

Introduction

upon the history of philosophic thought by the realization of the influence capable of being exercised upon the lowest and most unworthy feelings of a nation by the immoral recklessness of such writers as Bernhardi, Nietzsche, Treitschke, and their fellows.

In this volume one would have liked to say more—by way of balance—about recent contributions to our subject by men of the Romance nations, but it may suffice to mention Piat's *Leibnitz*, the elusive theories of Bergson, and the works of two Italians, Benedetto Croce (*The Philosophy of the Spirit*), and Giovanni Gentile (*Absolute Idealism*).

Amongst recent contributions in our own tongue may be set forth Burnet's *Greek Philosophy*, Shand's *Foundations of Character*, Whitaker's *Theory of Abstract Ethics*, Bishop D'Arcy's *Donellan Lectures*, and A. J. Balfour's *Gifford Lectures*. All of these writers are already honourably distinguished by their studies in the philosophic field.



ANCIENT & MODERN SYSTEMS

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY may be defined as the knowledge of the reason of things ; in opposition to History, which is the recital of the facts of the life of nations, or to Mathematics, which is the knowledge of the number or quantity of things.

The early scheme of division was into : (1) Moral or Ethical ; (2) Intellectual ; (3) Natural or Physical. In the present day there are extensions into other regions of enquiry, which are noticed elsewhere in this book.

In Moral and Intellectual Philosophy the chief ancient systems were :

The Pythagorean.

The Platonic, the Academy, founded by Plato.

The Peripatetic, the Lyceum, by Aristotle.

The Sceptic, by Pyrrho.

The Cynic, by Diogenes.

The Epicurean, by Epicurus.

The Stoic, by Zeno.

The Middle Academy, by Arcesilaus.

The New Academy, by Carneades.

Neo-Platonism represented an attempt to combine Platonism with Christianity made by Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Julian, and others.

History of Philosophy

The more Modern Systems are as follows :

Rational, by Francis Bacon.

Cartesian, by Descartes.

Reflective or Perceptive, by Locke.

Idealistic, by Berkeley.

Elective, by Leibnitz.

Common Sense, by Reid.

Transcendental, by Kant and Hamilton.

Scientific, by Fichte.

Involving Absolute Identity, by Schelling.

Involving Absolute Idealism, by Hegel.

Utilitarian, by Bentham.

Positive, by Comte.

The primitive sages of Greece were accustomed to style themselves *sophists*, or wise men ; but as, in these early times, it was frequently found that " knowledge came whilst wisdom lingered," even fools came to the conclusion that the profession of wisdom sometimes marked but its absence. Therefore a more appropriate (because less arrogant) term was introduced, probably by Pythagoras, viz., *philosopher*, one who courts, or loves, wisdom.

Later Greek teachers sought to justify this application by disinterestedness and devotion to their science and its votaries, being frequently in the habit of communicating their doctrines—without fee or reward—to all who came to listen and to learn.

The History of Philosophy is the history of the more exclusive and idealistic forms of thought amongst mankind. The common herd of men are down-lookers ; their constant cry is : " What shall we eat ? What shall we drink ? Wherewithal shall we be clothed ? "

Philosophy at a Discount

Their life is spent in the monotonous and repeated performance of the menial offices of life. The trivial round, the common task, includes all they wish—all they accomplish, and, whilst it may be conceded that these folk include a large multitude of honest, intelligent, and even duty-loving, God-fearing, people, it is nevertheless the truth that they dwell in the valleys. The heights are not for them, the air being too rare, too nimble; the blast too keen; the vision too extended and nebulous.

It must be confessed, however, that these "commoners" frequently criticise the "aristocrats" of thought; and, indeed, rightly so, for philosophy has oftentimes led its followers into blind alleys and strange and uncertain tracks. This has arisen mainly from three causes:

- (a) Men's ignorance or blindness as to the working of natural forces.
- (b) The want of comprehension as to one's own mental and moral nature.
- (c) The rearing of theories and forms of speculation on too slender a foundation.

Even at the present day philosophy is at a discount—the search for the Ultimate Reality seeming to be but a hopeless quest; so that the study of Metaphysics and Ontology is regarded by the Philistine as leading to the pursuit of a will-of-the-wisp, an effort unworthy of being carried on especially at a time when Natural Science holds the field, in such wise that (as is claimed) its methods of investigation—by experimentation and strict inference—must needs be rendered applicable to all methods of enquiry whatsoever.

History of Philosophy

Simple folk are the more justified in assuming this critical attitude, inasmuch as it is admitted that philosophers themselves are not united as to the value of the different branches of their science. The empiricism which bases itself on Hume, the positivism which founds itself on Comte, and certain phases of Kantian thought all agree in the disparagement of pure metaphysics. The ancient distinction between the *phainoumena* and the *noumena* has been revived in a somewhat different fashion, and has become current in modern thought.*

Perhaps moral philosophers themselves contribute to this depreciation—either unwittingly, or, rather, as one may think, defiantly—by allowing that their science is not destined to finality—that one can never be sure of taking the right road—that abstract thinkers like themselves even spurn the notion of ever attaining to a complete view or to a complete knowledge of the Absolute and of matters relating thereto. They exhibit something of the spirit of certain enthusiasts of one's Cambridge days, who were accustomed to meet

* In this place, it is important, once and for all, to make clear what is meant by the term, *Metaphysics*. Although this is a plural, it is often treated as singular. It may be defined as the theoretical philosophy of being and knowing: *i.e.*, the philosophy of mind. The disciples of Aristotle considered that *matter or nature* should be studied before *mentality or mind*. In Greek, *matter or nature* is *physis*, and the science of its causes and effects, *physics*. Thus, *meta-physics* is the Greek for *after-physics*, *i.e.*, it is *Ta meta ta phusika*. Sir James Mackintosh, however, takes a less intentional view of the case, contending that the word arose from the mere accident of the compilers, who sorted the works of Aristotle, and placed those dealing with mind and intelligence *after* those upon matter and nature. A further definition of metaphysics is that it is the consideration of things in the abstract, *i.e.*, divested of their accidents, relations and materiality.

Sad Retrospect

annually at a feast in honour of their goddess, whom they toasted in the following terms : " Here's to Pure Mathematics, and may they never be of the least use to anybody." Such serene heights, however, can be reached but by few.

The history of human progress and endeavour forms a record infinitely sad. Hence it is not to be expected that the path taken by human thought and speculation could present anything but a series of wrecked trenches and abandoned defences.

One will be disposed the less to sorrow at this pitiful retrospect if one reflects on two considerations :

- (1) That these vain essays and tragic failures have led from age to age to the maintenance of thought at a high level, and to the perfecting of the mechanism of thinking—a state of things which must undoubtedly bear good fruit in the generations to come.
- (2) That the world is yet in its childhood, so that what has gone before in the way of investigation " by trial and error " was only to be expected from the race of men, even as it is expected in regard to every individual of the race from infancy to maturity.

That the world is yet in its infancy in respect alike of logic, morals, and religion is demonstrable at once to the detached thinker by a glance around—at the political and social hurly-burly which presents itself—at national and theological jealousies—at the monstrous destruction of life and property and the heritage of woe caused by such conflicts as those which have

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harried the homes and bruised the hearts of so many poor souls in our own generation.

The record of the Rise and Progress of Philosophy not only unfolds a chapter of supreme interest in the history of mankind, but is likewise important in relation to the study of philosophy itself. Doubtless among every nation that has risen out of savagery there have been developed lines of thought akin to the philosophical ; but, for our purpose, the history of philosophy begins with Thales, in Greece, about 600 B.C.

From this epoch there are distinguished certain great periods of philosophic thought :

The Ancient or Greek.

The Mediæval—until about 1600 A.D.

The Modern—since that date.

The pre-Socratic thinkers were divided amongst themselves, but they appear to have all devoted their attention mainly to the phenomena of external nature. Amongst these may be mentioned : Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras.

The Sophists (even as Socrates himself) nevertheless devoted a certain part of their time to the elucidation of pure knowledge, turning their consideration to man's own nature and habits of thought. In the idealist systems of the two Masters of the Schools—Plato and Aristotle (400-322 B.C.)—one notes the golden age of Greek philosophy. In Aristotle the theoretic genius of the subtle Greek mind seems to have reached its high-water mark. The period immediately following was

Early Greek Thinkers

mainly devoted to the determining of questions of practical need.

After the Socratic there followed various systems, such as: the Cynic, Cyrenaic, Eleac or Eretriac, Eleatic, Epicurean, Heraclitian, Ionic, Italic, Megaric, Peripatetic, Sceptic, and Stoic.

At a later period, the Neo-platonic, with its religious mysticism, carried on the traditions of philosophy until the downfall of the Roman Empire in the west and the death of Boethius (470-524). The Dark Ages led to little original thought in a metaphysical direction. Its teaching was formal and intensive. Mediæval philosophy found a protagonist in John Scotus Erigena, who may be classed as a Christian Neo-platonist.

At this period the main design of philosophers was the application of Aristotelian logic to the doctrines of the Church. Somewhat later, when the other treatises of Aristotle were made definite objects of study, the pundits exhausted themselves in an elaborate attempt to harmonize the philosophy of the Stagyrte with Christian theology. Even so, there were giants in those days, as will be evidenced when the following names are mentioned: Anselm, Abelard, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.

With the dawn of a new day the clearer light dispersed many clouds. The Renaissance put an end to Scholasticism. The new thinkers took to themselves that which was best worth preserving in the systems of the older philosophers, and also attempted to strike out new paths for themselves. Thus the New Age was one of transition, but it paved the way for the beginnings

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of a wider sweep of thought, which heralded the advent of a philosophy worthy of the epoch which ushered in the Revival of Learning.

In duty bound we hark back, in this connection, to a noted Englishman, Roger Bacon (1214-1292); but his greater namesake is the true father of inductive philosophy. Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum* was published in 1620, and was followed in 1637 by Descartes' *Discourse on Method*. The former work is mainly logical and methodological. Its influence was of the widest character, but (from the purely metaphysical side) Descartes is the real founder of modern philosophy. On the Continent his teaching was developed into the great monistic system of Spinoza, from which the monadistic and individualistic theory of Leibnitz was a reaction.

In our own land, under Locke's treatment, philosophy took a direction involving Psychology and Theories of Knowledge. This was continued by Berkeley and Hume, who respectively developed Locke's dualism into subjective idealism and scepticism. Hume's analysis of knowledge from the sceptical angle led—by the clash of opposites—to the Critical Philosophy of Kant, which includes lines of thought derived alike from Continental and English thinkers. This form eventuated in the idealistic developments of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and the realism of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. A realism of a more individualistic cast is represented by Herbart and Lotze. This definitely looks back to Leibnitz, and is comparatively little influenced by the philosopher of Königsberg.

Scottish writers have occupied a consistent and

Later Writers

distinguished position in metaphysical speculation. Generally, they have maintained the reality of knowledge and the dualism of experience in opposition to the scepticism of Hume; but, like the majority of English philosophers, they have dealt mainly with the subject from the psychological side. In these islands the currents of thought have been calm and steady as compared with the strong and tumultuous billows that have swept over the area of German philosophical speculation.

The best general histories of philosophy are by Erdmann, Ueberweg, and Schwegler—all accessible in English translations. The greater part of Zeller's exhaustive history of Greek philosophy has also been translated.

The most generally serviceable introduction to philosophy is that of Külpe (trans. 1897). Croom Robertson's *Elements of General Philosophy* (1896) is rather more elementary and has the advantage of a more historical plan. Sidgwick's *Philosophy: its Scope and Relations* (1902), and Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy* (1898), appeal to more advanced students. Among the histories of philosophy, Windelband's (1900) may be specially mentioned on account of its plan of dealing primarily with the problems of the several epochs, rather than with individual thinkers taken separately.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (*continued*).

THE first man must have been a bit of a philosopher, even as the last man will be ; although the primary instinct of man is to take everything for granted and to interpret all phenomena in terms of sense. He sees the sun go round the earth—therefore, to him, the sun *does* go round the earth. But personal experience, or experience derived from others, gradually leads him to the conclusion that he cannot always trust first impressions, and that the easiest and most obvious conclusions are not necessarily the truest.

A repetition of such experiences leads him to attempt to generalize, to group together like phenomena, and to endeavour to develop the causation, the order of occurrence, *i.e.*, the *law*.

This is true both in respect of the world on which he dwells and the self which forms a part of it.

In spite of what has been said above, ordinary men are satisfied with a small amount of knowledge. Careful observation and strict reasoning are practised but by the few. Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand live and move and have their being in a tiny world of thought, knowing nothing and caring less about the men who—during the recurring centuries—have stood on the lofty tower of observation and strained their eyes into the darkness to endeavour to glimpse

Rewards of Study

the star that sheds a ray from the infinite Universe beyond. To them, Plato and Aristotle are but shadows, or, even, mere names—to them, systems of philosophy are but the bewildering hotch-potch of thought.

It must be said, however, that there is some little excuse for such Gallios. Certain of these philosophic systems are obscure and involved—ordinary words are employed with extraordinary connotation, and each new system seems anxious only to gobble up its immediate predecessor. Nevertheless, the true philosopher, the lover of the fair Sophia, should endeavour to make himself acquainted with the trend of opinion in the past ; with the leading thoughts of the great thinkers of all time ; and with the reasoned conclusions to which the twentieth century—with its refinement of scientific method—may be expected to lead him.

It may readily be believed that thoughtful men soon began to endeavour to wrest the secrets from Nature and from Self. Some took a wider flight, and sought to think down to the origin of all things, so that even Religion became involved in their speculations. Amongst these may perhaps be named Sakya Mouni and Zoroaster, Confucius—a kindred soul—confining himself to the science and practice of morals.* On the present occasion, however, one must restrict oneself to the consideration of Western thought, with the exception that Palestine must ultimately be introduced.

The ethical speculation of Greece, and therefore of Europe, has not (any more than other elements of

* Sakya-Mouni, or the Buddha, flourished about the 6th century, B.C. ; Zoroaster, or Zarathustra, about 485 B.C., and Confucius, or Kong-fu-Tzee, about 479 B.C.—but all these dates are largely conjectural.

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European civilization) an abrupt and absolute commencement. The *naïve* and fragmentary utterances of sage precepts for conduct, in which nascent moral reflection everywhere first manifested itself, supply a noteworthy element of Greek literature in the "gnomic" poetry of the seventh and sixth centuries, B.C. Their importance in the development of Greek civilization is strikingly characterized by the traditional enumeration of the seven sages of the sixth century (Bias, Cleobulus, Chilo, Thales, Solon, Pittacus, and Periander). Their influence upon ethical thought is sufficiently shewn in the references that Plato, and even Aristotle, makes to the definitions and maxims of poets and sages. But from such utterances as these to moral philosophy there was still a long step; for, though Thales (circum. 640-560 B.C.), one of the Seven, was also the first physical philosopher of Greece, we have no ground for supposing that his practical wisdom had anything of a philosophical character. There seems to have been more of a connection between moral teaching and metaphysical speculation in the case of Pythagoras (circum. 580-500 B.C.), who is conspicuous amongst pre-Socratic philosophers as the founder, not merely of a school, but rather of a sect or order, bound by a common rule of life.

The moral precepts of Pythagoras seem to have been announced much more in a dogmatic, or even prophetic, than in a philosophic manner; and (whether sound or arbitrary) to have been accepted by his disciples with a decidedly unphilosophic reverence for the *ipse dixit* of the Master. Hence, whatever influence the Pythagorean blending of ethical and mathematical notions

Divers Greek Thinkers

may have had on Plato, and, through him, on later thought, one cannot regard the school as having really forestalled the Socratic enquiry after a completely reasoned theory of conduct. The ethical element in the "dark" philosophizing of Heraclitus (circum. 530-470 B.C.) shews more profundity of view but still less approximation to a system : in spite of the partial anticipation of Stoicism which we find in his conceptions of a law of the Universe, to which the wise man will carefully conform, and a divine harmony, in the recognition of which he will find his truest satisfaction. It is only when we come to Democritus (a contemporary of Socrates), the last of a series of original thinkers that we distinguish as pre-Socratic, that we find anything which we can call an ethical system. The fragments that remain of the moral treatises of Democritus are sufficient, perhaps, to convince us that the turn of Greek philosophy which was actually due to Socrates, would have taken place without him, though in a less decided manner ; but when we compare the Democritean ethics with the post-Socratic system to which it has most affinity, Epicureanism, we find that it exhibits a very rudimentary apprehension of the formal conditions which moral teaching must fulfil before it can lay claim to be treated as scientific.

In Socrates, for the first time, we find the required combination of a genuine ardour for knowledge, and a paramount interest in conduct. The pre-Socratic thinkers, from Thales downwards, were all primarily devoted to ontological research ; but, by the middle of the fifth century B.C., the clash and conflict of their dogmatic systems had led some of the keenest minds

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to doubt the possibility of penetrating the secret of the universe. This doubt found expression in the reasoned scepticism of Gorgias, and produced the famous doctrine of Protagoras, that the human apprehension is the only standard of what is and what is not. A similar view of the natural limits of the human intellect repelled the philosophic ardour of Socrates from physico-metaphysical enquiries. In his case, moreover, such a view found support in a *naïve* piety that indisposed him to search into things of which the gods seemed to have reserved the knowledge to themselves. The regulation of human action on the other hand (except on occasions of special difficulty, for which omens and oracles might be vouchsafed) they had left to human reason : on this accordingly Socrates concentrated his efforts.

The emergence of an art of conduct with professional teachers cannot thoroughly be understood, unless it is viewed as the crowning result of a general tendency at this stage of Grecian civilization to substitute technical skill for traditional procedure and empirically-developed faculty.

Taking the teaching and character of Socrates together, we find :

- (1) An ardent enquiry for knowledge, such knowledge nowhere to be found, but if found, available to perfect human conduct.
- (2) A demand, meanwhile, that men should act, as far as possible, on some consistent theory.
- (3) A provisional adhesion to the commonly-received idea of good, in all its incoherent complexity ;

Socrates and those who Followed

and a perpetual readiness to maintain the unity of its different elements and demonstrate the superiority of virtue by applying the commonest standard of self-interest.

- (4) Personal firmness, as apparently easy as it was actually invincible, in carrying out such practical convictions as the enquirer had obtained.

It is only when we keep these points in view that we can understand how (from the spring of Socratic conversation) flowed the branching rivers of Greek ethical thought.

Plato must be regarded principally as a moral and political philosopher, and as a dialectician. As a physical enquirer he did not shine, and the *Timaeus* is his only work in that branch of philosophy. The fundamental principle of his (Plato's) philosophy is the belief in an eternal and self-existent Cause, the origin of all things. From this divine being emanate not only the souls of men, which are also immortal, but that of the universe itself, which is supposed to be animated by a divine spirit. The material objects of our sight and other senses are mere fleeting emanations of the divine idea ; it is only this *idea* itself that is *really* existent ; the objects of sensuous perception are mere appearances, taking their forms by participation in the idea. Hence it follows that in Plato's view all knowledge is *innate*, and acquired by the soul before birth, when it was able to contemplate *real* existences, and all our ideas in this world are mere reminiscences of their true and eternal patterns.

These principles, when applied to the investigation

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of language, necessarily made Plato a *realist* ; *i.e.*, he held that an abstract name, expressing a genus—as, *e.g.*, mankind, comprehending all individual men ; *tree*, comprehending every species of tree—and so forth—were not mere signs to express our modes of thinking, but denoted *real* existences ; in fact, the only *true* existences, as being the expressions of the eternally pre-existent idea.

Speusippus, Plato's nephew, became the head of the Academy after his uncle's death. The Middle Academy begins with Polemo and Arcesilaus, the latter of whom flourished towards the close of the third century B.C., and succeeded to the Chair on the death of Crantor, who was the first to write commentaries on Plato's works. Carneades, who flourished towards the middle of the second century B.C., founded the New Academy. The Academy lasted from the days of Plato to those of Cicero. As to the number of successive schools, the critics are not agreed. Cicero himself and Varro recognized only two, the Old and the New ; Sextus Empiricus adds a third, the Middle ; others a fourth, that of Philo and Charmidas ; and some even a fifth, the Academy of Antiochus.

Four distinct philosophical schools trace their immediate origin to the circle that gathered round Socrates—the Megarian, the Platonic, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic.

Megara, the capital of Megaris, was situated about a mile from the sea, opposite the island of Salamis. Its philosophical school (Megaric, or Dialectic, or Eristic) was founded by Euclid, a native of the city and a disciple of Socrates. It distinguished itself chiefly by the

Four Philosophic Schools

cultivation of dialectics. The doctrines of the Eleatic formed the basis of its system. The founder must not be confounded with his mathematical namesake, of Alexandria, (323-263 B.C.). The latter, by the way, was a Platonist and well read in the doctrine of that school.

The Cynics owed their origin to Antisthenes, of Athens, and were so called because the school was held in the gymnasium called Cynosarges, set apart for those who were not of pure Athenian blood. The name means *white dog*, and was so-called because a white dog once carried away part of a victim which Diomeos was offering to Hercules. The chief of the Cynics were Diogenes, Onesicritos, Monimos, Crates and his wife Hipparchia, Metrocles, Menippos and Menedemos, surnamed the madman.

The Cyrenaic School was founded by Aristippos, of Cyrene in Africa. He flourished about 370 B.C. The chief dogma of this philosopher was that pleasure and pain are the criteria of what is good and bad. The Cyrenians may be said ultimately to be an offshoot of the Epicureans.

The Stoics were founded by one Zeno, a native of Citium in Cyprus, and the son of Mnaseas. He was shipwrecked in the neighbourhood of Piraeus and was led to settle in Athens and devote himself to the study of philosophy. He attached himself to the Cynic Crates. In opposition to his advice he studied under Stilpo, of the Megaric school, subsequently receiving instruction from two other Megarics, Diodorus Cronos and Philo, and from the Academics, Xenocrates and Polemo. After many years, he developed his peculiar philosophical system, and opened his school in the

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porch adorned with the paintings of Polygnotus (Stoa Poecilê).

Zeno wrote numerous works, but the writings of Chrysippus and the later Stoics seem to have obscured and altered his teaching. His lectures were published by his pupil and friend Arrianus (90-170).

Epictetus was the founder of the new Stoic School.

One of the ornaments of the later school was Antiochus, of Aegae, in Cilicia, a sophist or, as he pretended to be, a Cynic philosopher, who flourished about A.D. 200. He was one of the most distinguished rhetoricians of his time, and also acquired some reputation as a writer.

Antiochus of Ascalon, the founder of the fifth Academy, was the friend of Lucullus, and the teacher of Cicero during his studies at Athens, B.C. 79; he lectured at Alexandria also, and at Rome, as well as in Syria, where he seems to have ended his life. His principal teacher was Philo (a native of Larissa, and a disciple of Clitomachus) who succeeded Plato, Arcesilaus, and Carneades, as the founder of the fourth Academy. He is, however, better known as the adversary than the disciple of Philo, and Cicero mentions a treatise called *Sosus*, written by him against his master, in which he refutes the scepticism of the Academics.

The ethics of Plato cannot properly be treated as a finished result, but rather as a continual movement from the position of Socrates towards the more complete and articulate system of Aristotle; except that there is a mystical element at the core of Plato's thinking which finds no counterpart in Aristotle, and in fact disappears from Greek philosophy soon after Plato's

From Plato to Aristotle

death, until it finds a partial revival and fantastic development in Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.

When a student passes from Plato to Aristotle, he is so forcibly impressed by the contrast between the habits of mind of the two authors that it is easy to understand how their systems have come to be popularly conceived as diametrically opposed to each other; and the uncompromising polemic which Aristotle, both in his ethical and metaphysical treatises, directs against Plato and the Platonists, has tended strongly to confirm this view. Yet a closer inspection shows us that when a later President of the Academy (Antiochus of Ascalon) repudiated the scepticism which for 200 years had been accepted as the traditional Platonic doctrine, he had good ground for claiming Plato and Aristotle as coincident authorities for the ethical position which he took up. The truth is, that though Aristotle's divergence from Plato is very conspicuous when we consider either his general conception of the subject of ethics or the scientific working out of his system of virtues, still his agreement with his master is almost complete as regards the main outline of his theory of human good; the difference between the two practically vanishing when we view them in relation to the later controversy between Stoics and Epicureans.

Of all the philosophical systems of antiquity that of Aristotle was best adapted to the practical wants of mankind.

On the whole there is probably no treatise so masterly as Aristotle's *Ethics* of the Peripatetic School, and containing so much close and valid thought, that yet

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leaves on the reader's mind so strong an impression of dispersive and incomplete work. It is only by dwelling on those defects that we can understand the small amount of influence that his system exercised during the five centuries after his death in which the Schools sprung from Socrates were still predominant in Græco-Roman culture, as compared with the effect which it has now directly or indirectly in shaping the thought of modern Europe.

The intellectual descent of the ethical doctrines of the Stoics is principally to be traced back to Socrates through the Cynics, though an important element in them seems to be attributable to the school that inherited the "Academy" of Plato. It is only by a modern misinterpretation of Stoicism that tranquillity or serenity of soul is taken as the real ultimate end, to which the exercise of virtue is merely a means. In Zeno's system, as in Aristotle's, it is good activity, and not the feeling that attends it, which constitutes the essence of good life.

We come now to Epicurus. He maintains, on the one hand, as emphatically as Aristippus, the Cyrenaic, that pleasure is the sole ultimate good and pain the sole evil, but the aspect of this statement changes when we learn that the highest point of pleasure, whether in body or mind, is to be obtained by the mere removal of pain or disturbance, after which pleasure admits of variation only and not of augmentation. It would appear therefore that the utmost gratification of which the body is capable may be provided by the simplest means, and that "natural wealth" is defined as being no more than any man can earn.

The fate of the various Greek schools varied

Epicurus, Plotinus and Aquinas

considerably. Epicureanism languished, and Stoicism changed its mode, partly by reason of the natural inner development of the system, partly owing to the reaction of the Roman mind on the essentially Greek system which it received.

The Egyptian Plotinus (205-270 A.D.) is the latest-born of the great thinkers of antiquity. He inaugurated Neo-Platonism. The ethics of Plotinus represent the moral idealism of the Stoics cut loose from nature. The cardinal assumption of Plato's metaphysics is, that the *real* is definitely thinkable and knowable in proportion as it is real. Plotinus argues that as all thought involves difference of quality of some kind, it cannot be the primary fact in the universe, *i.e.*, what we call God.

Neo-Platonism is originally Alexandrine, and is Hellenistic rather than Hellenic, a product of the mingling of Greek with Oriental civilization. The *forms* of Oriental thought by which the views were philosophically reached are essentially Greek. At the same time, one ought not to overlook the affinities between the doctrine of Plotinus and that remarkable combination of Greek and Hebrew thought which Philo Judæus had expounded two centuries before ; nor the fact that Neo-Platonism was developed in conscious antagonism not only to the new religion which had spread from Judæa and was already threatening the conquest of the Greco-Roman world, but also to those fantastic hybrids of Christianity and later paganism, the Gnostic systems ; nor, finally, that it furnished the chief theoretical support in the last desperate struggle that was made under Julian to retain the old polytheistic worship.

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It was not until the fourth century, under Ambrose, that the first attempt was made to offer anything like a systematic exposition of Christian morality, and nine centuries more had passed away before a genuinely philosophic intellect—that of Thomas Aquinas—trained by a full study of the greatest Greek thinker, undertook to give complete scientific form to the ethical doctrine of the Catholic Church.

The moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is Aristotelianism with a Neo-Platonic tinge, interpreted and supplemented by Christian dogma, inflected with the study of Roman jurisprudence. Leading up to the analysis of Thomas Aquinas we have the dogmatic construction of Anselm (1033-1109), the bold questions and suggestive paradoxes of Petrus Lombardus (*d.* 1164); the moral Aristotelian erudition of Albertus Magnus (1193-1280), and the Neo-Platonic mysticism of Johannes Scotus (Erigena, *d.* 875).

The work of Aquinas was foredoomed to ultimate failure, since it attempted the impossible task of framing a coherent system out of the heterogeneous data furnished by Scripture, the Fathers, the Church and "the Philosopher"—equally unquestioned, if not equally venerated, authorities.

What philosophic quality is to be found in the work of Thomas belongs to it in spite of, not in consequence of, its method. Still its influence has been great and long-enduring—in the Roman Church primarily, but indirectly amongst Anglicans and Protestants, especially in England, since the famous first book of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* is (to a great extent) taken from the *Summa Theologiæ*.

CHAPTER III

THE INCEPTION OF THE IDEA.

IT is a matter of the greatest interest and importance to review the speculation of thinkers from early times as to the philosophic problems which have vexed the minds of men; to mark the rise and fall of theories, the jetsam and flotsam of thought, so that one might be enabled to realize what is left to us in the twentieth century in such wise as to form an assured foundation on which to rear a more illustrious and permanent edifice of thought for the future.

We will treat of the subject under the following heads :

- A The inception of the " Idea."
- B The correlation of thought to produce new combinations.
- C The conception of the Absolute.
- D The problem of Determinism or Free Will.
- E The existence of evil—so called.
- F The influence of modern thought and discovery on ancient and mediæval philosophy.
- G The effect on the mind of the study of philosophy.
- H Casuistry—a department of philosophy.

THE " IDEA."

We shall define the " Idea " to be the inception one is led to entertain of an object realized as external.

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This is mainly and primarily due to sense impressions. There are certain qualities attaching to any object which appear to be intrinsic—such as extension, mass, resonance, crystallization ; others which are accidental—such as position, colour.

These qualities, whatever they be, are apprehended by our sense-organs, which convey the impressions they derive along afferent nerves to the nerve centres—ganglia and brain—where they produce corresponding molecular changes.

It is evident that, in the stages of infancy, the imperfection of the instrument and the lack of power of interpretation preclude the individual from forming adequate and correct conclusions ; but this handicap is removed with the increase of time and education ; so that, ultimately, the individual arrives at such a stage as to be able to recognize the same object under differing circumstances, to compare it with like objects, and to mark the elements of similarity or differentiation.

Two matters await us on the threshold of this subject—matters that have been brought into notice but in recent times, viz :

(1) The fact of subconsciousness.

(2) The light thrown by the theory of evolution.

(1) Consciousness may be regarded as a field with a central or " focal " part, and a marginal area. When attention is intensely fixed, consciousness seems gathered to a point ; in reverie, on the other hand, no part of the field of consciousness seems more prominent than another. Ordinary consciousness consists essentially in discrimination of objects from each other ; so that

Sub-Consciousness and Evolution

the difference between consciousness and sub-consciousness resolves itself into the presence or absence of discrimination.

"Threshold of consciousness" is a term often employed in connection with the relation between consciousness and sub-consciousness. From this point of view, sub-consciousness usually has an extended meaning, and so stands for the whole of the ideas capable of being restored by memory to full consciousness. All these are below the "threshold," and rise above it into clear consciousness under certain cognitive or emotional conditions. Such often appear to arise spontaneously ; at other times only such ideas arise as have some affinity with those which already occupy the focus of consciousness. In this view, ideas are conceived to be constantly passing above and below the "threshold of consciousness."

(2) The theory of evolution would appear to have a bearing on the discussion respecting Innate Ideas, *i.e.*, ideas supposed to be in the mind independently of experience. Locke assails this doctrine in his "Essay on the Human Understanding." It can now hardly be said that he is right in his advocacy of the opposite hypothesis that the mind before sensuous experience is a "tabula rasa." It was the Cartesian Philosophy that Locke attacked ; but the "innate ideas" of Descartes himself rather resemble the Categories of Kant. According to Aristotle's treatment, the Categories are a classification of the kinds of possible predicates of a subject, and are ten in number. Again, J. S. Mill sets out the Categories as a classification of nameable things. In Kant's view, the Category is an

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a priori principle of the understanding, a principle without which experience of objects would be impossible. The Categories of the understanding arrange and interpret the matter which is given to sense. "Cause and effect" is one of his Categories. By experience we learn that a particular phenomenon A is the cause of a particular phenomenon B; but the principle that "every effect has a cause" is an *a priori* principle of the understanding without which we should have no idea of seeking to explain phenomena as related causally. This principle is not derived from an observation of instances, but is presupposed in all particular instances.

Therefore, Nativism (as it is called) would teach that certain ideas and principles are inborn or innate in the mind, so that man would bring them into the world inchoate but complete.

Plato's Nativism appears especially in his Dialogue, entitled the *Meno*, where knowledge is described as Reminiscence.

Leibnitz took up a middle position. He replied to Locke's formula, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, by the limitation, *Nisi intellectus ipse*.

In Kant's view, the *a priori* elements are not prior to experience *in time*; indeed, they are nothing at all apart from sense-experience. He means simply that certain ideas—*e.g.*, the idea of cause—do not arise from sensations, but are elements furnished by the mind itself.

CHAPTER IV

THE CORRELATION OF THOUGHT TO PRODUCE NEW COMBINATIONS.

A GREAT and assured advance may be looked for when these problems are approached from the physical and evolutionary points of view. Philosophy has often obtained a bad name from the fact that its votaries are apt to argue about terms imperfectly defined ; about faculties which were attempted to be isolated from other faculties ; and about phenomena which could not be brought to the test of repeated trial and experiment. Hence, there arose interminable arguments amongst men wandering in the mazes of speculation and evolving facts out of their own inner consciousness. Even in philosophy it is as well—so far as the subject allows—to introduce scientific fact and scientific method.

The origin of life must be tackled before we can tackle the further problem of the origin of thought and all that *thought involves*.

Undoubtedly the former problem is largely a matter of speculation, but the hypothesis which at present holds the field is that, at some remote period, by means of an agency not revealed to science, under terrestrial conditions due to a special geologic period, certain inorganic elements were combined to form the protylic stuff out of which all life—vegetable and animal alike—

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was to be afterwards derived. Whether this was done once for all at one point only on the earth's surface, or whether it has been a continuous process at various points even up to the present day, it is unnecessary to debate for our present purpose.

From this original protoplasm—capable of multiplication and extension by budding, by parthenogenic or sexual action—has been formed the warp and woof of that garment out of which Dame Nature has vivified and developed every shrub, every animal, every sentient being, that has ever existed. In each of these individual objects or beings has been hidden away a modicum of this protoplasm, a modicum acted upon in such a way by the mature organism that a multiplication is furnished in the seed plot, which (by divers means) is capable of being passed on—by means of male and female elements—to individuals of the same species, who, in their turn, can transmit like elements of life to succeeding generations.

Hence, in respect to any human being, life is not a special creation, but is linked on to all other forms of life from the beginning, and will itself furnish a link to all other forms in the future. We are not separate individuals—we are interdependent members of a colony. Thus there is impressed upon the protoplasmic cell (which in the form of the impregnated ovum, forms the beginnings of foetal life), an element common to all other life whatsoever—of all kinds and of all times—a capacity for the reception and assortment of impressions derived from that existence which is common to all. As we know, the exhibition of these powers in the infant is lingering and imperfect. At

Sense-Impressions

first, it is deaf to the voices of nature ; insensible and irresponsible to her blandishments ; but by constant experience of trial and failure, and by participation in the experience of others, at length it attains to the full use of its faculties, and enters into its complete heritage. These facts appear to dispose of the idea that the mind is originally nought but a *tabula rasa*, and to support the conclusion that those philosophers were right who maintained the theories of Nativism and Innate Ideas.

From these considerations one can understand the possibility of the mind, with these ancestral powers impressed upon it, catching up any sense-impressions falling upon it, sorting them out, putting some aside for further consideration, comparing others—by way of likeness and unlikeness—with impressions already received, in such wise as to modify old conclusions, or (by way of acceptance or rejection) to formulate new ones.

It is unlikely that any sense impression, or what follows upon it (by reason of that primitive action which—by the original union of new elements marking the origination of a distinct personality—is brought to bear upon it) is ever completely lost to the individual. It is open to conjecture, *e.g.*, that each of the millions of particles of grey matter that go to form the brain has a distinct office to perform as a carrier of some particular excitation. That possibility may enable us to realize more clearly the function of *memory* ; a function more readily accounted for on the theory of Nativism than on any other. When the will is strong and active it can call up and put in train lines of consecutive thought converging to form a particular

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judgment. When the will has lost control, as in dreams, the cell carriers do not form consecutive or converging lines ; hence the formation of incongruous images made up of portions of sensible forms and allowed to wander, crowded together, through the avenues of the mind.

In the case of senile decay past events can be impressively rendered by reason of the frequent repetition—consciously or unconsciously—that has taken place ; but the photographic surface of the brain cells is dulled—the tissues are hardened—the blood current is sluggish ; hence new facts are mastered with difficulty ; the connecting lines are blocked ; the veteran finds it hard to remember the names of persons and places, or even what he himself had said or done a brief while ago.

CHAPTER V

THE ORIGIN OF EVIL

THERE are various considerations which enter into our investigations of this subject, *i.e.*, of the origin, nature, characteristics, extent and dominion of all that is comprized under the term Evil—including alike physical pain, catastrophic desolation in nature, and moral turpitude. Such are the following :

- A The nature of the Absolute.
- B The characteristics of Human Personality.
- C The elements of Determinism and Free Will.
- D The transitoriness of Human Life.
- E The definition of what is popularly called Evil.
- F The theory of Development, and the consequent imperfection of our earthly existence.
- G The inter-relation of the Individual and the Species

It will be found that what we now know and are enabled to realize of all these points will lead us to entertain no surprise that there should exist, in this world, amongst human beings, physical, mental and moral disturbance eventuating in what may be rightly termed pain and sin.

A. THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE.

Man is not qualified, by his position, constitution, or acquirements to solve this problem with any degree

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of completeness, to determine "the beginning before the beginning," the origin, personality, characteristics, mode of existence and nature of what we provisionally call the Absolute. Indeed, it may well be that at no period of man's future career will his faculties, (though indefinitely enlarged and extended) be capable fully of apprehending or compassing these factors. Nevertheless, it may be asserted with confidence that, at the present stage of human thought, the nature of the problem and its limits are more clearly understood than ever before, inasmuch as the ground has been cleared of certain errors due to the childhood of the race, so that philosophic thought has advanced a step forward, and received guarantees of future progress. In great measure this is due to the extension of biological science; and although in the time to come present-day theories of evolution and development may be modified or enlarged, it is unlikely that they will be altogether superseded, and that scientists should revert to theories now discarded relating to special creation or the like.

As a matter of speculation, the Absolute may be taken to be the sum of all life—sentient and non-sentient—known to us and existent on this sphere as in the most distant orbs of the stellar universe.

It would seem to follow that anything—of what may be called good or evil import—which affects one part of the general organism must also affect every other part; after the manner of a stone cast into a pond causing eddying circles to appear which spread out widely and more widely still until they break on the distant shore.

The Absolute

This being allowed, an extension into the psychical sphere may also be granted, viz., that it is probable the Absolute must respond to the incidence of evil or of good. Employing the familiar term God, it would appear to be a false idea to regard Him as a thing of ice—a Being Who, while sitting above the water-floods, setting in motion streams of tendencies, permitting to happen events—alike of good and evil import—in the physical and moral worlds, is entirely unmoved by the consequences, which are thus conceived to be incapable of exerting any reflex influences whatsoever upon His exalted Nature. How much better and truer would it conceivably be to assume that His infinitely sensitive personality would respond to any good deed done by any one of His creatures, or, contrariwise, to any doing of evil—that He rejoices at the one and deprecates the other. It would appear that the denial of this relation and union would withdraw a distinct element from the Absolute, and that such a conception as an apathetic, cold-blooded, indifferent, impassionate personality would weaken our adhesion, whilst the realization of a feeling, sympathizing, even suffering Being, would tend to add to the sum of the Ultimate Good. If it could be alleged that the Christ wore the highest manifestation of the Absolute in human form, it should be the highest interest and pleasure—both for individual and collective reasons—for each believer to make this fact known even to the furthest corners of the globe. To the extent to which this is done, to the same extent the kingdom of God is advanced ; if indifference prevail, to that degree the coming of the Kingdom is retarded.

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One must not leave out of account the supposition that there may be other spiritual powers than the Absolute. If one were led to attribute to one—the Head, let us say, of these spiritual powers—the attributes of omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence, as in the case of the popular Devil—but another form, by the way, of the Miltonic Satan—we should be running the risk of suggesting a Dualistic Universe, the elements of which would be warring one against the other. That idea appears to be negatived by the declarations of science as to the physical Cosmos, in which Order (implying Unity, or, at all events, Co-operation) is predominant. The incidence of catastrophic occurrences may appear to militate against this conclusion, but might not these be accounted for, on normal grounds, by regarding them as the outcome of ordinary “laws,” operating in respect of the cumulative effects of small forces?

Reasoning from analogy, one might, perhaps, presume to say that Order was likewise predominant in the moral world, that “good” was capable of overcoming “evil,” in spite of the facts that it is easier for the individual to do evil than to do good, that “good” is slow in coming to its own, and that it often appears to be neutralized or overwhelmed by “evil.”

Nevertheless, if we allow the independent existence of malign spiritual powers, and couple with that the action of “free-will” amongst mankind, we must also allow the possibility—or rather, the conceivability—that the Good Powers may ultimately be dominated by the Evil.

The Conception of the Absolute

THE CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE.

It is clear that one cannot reach any conclusion on this point *per saltum*, seeing that one can but start with the consciousness of one's own existence—one's power of receiving, comparing, contrasting, the impressions derived from "outward" things, and one's power of forming judgments concerning these as to their entities—their essentials, their accidents, their place in space and time. After a while, one naturally asks certain questions about the world and all things therein: Whence came they? Why do they always behave in such and such a manner, or display such and such attributes? Why do they act in such and such ways when at rest or when in motion? Hence, we have two things at least to account for: the existence or origin of particular objects; their behaviour under changing circumstances.

From our own personal action and experience we are prone to say: the thing which is made must have a maker. But it is clear that our experience is limited both in time and space. We know but little of the life-history of the world in which we dwell, still less of the manner of development of the solar system or the celestial universe which fills illimitable space. Even assuming the above general proposition that "everything that is made must have had a maker," is it clear that there must have been but one maker, or have there been different makers at different times, or are there many makers now existing simultaneously? Further, if there be One Universal Maker, why should it be impossible to apply our original guiding principle (as little children

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sometimes do) and assert that this Maker must have had a Maker, and so on, in endless succession ?

The fact is that the mind reels when one attempts to consider the ultimate origin of all things—of Time and Eternity, of Space and Infinity, of Matter and Motion, on the lines—objectively—on which we generally conceive of such verities as being outside our own cranium. It is clear that our ordinary two-foot rule cannot measure infinite space—neither can our ordinary thought conceive of an infinitely extensible, universal, First Cause, All-seeing, All-knowing, All-powerful.

Hence, the discussions that have taken place as to the Absolute, the *causa causans*, the Name otherwise described as God, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, the Reality, the Infinite Substance. The goal of all monistic philosophies is to discover the nature of this Infinite Being, which is alone real and unconditioned, and the ground of all finite conditioned beings. Finite Being exists, and is known through its relations with similar beings ; the Infinite Being (by its definition) is above all finite relations, and so is Absolute. This Absolute Being is called *Substance*, by Spinoza—*Spirit*, by Hegel—*Experience*, by Bradley.

Differing conceptions of the Absolute have led to the development of different philosophies, such as :

Pantheism ;

Deism ;

Theism.

Pantheism is the doctrine of God's being which insists on the Divine immanence in Nature to the exclusion of the idea of His transcendence.

The Ego

If Pantheism may be regarded as arising out of the exclusive emphasis of the idea of Divine immanence, the opposite extreme (namely, the exclusive emphasis of the idea of Divine transcendence) leads to Deism.

Hence, from this point of view, Theism is the mean of which Deism and Pantheism are the extremes.

All this goes to demonstrate the difficulty of arriving at any quick and certain demonstration as to human personality, even as to the principle—freed from all doubts—with which, Descartes started to construct his philosophy. Finding the witness of the senses doubtful, and observing how much uncertainty attached to all knowledge, he determined provisionally to doubt everything. But of one thing he found it impossible to doubt, the existence of the “*I*.” For if *I* doubt or *I* deny, that means *I* must think, and the *I* who thinks must exist. Hence his first principle, “*Cogito, ergo sum.*” So far Descartes, but why may one not go one step further and say: “*Cogito me cogitare, ergo, cogito me esse,*” “*I think that I think, therefore I think that I am?*” One may even suggest a further series, but that way madness lies!

THEORIES OF THE OPERATION OF THE ABSOLUTE IN NATURE.

How can we explain the creation and government of the world in which we live? We can do it only by assuming that the phenomena we observe in Nature are co-existent; and that a particular collocation of circumstances (unless interfered with by an external agent) eventuates in similar conditions; also that under like circumstances, the sequence of like phenomena is

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uniform. Hence some may say that a like cause invariably produces a like effect, and that we can lay down laws which shall be immutable. But, when we dive to the bottom of things, these explanations prove too facile.

THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING.

The traditional arguments for the existence of God are :

- (1) The Ontological,
- (2) The Cosmological.
- (3) The Physico-Theological, or the Argument from Design.

(1) The first-named was adumbrated by Anselm, but in its present form is due to Descartes, who says : We have an idea of a most real or perfect being, and since one attribute of a perfect being must be *existence* (for we could not speak of it as perfect if it were lacking in that attribute) it follows that the most real or perfect being exists. Our idea of God, that is, implies *existence*, although the argument cannot be used of anything *finite*. This argument was opposed by Hume and Kant.

(2) The Cosmological—also developed by Descartes—runs : If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being exists : *I* exist, therefore an absolutely necessary *Being* exists. Yet, as we have said, the cause of finite existences may (conceivably) be not a single perfect, all-inclusive being, but a number of beings, each contributing some part to the general effect.

(3) The Physico-theological argument or argument from Design, elects to prove the existence of an all-powerful, all-wise, and all-benevolent Creator by the

Cause and Effect

marks in Nature that show it to be contrived to subserve some human good. Hume objects that there are marks of inadaptation as well as of adaptation to man's good. Kant observes that so far as the argument is valid it points to no more than a wise architect of the world, certainly not to an Omnipotent Creator, who is absolute master of the machine with which he works.

Monism is a theory which explains the world as the manifestation of one principle, whether this be spiritual or material. It is opposed to Dualism and Pluralism. Idealism, Materialism, Naturalism are all monistic theories.

Thus one sees the thorns in the way of a perfect demonstration.

There are two series of thoughts which enter into the field of view in our own day—one of which complicates the issue, the other simplifies it.

The first is, that owing to enlarged conceptions of the interdependence of the various elements of the Universe to one another, we cannot speak of a single cause or a single effect. Every phenomenon of which we can have any conception is the product of the infinite number of causes which have been in operation during an infinite series of times, and eventuate in a resultant which is not the issue of a small number of simple forces but of innumerable forces acting together. We ourselves see one event following upon another, we do not *see* one event cause another. Everywhere in Nature, so far as external experience goes, we discover sequence but not causality. Further, no sooner is an effect produced than it is involved in the series of

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world-effects, and is operative to produce other effects in the immediate future.

But, secondly, it will be said, what of the Reign of Law? Law is the issue of a chain of causes issuing in an unvaried series of events. It is impossible to assert that there is any such series which does not admit of interference from without and consequently may not—now and then—exhibit a departure from the sequence. Law is sometimes spoken of as if—of itself—it exercised a constraining influence to bring about an infallible and unvarying result ; but it will be gathered, from what has been adduced, that this is a conception which goes beyond the record. One may conceive of an Absolute Power exercising his fiat—through all time—in a certain direction ; but that would be confounding Will with Law, and would be a theological idea rather than a philosophical.

It is true that recent researches in science have demonstrated the fact that there is a series of distinct unities in the visible material world, viz. :

Unity of material.

Unity of shape.

Unity of motion.

This applies to the most distant star as well as to our humble planet, and would seem to lead to the conclusion that there must be a unity of design and purpose in a creative, energizing, and controlling power ; but we are only led to this conclusion by assuming that *our* order of thought and power of judgment are similar to the order of thought and power of judgment of the original Creative and Ordaining Principle.

Unity of Design

The facts as to the Conservation of Matter and the Conservation of Energy* are strongly confirmatory of the Unity of Creation, although we need to be reminded that—so far as one knows—there is no similar principle in the realm of thought, or feeling, or will ; which tends to show what difference may exist between the material and the spiritual. The nature of this difference will doubtless be further illustrated in the future by extended investigations into vibratory forces, such as light, heat, and electricity, including the transmission of electrical waves through the air without the assistance of wires.

It may be well to pause here for a moment to note the different conceptions introduced into our consideration of " matter " by recent theories relating to centres of force and vortical motion, which have replaced the hard and fast ideas formerly entertained respecting the " manufactured article "—the atom. The researches, too, of our advanced physicists into the nature and behaviour of the celestial ether may prove to have an important bearing upon existing notions of matter and motion.

B. •THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN PERSONALITY.

Each individual passes from stage to stage, at each stage discarding certain characteristics and assuming others ; yet his personality exists, although varying in its manifestations. The child who plays with a few tin

* One leaves out of account, for the moment, the problems introduced by the discovery of radium and its successive decompositions.

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soldiers on the floor of his nursery is the same individual who may ultimately find himself the commander of a million armed men. At the first there is displayed all the elements of childhood—immaturity, wilful ignorance or inevitable lack of knowledge and experience, and uncertainty or frailty of judgment. However long the individual may live, he will never be able to survive the original imperfection due to his inchoate nature.

C. THE ELEMENT OF DETERMINISM OR OF FREE WILL.

This element has been already touched upon under different heads, to which reference may be made in the respective pages.

One may conceive a Creator constituting a world of inanimate objects incapable of thought or feeling; one may also conceive of his peopling this world with animate objects, dowered with instincts invariably causing them to fulfil the design of their creation; but such beings would practically be automata, having no sense of right or wrong, and therefore no responsibility. Hence, they could neither be praised nor blamed for anything they did—they could be neither congratulated in times of victory nor consoled with in defeat.

These successive acts of creation would contribute so many upward steps; first, there would be matter unformed; next, matter organized into sea and sky and air, into tree and shrub, into flower and fruit; the next stage would witness the advent of creatures able to respond to outward influences—to form communities and to engender life—to guard that life from danger—

Free Will

and to supply the necessities of those—younger or weaker than themselves—cast upon them for protection.

Presumably the Creator would be a thinking, reasoning, feeling Being, possessing, above all, the attribute of Freedom. This is one of the highest attributes of sentient life, enabling the individual to discuss the difference between light and darkness, good and evil, truth and error; to deliberate, and (free and unfettered) to make a choice; to energize in order to bring about the desired result, and even (when for the time the matter appeared to hang in the balance) to maintain the pressure against opposing forces; to respond to the impulse to put forth still greater efforts; and, finally, to accomplish the end steadfastly and persistently set before the mind so as to achieve complete victory.

To us that state appears to be the highest form of existence—*i.e.*, for the individual to have the opportunity of choice—to realize the possible loss on the one side, the possible gain on the other—and, finally, to throw all the weight of thought, feeling, and will into the scale for good.

Therefore it need not be matter for surprise that, in the ascending scale of creation, human beings should be created after this pattern, and we are not dismayed by the fact that it has taken long drawn out æons to transform the unintelligent and unreflective beast into the reasoning and responsible man. Such work is always carried on gradually, the best work being ever of the slowest growth.

It may seem unnatural and unusual that the creature

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should be able to defy the will and defeat the design of the Creator—for that is what the exercise of free-will often means—but our astonishment is lessened when one reflects that human parentage leads to the same confusion. The child becomes a separate personality, with a power of initiative, with ideas and a will of its own. Constant illustration is furnished of the fact that the wills of parent and child may come into conflict, and that the love and care exercised by the older and more experienced may be set at naught by the younger.

Such exhibitions as these—but, far more, the disobedience and disloyalty of man in general to the Creator—the evil passions of individuals—the blindness of nations—the apathy and indolence of Christian Churches—may serve to remind one that we are only just emerging from barbarism, and are slowly passing from the childhood of the race to what we trust may prove to be a purer, better, more restrained and obedient manhood.

D. THE TRANSITORINESS OF HUMAN LIFE.

If life here had a finite limit, if death ended all, the problem we are considering would assume a greater complexity. There may be some who would say—“Considerations affecting the origin, constitution and government of the Universe—of the life and travail of human beings—of the danger and temptation which beset every individual—of the possible destiny of the race, whether here or hereafter, are so complex and insoluble that we will put them on one side and not attempt to solve all these riddles, but carry on our life on such lines as the ordinary experience of ordinary men

Transitoriness of Life

may suggest." Such a repression of thought, however, is neither possible nor desirable for the vast majority of thinking, feeling, suffering mortals ; but all that is possible even for the acutest thinker is to formulate such a series of solutions as may furnish a coherent whole and be not inconsistent with such probability and experience as it is possible to attain. A formulation such as this may be speculative but not necessarily unreal.

Such a theory is founded on the conviction that this world is not the final home of its inhabitants, that a wise and beneficent Creator is persistently interesting Himself in the welfare of His Creation, and that He designs this world to be a School wherein His scholars might be taught and disciplined by the varied experience of sunshine and shadow, joy and sorrow, success and failure here below ; to the end that their moral fibre may be strengthened, and their whole life elevated so as to render them fit subjects for an entrance into a future life where, with enlarged powers and capabilities, they may be permitted to engage in a nobler work.

It cannot be said that this conception is unworthy either of God or man—it is complete—it is coherent—it has satisfied the aspirations of some of the noblest men and women of all ages ; and it goes far to explain the presence of that physical and moral tension we call pain and grief and sin.

E. THE DEFINITION OF WHAT WE CALL EVIL.

Thus, we have recognized that this world may conceivably be but a passage way to another and a higher

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form of existence ; that we are on the childhood stage of existence, involved in a wave of development. Hence, we can see and judge but partially the accidents and incidents of our daily life. Oftentimes we call good evil and evil good—we are hasty and premature in our judgments—what, in relation to ourselves, is an accident, is to others a judgment—we fail to see that pain, loss, anxiety, temptation, danger, shame, affliction, death—everything, in fact, we include in the generic term *evil* may be but instruments in the hands of a Higher Power to discipline our character, to evoke sympathy for others, and to wean our affections from the distractions of the world below so as to fix them upon the delights and experiences of a loftier future and a higher plane of life.

The existence of free-will enables us to forecast the existence of what is called evil.

Doubtless, much of what *we* call evil is merely inconvenient to the individual ; again, much of what *we* call evil may (unknown to us) serve to release us from greater evil, or, indeed, may prove to be but blessing in disguise. Further, the incidence of evil to one individual may be the immediate cause of good fortune to another.

Yet, when we survey the great catastrophes of nature—storms, natural disturbances of all kinds (which no wisdom could enable mankind to forecast and no sleight of hand enable him to avoid or overcome)—one cannot help sometimes doubting the goodness of the God we postulate and His care for the creatures He has called into being.

Again, when one considers the general rapacity of

Good in Evil

Nature, the oppression of the weak by the strong, the spoliation of the simple-minded by the cunning, the inroads of the many upon the few ; the greed, vanity, and lust of power of the ruling authorities of one nation in conflict with another (such as the exploitation of Luxemburg, Belgium, and Servia by Germany, in our own day), one cannot help occasionally asking oneself why God did not interfere to prevent such crimes or, at all events, to mitigate their consequences.

It is very difficult even for an advanced Christian to formulate a satisfactory reply. Such a one is often hampered—if one may call it so—by the popular idea of special Providential interpositions. Theoretically, God is instant in every place and at every time—not a sparrow falls to the ground but by His fiat—He controls every heart-beat of the least of His creatures.

Neither would it help us to formulate the idea of a mechanical universe, which would have impressed upon it immutable laws and dispositions and be wound up and set going in such wise as to be self-acting and eternal.

It would appear to meet the case to assume that God's existence and attributes are of such a nature as to presuppose our nature and attributes too ; and that God (being, as must be supposed, inherently strong enough and wise enough to overcome with a supremely-conscious effort all desire to error or defect) is limited by His own nature thus to fight against evil in conjunction with those who carry on the same fight in this world below.

One allows by experience that it is far easier to do wrong than right ; that (in a moment) one may commit

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a sin of which the consequences may follow one through all time.

Yet, with all this, it is also true that the fight against evil, the frequent effort following the frequent fall, the strenuous endeavour to face the bitter failure and to discipline the whole man, all combine to strengthen the character, to harden the will, and to elevate the entire individual self.

The disposition of the man or woman who may have passed through the fiery trial of loss and shame—of pain and sickness—of lengthened spiritual struggle against outward danger and inward temptation—is usually found to be more elevated and sublimated even than that of one who has led a good life whilst being sheltered from the cold blasts of trial and dismay.

All this does not meet the case of those catastrophic disasters which, ever and anon, startle humanity—such as the explosion of a volcano, the vengeful track of a torpedo, the loss of a miracle of thought and industry, such as the "Titanic"; but, to take the latter instance only, a loss of that description tends to rebuke man's presumption; so that speaking generally, every great convulsion of nature with its many victims summons mankind to reflect on the uncertain tenure on which our mortal life is held and the necessity to be ready at *all* times for the change that *may* come to-day but *must* come to-morrow.

Furthermore, in times of sudden tragedy, a large measure of sympathy is evoked, whereby hearts and hands are opened, and man is brought nearer to his fellow.

If life were lived here below without accident, or

Alleviations

incident of evil, we should all become self-contained, self-indulgent, hard-hearted, and close-fisted—this world would become a perfect hell; for one may readily conceive of hell as a place of recrimination, without sympathy or mutual help.

If the Higher Power promised to all His subjects here below unlimited prosperity and endless life, there might be occasion to complain of visitations of famine or destruction, or of sudden or violent death. Such promises, however, have nowhere been made; certainly not by Christ and His Apostles in the new dispensation.

All those who went down on the "Titanic" must have died at some time or other—many, perchance, after long years of suffering from malignant disease, or after being slowly worn down by the insidious inroads of old age. Further, life at its best must have been for many of them a long and bitter struggle against evil fortune. Thus, when the balance is struck, one must conclude—even in view of the spasm of despair at the awful doom which befel them—that (even taking into account this brief and bitter experience) the sum of human discomfort, loss, and misery, was lessened rather than heightened even in respect of one of the greatest of the fell calamities of the sea.

There are three possible ways of meeting the supreme difficulty arising out of the untoward course of things in the world.

(1) It may be denied that evil is really evil.

But either our moral judgments are valid or they are not. If they are not valid we have no right to say that the world is very good, inasmuch as we have no sure

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ground for coming to any conclusion with a claim to certainty.

(2) To suppose that while the designs and intuitions of God are good, He is prevented from carrying them out without allowing or causing at the same time some measure of evil.

According to this view, the world process may be looked upon as a process by which evil is gradually being eliminated, and the good developed, by a perfectly-good Being who is the *most* powerful Being in the Universe, but not *all*-powerful. In this way it becomes possible to regard God as not only good, but as not, in any sense whatever, the author of evil.

Again, whatever our exact ideas may be as to the relation between our mind and body, it will scarcely be denied that they are (in some way or other) very closely connected.

The development of mind goes on *pari passu* with material processes in the brain and nervous system. The natural inference is that whatever power causes the successive steps of the material process causes also the accompanying psychical or mental changes. How then, on the above supposition, can we account for evil feelings and thoughts?

(3) If the limitation of power which explains the causality (or allowance) of evil by a perfectly righteous will is not to be made clear by the existence of beings or forces which are outside of Him, it must be due to an internal or original limitation of Power on His side.

God is limited simply by His own eternal Nature. This is generally admitted by theologians as regards limitations arising from character. It is not considered

Ways of Meeting Difficulty

necessary to the Omnipotence or to the freedom of God to maintain that He could do things inconsistent with His character, that He should be able to cause evil, for instance, otherwise than as a means to good. Why should there not be a limitation of the same intrinsic nature to the power of God ? Unless one admits such a limitation, one simply cannot maintain the unlimited goodness of God, except by the aid of some one or other of the sophisms which seek to shew that an evil which tends to good is not really evil.*

F. THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT.

Upon a careful summing up of the partial evidence we possess and on the supposition that we desire to attain to a perfectly satisfactory conclusion, it may well appear that the problem of the origin of evil is insoluble. In part we are driven to this confession by the fact so little realized that we know but little or nothing of the origin, personality, characteristics of the Being we call God. In the case of Christians like ourselves, it may be said that we have a perfect revelation in the Scriptures. In the view of those who take a very modest estimate of inspiration, they tell us little about God, but much about man's thoughts about God ; those writers being, like ourselves, tiny, ignorant, fallible creatures crawling about on an insignificant planet tucked away in a corner of the stellar—and indeed of the solar—universe.

Doubtless our thoughts are permitted to deal with the mysteries of this greater Universe, its vastness, its

* *Vide* Canon Rashdall's Essay on *The Problem of Evil* in "The Faith and the War."

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multitudinous parts, its symmetry, order and unification. Undoubtedly power and wisdom alike are manifested in its constitution and preservation, but the possession of strength and mentality on the part even of a Deity does not of itself justify us in the assumption that such a Being must necessarily and by consequence possess moral attributes.

Again, when we turn our attention to the world in which we live, we cannot fail to note that there is much pain, hardship, hunger, thirst, and fear of death involved in the existence of every living thing. In the primeval forest the deer has to run for his life several times a day, and when old age or accident supervenes it falls a fearful and palpitating prey to the red tooth of the despoiler.

It is claimed by apologists that death is necessary to ensure the succession of life, to make room for that succession, and to provide a supply of food ; also that on the whole the balance inclines to the advantage of the animal race. That reason is insufficient, inasmuch as it ignores crucial points such as these : That on any theory one is able to frame, suffering is permitted to exist, and to form a daily element in the existence of every sentient creature ; that it is impossible to prove that pleasure neutralizes pain ; that it is ludicrous to attempt to shew that the pleasure of one individual does away with the pain of another. No—pain will remain pain, and pleasure will remain pleasure all the world over in the realm of the lower creation.

The issues are more pregnant and varied when they are derived from the experience of reasoning beings such as ourselves. But herein a great mistake is made.

Intricacy of Life

An individual is looked upon as self-contained, complete, as having a distinct beginning at birth, and as being responsible only for everything said and done by himself after his advent into the world. That is an error. On the evolutionary hypothesis all life, vegetable, non-sentient, sentient, is connected together, inasmuch as everything—however lowly—that hath life is constituted of the warp and woof of the protoplasmic elements out of which the garment of Nature—ever diminishing, ever growing—is made up.

G. THE INTER-RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SPECIES.

Hence there is something in the frame and nature of every man which goes back to the ultimate beginning of things, and appertains to the idiosyncrasy of his remotest ancestry.

Now-a-days one cannot but regard the narrative of the Fall of Man and the Origin of Evil in Gen. iii as anything but symbolic. Strangely enough, however, present day knowledge furnishes us with an equivalent in the theory adumbrated above. Thus we can translate into biological language such terms as *original sin*, the *infection of nature*, the *following of the sin of Adam*, where Adam stands not for an individual, but as the typical man. So we may come near to the same conclusions as S. Paul, though varying the language and generalizing the imagery.

H. THE IMPERFECTION OF OUR EARTHLY LIFE.

Heredity presupposes a certain element of constraint

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in the direction of good or evil ; education and environment account for still more. Thus, in a way, man is predestinate, not only as to the time, the place, the parentage, the sum and circumstance of his birth and constitution, but (in a measure) to his character, disposition, bent, and destiny. We judge our fellows in perverse ignorance of all this. We blame individuals for defects, defaults, and sins, which, if we knew all the circumstances, we should be bound to conclude their origin and up-bringing had rendered inevitable—at all events, as inevitable as is compatible with our belief in a certain power of choice and judgment attaching to each normal individual.

In due time we hope and expect the Judge of all will take these several elements into account, and launch each personality into the first of a series of spiritual reincarnations which will ultimately lead every individual to the highest degree of excellencè, of which the exercise of free-will in his earthly existence has made him susceptible.

CHAPTER VI

THE INFLUENCE ON PHILOSOPHY EXERCISED BY MODERN THOUGHT

AN advance has been made of late years second only in importance to that following upon the introduction of Christianity—due to the importation into the study of Mind of exact methods of science in relation to such elements as Psychology and Physiology. In the past the machinery of thought was considered to be exclusive to the individual, and the questions were asked : are the phenomena due to sense-impressions alone to be considered ?—or were ideas innate ? The doctrine of evolution—dimly shadowed forth, of old, by Lucretius (95-55 B.C.) and in more recent times by Laplace (1749-1827)—was trumpeted forth in our own days by Darwin and Wallace.

In regard to our Science, one was led to believe that the human mind is not an individual water-tight compartment, but that our vision must be infinitely lengthened, so that it should begin with the earliest created beings, and pass on through the throngs of uncivilized and partially civilized men to the profound thinkers of to-day. So shall we be made acquainted with the rudiments of thought, the first incoherent stirrings of feeling and of will, the first imperfect response to the excitation of the human and the Divine. Then shall we be in a better position to pass from the beginning to the end, from the known to the unknown ; to ply the

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forces of Induction and Deduction, and ascertain what *is*, or what we think *is*, or *ought to be*. Further, we are led to give up the idea of the absolute separability and personality of the individual and to regard him as part of the chain of life—originated in the far past and stretching out to the illimitable future. The origin of the non-body part of the individual has been little discussed. In the author's work "On the Genesis and Evolution of the Individual Soul," he has done his best with his feeble rushlight to illuminate a dark subject.

Briefly, one may express the belief that from the original element of protoplasm (developed on this planet under conditions which perhaps no longer prevail) elements were detached bearing the impress of the characters of the transmitters; and that in the highest forms of life, where the dualism of male and female is fully wrought out, these two elements combine, at the time of conjugation, in such wise that another personality is engendered, with bodily and mental characteristics bearing the impress of all past generations, latent indeed at the beginning, but awaiting the operation of external and internal forces to cause that reaction which results in muscular activity and independent thought.

If the matter be looked at in this way, we shall not readily fall into the error of Descartes, whose apophthegm *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu* was successfully capped by Leibnitz with the reservation *Nisi intellectus ipse*. We shall allow that the philosopher is implicitly in the germ even as the flower is in the seed, and that the mind, the soul, the spirit—whatever

The Origin of Things

one may be pleased to call it—though dormant, has all the potentialities we realise in a Socrates or a Shakespeare.

Further, we shall not assert that the spirit is a function of the body, but, rather, that the body is a function of the spirit. We shall then be more ready to allow that when the congeries of force we style *the body* be resolved into zero at the moment of our dissolution, the spirit can easily be attached to a new nexus, whereby its personality may be preserved.

Doubtless one is surrounded with mysteries here below—the mechanism of ordinary thought fails us when we essay to dive into the origin of all things, the mode of creation and preservation of the universe; death which alone renders life possible, and life, so fitful and uncertain, oftentimes so suddenly and (to appearance) completely extinguished.

Nothing but mathematics is capable of mathematical demonstration. The history of Moral Philosophy makes it clear that even in respect of the science which touches most nearly our own conceptions of true and false, right and wrong, the Highest Good and its opposite, opinions are not only various but conflicting, system after system being formulated only to be devoured by its successor. The *summum bonum* of all discussion is resolved into this counsel of despair that "Probability is the only available guide of life." This is even true where we should least expect it, viz., in the realm of the greatest science of all, Religion. One cannot prove to exact or logical demonstration that there is a God—One only—alone Good. In this particular, Natural Religion fails us. Many schemes of Teleology, Ontology,

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have been elaborated—many have been abandoned. If to every effect there must be a cause, the world is due to Causation, but what is Causation? What induced it in the beginning? What maintains it to-day? As says the little child: "God made all things, but who made God?"

The matter is complicated by the consideration that an effect is not due to one only cause, but rather to a combination of causes, starting from the long ago and bringing about a resultant which is immediately resolved into a complex of other resultants. Thus we are led to say that, in like manner as an individual life is, in some measure, the expression of all other lives that have gone before, so one specific effect is brought about by all pre-existing effects.

In the strict sense, then, even our Religion is founded on certain hypotheses. Indeed, much as some might be inclined to cavil at this statement as untrue and unworthy of a Christian—much more of a philosopher—it is established by the insistence of all religious teachers on the necessity for Faith. There is no need to pile up instances of this. In every age faith has been declared to be a cardinal virtue. In the words of the great apostle of the Gentiles, as acute a logician as he was devout as a believer: "Now abideth Faith, Hope, Love . . ."—a wonderful triad. You may pile up Pelion upon Ossa, argument upon argument, demonstration upon demonstration, yet there will always remain a chasm unbridged between the logical mind and God. That chasm can only be crossed by the aid of the wings of Faith. Indeed, this is constantly made a subject of rejoicing on the part of devout Christians.

Is Unity of Design Enough?

Acting on these conclusions, are there any intelligible propositions or hypotheses we can lay down to furnish as firm a foundation for Belief and Ethics as will satisfy us for the practical purposes of this life? Most thinking men have long ago answered this query in the affirmative.

Is this Universe Pluralistic, Dualistic, Monistic? We observe a unity of design, of material, of movement, and this definite unity causes us to predicate One Creator, Sustainer, Giver of Life, Infinite in Duration, Power, Knowledge. But that is not enough for us. Such a Being might use His knowledge to confound, His power to destroy. Doubtless there are indications that the energies of the Universe are variable and destructive, that Nature is red in beak and claw, that mankind is oftentimes ignorant, cruel, mercenary. If we could be assured that our God had intended man to remain here for ever and had promised to every soul unlimited happiness, these contradictions could not be reconciled; but (from knowledge derived from experience and the Scriptures) we form the conclusion that this world is *not* the sole and final home of God's people, but that it is a place of trial, of probation, of passage—a school, a sphere, wherein our bad inclinations may be repressed and our good impulses encouraged.

Subject to these conclusions Hedonism receives its death-blow, if its claims be interpreted literally. The end of man here below is not definitely to seek pleasure, comfort, happiness, for their own sake, for personal gratification; but (after the teaching of Him who most fully revealed God to man) to find one's own pleasure in promoting the pleasure of others; thus, in relation

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to one's brother, obeying the Will of God in perfect duty to Christ and the following of His example. However, it is to be noted here that in the discharge of his full duty, the Christian is expected to find pleasure, and is encouraged to hope for a relief from punishment by and by and for a participation in the glories of Heaven. In this respect Hedonism is again brought in, but we are led to believe that Christian Hedonism is different from that which is merely logical.

As has been said, the old theories as to the inception of ideas have been altered by the teaching of evolution. The chick—the moment it has chipped the shell—turns its attention to picking up the neighbouring fragments of soft seed, and many wonderful instances of prevision and adaptation may be related even of humble creatures such as the beetle, the ant, or the bee. Naturally, it may be said this is *instinct*, not *reason*. But is not a man better than a beast? Is not his heritage—are not his powers—better than theirs? Assuredly. It may be allowed that his powers are slower in their development—that is only to be expected, inasmuch as the hardest wood is of the slowest growth, and man's life is longer and more worth to the world than that of an insect.

Various theories have been held as to the relations which ought to obtain between man and his fellows. Thus we have Individualism and Socialism. Individualism is the political doctrine that social well-being, stability and progress, as well as the good of the individual, depend upon the freedom of that individual, as far as possible, from interference by the State. This is the principle which has been acted upon in large

Socialism Run Mad

measure in the industrial life of the past. Doubtless there have been much injustice and inequality in its working out, but this lapse has been due rather to the ignorance, selfishness, and dishonesty, both of employers and employed, than to any radical defect in the system itself. This principle has developed a wonderful amount of mental alertness, of initiative, self-reliance, perseverance, and the like.

There is a tendency now-a-days on the part of sections of the community to discourage private enterprise and to exalt the State into a sort of beneficent grandmother and universal provider. This is Socialism run mad. It may be allowed that the State is the proper authority to take in hand the collection of a general tax for national purposes—the defence of the country against external foes—the collection and delivery of letters; and that municipal corporations should be permitted to have charge of the roads, drainage, and perhaps of gas and water undertakings; but a wise and self-respecting community should sternly set its face against the communistic principle—the municipalization of all industries and the like, leading up to the abolition of the home, to free marriage, the national care of all children, and a general reversion to a Tribal system. Such Socialism would only lead to the paralyzing of full and earnest endeavour. Everywhere you would find half a dozen men discussing how a certain work should be performed, and spending the rest of the day in not doing it. This scheme would be advocated by the many in the false perception of the democratic principle, resulting in the counting of noses rather than in the estimation of knowledge.

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The Almighty has never ruled through a democracy, but through an aristocracy—using that word in its purest etymological sense; an aristocracy which should govern for the benefit of the democracy, and which should continually absorb into itself the best elements of that democracy. Usually government by a democracy resolves itself into government by an autocracy—whether of President, Cabinet, Caucus, or Political Party.

The problem of the freedom of the Will or its more or less complete restraint has received much attention from moral philosophers, but it can hardly be doubted that the subject receives illumination from the principle of evolution. This carries heredity to the furthest bounds and indicates a certain amount of constraint; it brings into view the differentia of environment which adds another measure; but it must also be remembered that each individual born into the world adds somewhat of a new element by way of combination of existing elements to what has gone before.

In Chemistry, there is a principle called the Conservation of Matter; in Physics another principle styled the Conservation of Energy; but, in these sciences, as well as in Geology, notice must perforce be taken of explosive forces—sudden and catastrophic. The case is even stronger in the world of morals. Could one speak of psychic force, moral force, spiritual force, as constant in quantity though varied in operation? Certainly not. Therefore, in spite of all restraints impressed by birth, education, habitual functions, there is inherent in each individual a certain liberty of choice either to persevere in the normal or

Liberty of Choice

to depart from it to a greater or less extent. What percentage of choice is realized varies with the individual, the occasion, the excitation. But even a small percentage of this Free Will may serve to make a deviation from the normal which—small at first—may create a wide divergence in the near future.

Our wonder that the free will of an individual may cause him to turn his back on his Maker and disregard His plainest laws and exhortations is considerably lessened by the reflection that the children we beget—derivable entirely from elements formerly a part of our own organism—are free to act the same unnatural part towards ourselves. If that be done on the lower plane, ought we to be surprised at its possibility on the higher ?

A well-known scientist once expressed regret that he was not made like unto a clock, so that, being wound up, he should instinctively do the right and avoid the wrong. When looked at squarely such an aspiration is dishonouring both to God—at all events such a God as we predicate—and to man. How an evolutionist—like the scientist in question—could have suffered himself to make such a remark passes comprehension, inasmuch as there are already in Nature various orders of creatures whose movements and arrangements—wonderful and adaptable as they may be—are, to all appearance, purely instinctive and automatic; but these are of a low type, and have long been passed in the evolutionary series by various genera of a far higher order of intelligence.

It is the glory of man that he is the crown of creation. He possesses two of the most notable attributes of

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God, viz., first, the ability to transmit life to his offspring; secondly, to use the powers of *Reason* to determine the wiser and better part, and of *Will* to choose and realize the choice. The first of these attributes is shared by the lower creation—the second in all its fulness is man's proud possession—and man's alone. Doubtless it involves an awe-inspiring responsibility, inasmuch as much is expected from those to whom much is given; but the sterner the fight, the nobler the victory; the greater the crisis, the larger the deliverance.

This naturally leads up to a discussion on the sense of duty, which is completely resolved by a reference to Christian Ethics on the practical plane. We recognize an explicit command external to ourselves—an intelligence to comprehend it, an opportunity to carry it out, and appropriate strength and grace to perfect it.

CHAPTER VII

THE EFFECT ON THE MIND OF THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

ANY writer undertaking to deal with the science and history of Ethics, must be conscious he is undertaking an herculean task. Even in early days it was found to have contact with divers subjects, but their number and complexity have increased of late years, so that a moral philosopher must know something of Theology—the Science of Religion—both Natural and Revealed, including the Personality, Attributes, and mode of Government of the Divine Being ; Religion—the practice of Theology, mystical or practical—the relation of man to God and to his fellow man ; the End of Life, whether Hedonistic or Self-sacrificial ; Psychology and Physiology—as affecting the evolutionary origin, development, mode of existence and action of the human body in its nature, both separable and combined ; the Genesis of Thought, sensible and experiential ; Questions of Determinism and Free Will ; Intuition or Sensitism ; the relation of man—as an individual—to other individuals in the domestic, social, corporate life—whether friendly or adverse—egoistic or altruistic ; and Political Economy, in respect of Individualism and Collectivism ; of various theories of Socialism ; and the like.

In almost all lands, from early beginnings, there have been found men who attempted to penetrate the secrets

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of existence. A good deal was effected even amongst non-religious or pseudo-religious races in the direction of bringing these various problems into prominence.

To Greece—also the land of poetry and of art—we owe an incalculable debt in this direction. The way had been largely prepared for the *primum mobile*, Socrates ; but, by his master mind and clear method, he endeavoured to dig down to the rock-bed of truth ; to get rid of fallacy and circumlocution ; and to exhibit truth in all her chaste beauty. The man himself, in spite of the limitations of his time and country, stands out pre-eminently as a forerunner of the Prophet of Galilee. We shall all acknowledge with reverence that he was not far from the Kingdom of God.

His teaching is variously represented by Xenophon and by Plato, but the spirit and temper with which he prosecuted his philosophic quest and teaching are admirably preserved by both, and his deliverances (when enlarged by the all-powerful and absorbing mind of Aristotle) have held the world in tutelage for centuries, and, even now, are found as text-books in every University in the world. They were further inflected by the genius of the Roman thinkers, who were taught their science and practice by such men as Cicero, Cato, Seneca, Plutarch, and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.

In the later years before Christianity, the theocratic and exclusive theology of the Jewish Church was beginning to influence Greek thought and to be affected by it in turn. In those years the Jews of the Dispersion spoke Greek and wrote in Greek. Palestine, though under Roman domination, yet found it necessary

Greek and Early Christian Thinkers

to sound out the message of the Gospel in Greek, and at least one Evangelist shows marked traces of Alexandrine—i.e., Greek and Oriental—influence.

Naturally, the inception of Christianity and of its theologic and moral teaching made a wonderful difference to the presentation of Ethics. Formerly, without a coherent idea of a Supreme God and all that that idea implied, the most earnest men were groping in the dark, and all modes of thought on morals and ontology lacked a stable foundation. Judæo-Christianity found a point outside this globe of ours on which to pivot a fulcrum, and so was able, by moral force, to move the world and set it on a new career.

During this period the names may be mentioned of Philo Judæus, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Plotinus, Lactantius, Ambrose, and Augustine of Hippo.

Hence we gather that four centuries had elapsed before the establishment of Christianity was sufficiently firm to enable the leaders of thought to formulate its ethics in scientific form, and it was not till long after that the great cataclysms of the succeeding ages enabled such teachers as Anselm and, *facile princeps*, Thomas Aquinas, to enlarge and codify its dictates.

Amongst many of the teachers of the Middle Ages there was much confusion of thought. The subject lent itself to uncertainty of definition, to vague presentation, to the following out of airy speculation to the last point of transcendentalism, e.g., the discussion of the problem as to how many angels could dance on the point of a needle—though no doubt interesting in the abstract—yet lacked the power of being brought

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home to the business and bosom of the majority of living and suffering men.

The Reformation and its precursors and promoters wrought a moral and ecclesiastical cataclysm, which the counter-Reformation influenced without destroying. The waves of this movement, in ever-widening circles, have reached every country in the world.

The acutest minds have been exercised in the consideration of metaphysical subjects, and between Socrates and Seneca—Seneca and Spencer—torrents of words have been poured forth and oceans of ink shed. Much of this dialectic has not advanced the Science of Ethics, although it may have tended to sharpen the wits of the disputants.

The stepping-stones across the brook of Time may be found in Greece, near the Academy and the Porch ; in the monkish cell of the Middle Ages ; in the circles of the Renaissance, of the Reformation, of the New Learning.

Plato's voice can be heard, also that of Ambrose, Thomas Aquinas, Hooker, Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Butler, Hume, Kant, Paley, Bentham, Hegel, Comte, Mill, Spencer.

Clergy of the National Church have held a prominent place as exponents of many-sided truth : Hooker, Sanderson, Jeremy Taylor, Chillingworth, Cudworth, Cumberland, Berkeley, Butler, Paley, Whewell, Maurice.

Many systems have been hatched and addled ; and many strange terms have been introduced, such as :—

Platonism and Neo-Platonism.

Conceptualism.

Various Systems

Realism and Nominalism.
Physics and Metaphysics.
Induction and Deduction.
Analysis and Synthesis.
Accident and Substance.
Agnosticism and Credulity.
Antinomy and Lawfulness.
Determinism and Free Will.
Relativism and Absolutism.
Idealism and Naturalism.
Subjective Realism and Idealism.
Chaos and Teleology.
Spiritual and Material.
Universal and Particular.
Altruism and Egoism.
Stoicism and Hedonism.
Individualism and Collectivism.
Immanence and Transcendence.
Intellectualism and Sensationalism.
Experimentation and Empiricism.
Utilitarianism and Indifferentism.

Others are arising to take their place, such as Pragmatism and Bergsonism.

It is important to notice that when we come back to the real essence of all thought we are involved in Subjectivity. Modern philosophy, from Descartes onwards, has usually considered one of its problems to consist of the enquiry: "How can that which is external to the mind be known, and so, in a sense, become internal to the mind?" The answer is clearer in our day than in his, by reason of the greater attention paid to the complementary sciences of psychology and

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physiology ; *e.g.*, it is interesting to note the machinery whereby a sense-organ—such as the eye—transmits a message to the nervous system, primarily to that part of it called the brain. By means unknown to us—akin possibly to undulatory or electrical influence—the intimation is conveyed to that which is behind the senses that the light from a star, let us say, refracted and bent in various ways until it reaches the retinal nerve, is carried along a continuing line of nerves until it reaches a particular region of the brain, where it causes the displacement of certain particles of grey matter. But this is not enough. This displacement is dealt with in such wise by comparison of images, related tactical experiments, and lengthened experience (derived through our sense of hearing as also from the relation of beings like unto ourselves) that we are enabled to form a specific judgment as to the name, size, movement, and distance from the earth of such a planet as Jupiter. It must be repeated that this is due not to outward sense-excitation alone but to excitation plus *Mind*.

One is often inclined to think that many of our ideas as to Infinite Space, Infinite Duration, and the like, when interpreted in the light of Subjectivity, are capable of a remarkable personal reduction. How wonderful to reflect that the whole Universe to its utmost extent—that Time, past, present and to come—are all included within the narrow limits of our own brain-pan ?

One fears that to the man in the street much that has been written concerning formal ethics has been written to little purpose. He cannot discern the principles

Philosophic Training

advanced, or understand the technical language in which the arguments are clothed.

If eternal salvation depended on a knowledge of any text-book of formal Ethics—or if men looked for a moral philosopher like Saul, head and shoulders above his brethren, it is to be feared mankind would be in a rather poor way.

Ministers of religion should be thankful that (in addition to their knowledge of the history and science of Ethics) they are furnished with a message to mankind which, though—or rather because—it is composed of the simplest elements, and dressed in the simplest language, is yet effectual not only to touch the hearts and consciences of the unlettered, but also to enable the philosopher to translate his knowledge into wisdom.

One good wrought by Philosophy is to lead one to begin at the beginning of thought—to make good our steps as we proceed, and to realize our own limitations. Men whose minds have not been attuned by contact with the dread realities of absolute fact and irresistible logic are easily satisfied with statements and inferences which trained logicians would find totally inconclusive. This is frequently manifested in the realm of theology, which deals with the most original and imposing verities of all; whose students, therefore, ought to discard all pre-suppositions and pre-conceptions, and dig as far down as possible to the basic Truth. It is unfortunate that the study of the science of theology is complicated by vague ideas as to revelation and the kindred subject of inspiration—ideas popularly based on tradition, and suppositions very difficult to bring to the strict test of historical fact.

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The genuineness and authenticity of many of the books of the Bible are so debated that one should be led to consider any book severally on its own merits rather than in regard to artificial authority. It is matter for surprise and regret that some religionists who are the greatest sticklers for the inspiration of their own scriptures are yet the first to deny inspiration to all others. In regard to this general enquiry it is permissible to argue that truth is the test of inspiration, not that inspiration is the test of truth.

It is important to note that we cannot know God—we can only know what we (as individuals) think about God. Hence, knowing ourselves as human beings best of all, we naturally fashion God like unto a human being. That fact is very marked in the Scriptures, especially in the Old Testament; but the case is not far different even in the present day, inasmuch as few Christians get far away from the conception of the Deity they formed in their childhood. What we see of all things that are not material we see only by reflection through a mirror, very dimly.

In a further stage of existence there will, doubtless, be a great change. Moral values will remain as they have been delivered unto us by Him who lived closest of all mankind to God—but physical values will be altered. Here below we are accustomed to live in space of three dimensions, and to regard Extension and Time as specific entities. In another life, Space and Time may be presented to our quickened senses and faculties in quite another fashion, offering a changed aspect—just as a disc presents totally different appearances when looked at respectively from the front or the side.

Life After Death

It is generally assumed that, after the decease of a believer, he would be furnished (after a certain interval) with that body that should abide for ever, and would be translated to the immediate presence of God ; but it is conceivable that the Supreme Creator and Original Cause may possess such illimitable attributes that He may never be capable of being seen by a created being in the same sense that one such created being can be seen by his fellows. It is further conceivable that every Christian, indeed every soul of man, will be required to pass through successive stages of purgation and probation, each successive stage enabling him to see more and more of the Beatific Vision. This may be effected in successive spheres in a regular series, good being ever increasingly in the ascendant, though trial would not be wanting, every sin being confessed and atoned for ; so that, in the end, all flesh should be saved—every allowance being made for the disabilities endured on earth, for ignorance, for wilfulness, for imperfect apprehension, for failure to reach even the more or less moderate standard each one sets up for himself.

Increased light and sense of one's obligations to the Eternal would furnish larger opportunities, and give rise to the elaboration and development of a more sensitive and responsive nature—with less risk of failure and greater assurance of success.

In the spheres beyond, under such conditions, the heathen would be admitted within the portals, the ignorant would be taught, the vicious reformed, the righteous spiritualized. Also, the infant would grow

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up, the ancient would have his youth renewed, the poet would complete the song he had left half-finished, the aspirations of all would be realized, the lame man would leap as the hart, the tongue of the dumb would sing.

CHAPTER VIII

CASUISTRY—A DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

CASUISTRY is the part of Ethics which deals with cases of conscience, or the collision of duties. It was developed extensively by the Talmudists and Scholastics. It relates to the discussion of problems of conduct with a view to action ; and, as a rule, takes the form of enquiring to which duty should be accorded precedence and authority when two or more duties appear to collide. Elaborate and subtle systems of Casuistry were built up in the Middle Ages. In particular, the Jesuit Order is remarkable for its attempts to reduce the moral life of the individual to a scheme which shall omit no possible variety of perplexed conscience. In this connection it should be noted that Casuistry has deservedly fallen into disrepute whenever it has introduced into conduct a self-consciousness which threatened to prove fatal to simplicity and morality.

In this introductory statement as to the definition of Casuistry, and as to the area of ethical life which it covers, a term has been introduced, viz., *Conscience*, which is the key-word of the whole position. Now, what is conscience ? How, and under what circumstances, is it developed or rendered operative ? Is it an absolute faculty among all men in all ages—in other words, is there an *absolute* standard, outside of

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themselves, to which all men are required to conform, or is there a standard *relative* in time and place and individual in application ? The etymology derives from the Latin, *con scire*, to know thoroughly, to be owing to ; but the derived meaning refers to a moral sense discriminating between right and wrong ; thus, we speak of a good or clean *conscience*, of a bad or guilty *conscience* ; of a *consciousness* that certain actions are either blameable or praiseworthy.

Naturally, ideas as to the evolution of conscience will vary with ideas as to evolution generally ; whether man came into being by special creation or by development from lower forms. The author accepts the latter alternative as being more consistent with probability, science, and history. Hence one is prepared to allow of the existence of this faculty among the lower animals. It will be conceded that it appears to be marked and impressive in the case of domestic pets, and one is disposed to contend that it is general—at all events amongst all the higher, *i.e.*, vertebrate, forms.

Furthermore, a brief consideration will bring us to the conclusion that it is due to the development of a reasoning process in regard to the pressure of external law, in such wise that it eventuates into the kind of faculty we call *moral*.

In regard to gregarious animals, this law would be the result of conditions tending to make for the comfort and security of the community. As referring particularly to the dog or the horse, the law would depend upon the will, convenience, or good feeling and humanity of the owner. In respect of primitive man, it would be evolved from the supposed whim or decree

Development of Law

of some tribal deity. In the case of a fully instructed Christian, it would be referable to the revelation of the true God in His decrees—natural or revealed.

It would require a volume, encyclopædic in its range and extent, to chronicle the rules and regulations of unlettered tribes, laid down, through long ages, by various communities, through the instrumentality of witch-doctors or priests, resulting in regulations affecting birth, puberty, marriage, war, death, and burial. The point to be noted is that these rules and regulations are varied as regards place and time.

Some of the differences are undoubtedly due to accidental circumstances or to pressure from without ; whilst others are intrinsic, relating as they necessarily do, to racial, geographical, or climatic conditions. It is apparent that many of the restrictions which arose in a barbarous state were stereotyped when the community became civilized, owing to the operation of a persistent strain of conservatism amongst all men where daily and social habits are concerned ; this conservatism being perpetuated by the existence of special castes, such as those of the warrior, the workman, or the priest.

At first these laws and regulations would persist in a fluid state, being preserved by tradition in a verbal form. In course of time it would be found more certain and convenient to codify them. The most illustrious instance of this in early times is that of the Laws of Hammurabi, the sixth king of the first dynasty of Babylon, who flourished just before the time of Abraham. The *stele* on which these Laws were inscribed was discovered in A.D. 1901, amongst the ruins of

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Persepolis, or Susa, and is now placed in the British Museum.

Let us now come to the England of to-day. It claims to be a land where free thought and free action are encouraged ; but in such a country as Germany, paternal government has reached its utmost limit. One is hedged in there by a chorus of *verboten*. In our own island things are bad enough, but one cannot compare the failure to darken one's windows to an act of dishonesty or violence. Every Englishman is supposed to know the law of the land and to be ready to obey it. As a rule the law of Equity and the Common Law are reasonable, and, ordinarily, it is sufficient for the Legislature to promulgate a decree to ensure general compliance. In this wise the community becomes a conscience to the individual. In the present day, in regard to our dealings with others, there is little need for one to say : " What course shall I adopt ? " " Is this act right ? " " Is that wrong ? " No, the course is prescribed for us, and we can usually recognize the reasonableness of any edict on two grounds :

- (a) Its general application.
- (b) Its unvarying and absolute enforcement by the supreme authority on all classes without fear or favour.

This state of things simplifies life and conduct and tends to reduce to a minimum cases of conscience in the community. Occasionally a conflict arises, as is evidenced in respect of such matters as vaccination or divorce.

It is, however, conceivable that cases of conscience

Constraint by Conscience

may arise, even when State-made law is clear and explicit, inasmuch as such action deals with men in the gross, and cannot possibly be framed to include exceptional individual cases. Moreover, it must ever be remembered that people who are afflicted with scrupulous consciences can always, if they will, discern a distinction between this State-law and the law they may have laid down for themselves in relation (as they would allege) to a higher law, such as the law of God. Further, new problems occasionally obtrude themselves, which affect the community, because they affect the individuals who compose that community. Until these are tackled by fresh legislation there eventuates division of opinion, which must always involve cases of conscience.

There may be instanced Euthanasia. In the case, we will suppose, of a person suffering from extreme old age, senility, or some incredibly painful or disfiguring disease, is it permissible (with consent and under proper safeguards) to administer a sleeping potion from which the patient would never awake? Or, by a surgical operation, in the supposed interest of the community, is it permissible to prevent idiots and the like—both men and women—from propagating their kind? Or, is it permissible for the midwife, or the doctor, to stifle at birth a creature of monstrous form? Or, is it permissible, because of small means, or the delicacy of the wife, artificially to limit the number of children in a family? Or, in the case of a person desperately ill, is it allowable to conceal, or to deny, the fact of some family disaster, such as the death of a near relative? Or, is it allowable to tell even a white lie

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under any circumstances whatsoever? Again, is it permissible (in the cause of morality and religion, as was alleged) to do what the late Mr. Bradlaugh and a co-adjutor did, some years ago, viz., bring out such a book as *The Priest in Absolution*, dragging to light all sorts of prurient questions which might be put to a penitent by a confessor under conceivable circumstances? Or, again, to come to matters which profoundly affect national safety to-day, Is the war immoral and opposed to New Testament teaching? And, ought the clergy to submit themselves to conscription for combatant purposes? One ventures to assert that divided opinions on such questions as the above would be expressed in any assembly even of well-meaning and well-educated people.

The early Greeks and Romans in the bright joyousness, or the laborious activity, of objective life, fully occupied in the pleasures of art or the business of war or politics, with no minutely detailed code or body of traditions to guide them, troubled themselves little with casuistical problems. When, however, the Greek philosophers and their Roman followers developed moral systems, attention began to be given to this department; and, at length, such questions as how far suicide is justifiable, or whether duty to the State is more important than duty to a friend, became favourite matters of debate.

In regard to our subject a remarkable illustration is furnished by the Jews. The worship of every jot and tittle of the Mosaic Law, which was the most remarkable characteristic of their conscientiousness, determined the nature of their casuistry. Of the rules which

Jewish and Christian Practice

were elaborately conceived and marshalled, some may be found in the Apocrypha, but their great repository is the Talmud. The writers therein enter into the minutiae of conduct with a detail which ultimately tended to retard real obedience to laws of maximum importance and which incidentally proved disastrous to individual freedom. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that—as is also the case amongst Mahommedans—the religious code of the Jews was intended to be, at the same time, their civil law. It may be noted here, in this connection, that part of their casuistry is comprised in our English law books, our code being simply an expansion of the Ten Commandments.

Christianity brought in a new method of settling casuistical questions—a method directly opposed to that of the Jews, in the midst of whom it had its origin. Following the teaching of its Founder, it consisted in an appeal to the true spirit of great principles, leaving the working out to the unfettered impulsion of a loving obedience.

In the Roman Church the practice of auricular confession gave rise to a system of casuistry designed to guide the confessor as to the imposition of penance and the giving of advice. Indeed, throughout the Middle Ages, the doctrines of the Church, being accepted throughout Western Europe as the supreme rule of conduct, led to the department of moral science involving casuistry to be the most fully developed. In the writings of Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and of Thomas Aquinas, one finds the uncompromising strictness of such of the early fathers as Tertullian and

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Augustine of Hippo but slightly modified. Abélard took a more indulgent view, but his teaching was condemned by the synod of Sens in 1140.

As has been said, the members of the Society of Jesus have obtained a great reputation in the field of casuistry. They took their rise in the year 1536, at a time when the fortunes of the Papacy were at a low ebb. The founder and his followers set themselves to stem the tide, and from that time to the present the Jesuits have been distinguished by learning and tenacity, if not always by discretion and straightforwardness. Indeed, the name of the members of the Order has become a synonym for those who exercise an excess of craft and subtlety and subscribe to the maxim that an end that is good justifies the means. Doubtless their very perseverance and success brought its customary penalty and raised up against them many enemies, even in their own communion. Those enemies were unsparing, and sometimes unscrupulous, for even the Jesuit is not as black as he is sometimes painted; although, by the way, the Order was formally condemned by the Pope in 1657, and, at some time or other, has been suppressed in almost every country in Europe, but it has recovered, and the "Black Pope," as the Head is called, still exercises enormous influence.

Of the Society founded by Loyola the following writers are credited with works on our subject: Suarez, Sanchez, Escobar, Velasquez, Molina, Bauny, Busenbaum, Toletus, Filiutius, Less, Ponce, Le Moine, Pirot, and Daniel.*

* Amongst other enemies, the Jesuits were opposed by the Jansenists and the Port Royal writers, Arnauld, Pascal, Boileau and Perrault.

Romanists and Reformers

The chief Roman casuists since the seventeenth century are St. Ignatio, Stattler, Lambertini, Amort, and Sobiech.

Amongst Romanists, a name still to conjure with is Liguori. St. Alfonso Maria de Liguori, founder of the Order of the Redemptorists, was born at Marianella, near Naples, in 1696. He was the author of a large number of works, moral, dogmatic, and ascetic—including many dealing specifically with the science and practice of casuistry. He died at Nocera in 1787, at the patriarchal age of 91.

In regard to the Holy Orthodox Church of Russia, there is nothing corresponding to the Lateran rule of annual confessions, yet the practice is universal, because traditional. It may be added, however, that the practice of Direction has not taken root in the Greek Church.

The casuistry of the Reformers was similar in its origin to that of the early Fathers. Its strictness was most extreme in the Calvinistic Church, whilst a more genial spirit pervaded the Lutherans, as is evidenced in the *Consilia* of Melancthon, and the treatises of Baldwin, Clearus, Osiander, and Spener. During the seventeenth century several works of the kind appeared in England. Those of Hall and Barlow are not marked by much power, but Perkins, in his *Cases of Conscience*, arrives at conclusions which often display vigorous sense and a stern and straightforward honesty. Thus he declares that a promise, though extorted under compulsion, or by means of deceit, is binding, so long as the loss to be sustained is merely temporary and private, and he condemns the striving for more riches

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than is necessary for the health of the body, the culture of the mind, or the satisfaction of obligations to one's family and friends. The treatise, *De Obligatione Conscientiae*, by Sanderson, professor of theology at Oxford, is distinguished by directness of moral aim, and by much learning and vigour. The most renowned deliverance at the time was Jeremy Taylor's *Ductor Dubitantium*, published in 1660, which, though somewhat diffuse and illogical, has always attracted a wide circle of readers.

One effect of the Reformation has been to weaken the idea of Catholicity in religion and to accentuate that of individuality. This is so, even in Anglicanism, but is exhibited, *in excelsis*, amongst Nonconformists, where extremists carry their religion under their own hat. In dissenting communions, the pastor is a preacher, a social force, but is not regarded as a spiritual director in a special sense. He may be looked upon as a prophet, but he himself would be the first to repudiate—and that with scorn—that he was a priest, delegated to give, or withhold, absolution or ecclesiastical censure. Even in the Church of England there is, in the main, but little encouragement given by her ministers to their flock to consult them in matters appertaining to conscience, even in face of the direction given in the Exhortations in the Office of Holy Communion. Doubtless the practice of auricular confession is increasing, but only in the face of opposition and suspicion.

The clergy appear to be satisfied with the performance of the public and occasional Offices; with attendance at numberless committees for the furtherance

Lack of Interest in Ethics

of social or benevolent objects; with dining-out, and with parochial visitation—often a matter-of-fact and non-religious function. Many parsons would even deprecate any close spiritual personal contact on the ground that deep spiritual experiences and conflicts should be immediate between the individual soul and the Creator.

It is noteworthy that the relation between the clergy and those who, oftentimes with bitter irony, are called their fathers-in-God, is largely restricted to business matters, the negotiations as to livings, the legal matters attaching to institution, the dilapidations to the glebe premises, the consecration of churches and churchyards, and the like; little or no intercourse taking place between the bishop and the incumbent as to the spiritual progress of the cure of souls often so lightly and perfunctorily committed to the care of the shepherd.

The author once heard a well-known learned bishop relate, with deep feeling, the early experiences of his episcopate. He said that most of his clergy were anxious to consult him about surveys of the glebe and other material matters, concerning which he knew less than nothing, but that no one appealed to him on questions relating to theology or the spiritual life—things which he had really attempted to study.

It is much to be feared—indeed, the idea has got abroad both in Roman and Nonconformist circles—that religion, as understood and practised in the Anglican communion, is too much of a go-as-you-please character; that too little is expected of their people in relation alike to doctrine and practice; that outward

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conformity and regularity of attendance at public services and functions is regarded as the be-all and end-all of the Christian life ; and that a high standard is tacitly deprecated as being difficult of attainment and impossible (or, at all events, fatiguing) to sustain.

It is regrettable that the Anglican clergy do not lay themselves out more systematically to invite the personal confidence of their people in spiritual things. In this case, as in so many others, there is a reaction against the abuses of the Roman confessional and the sacramental position assigned by extremists to Penance. Yet, when we are put to it, we all allow the truth of the aphorism *Abusus non tollit usum*. Many clergy are forward even to disavow the function of spiritual guides in this direction, asserting that no human instrument or instrumentality should be interposed between the sinner and the Saviour ; apparently forgetful of the fact that God always works by means. One may well ask, " Why was a Church constituted ? " " Why were clergy commissioned ? " " Why was a ministry of reconciliation instituted ? " " Why were sacraments ordained ? " The only answer is that all these are means to an end ; but agents and agencies to lead the penitent to the Cross.

It is admitted that there is great ignorance on the part of the laity in regard to Church History, to the composition of the Bible and Prayer Book, and to the study of theological problems generally. This is partly due to the fact that so few formal opportunities are furnished for questions to be asked by our hearers, and answers to be formulated. Sermons are preached and

Cases of Conscience

addresses given without any opportunity being sought to enquire how much has been understood and assimilated. Hence the net result is indeterminate and unsatisfactory. Indeed, in most cases, the subjects dealt with in the pulpit are so inconsecutive and remote from present-day life that there is no wonder simple and uninstructed hearers—to mention those alone—are bewildered.

On reflection, most of the clergy must feel disappointed at the few calls made by the laity upon their personal assistance even in regard to questions relating to devout participation in the Holy Communion. It may be their experience resembles that of a friend of the writer's who, on one occasion, was hastily summoned by a parishioner in a case said to be of spiritual moment, but (as it turned out) was nothing more than a request to him to write to a benevolent lady to seek for a loan to enable the applicant to take a boarding-house in a more convenient quarter.

Oftentimes the workings of conscience are strange and irregular. In respect of the Christian religion, as distinguished from the Jewish, there is laid down—as has been already said—no elaborate code of laws, regulations and ceremonies ; but, instead, a few broad principles which exhibit our duty (both by way of doing and abstaining) towards God and our neighbour. If we were perfectly disinterested and unselfish, perfectly prepared to give up our will to the Higher Power and to obey His behests without question or hesitation, the course to be followed, in the great majority of cases, would be perfectly clear ; but the imperfection of human nature leads one to quibble, to

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delay, to prevaricate, or to allege (by way of excuse) the lack of duty on the part of one's neighbour.

Doubtless the clergy are oftentimes consulted with reference to a call which would appear to be clear in the abstract—which, indeed, is perfectly clear to the individual questioner—but which he has come to the priest in order to try to force him, out of compliancy or pity, to give him or her—more frequently *her*—some little loophole of escape, or to furnish some excuse which would enable him to evade the discharge of a disagreeable duty. In many cases of conscience, the hesitation, the questioning, the implied doubt, should lead the penitent at once to come to the conclusion that this doubt was due to his own cowardice or imperfect apprehension of the right, that it exhibited but the force and the wiles of the tempter, and that one's better, truer, nature should not give it place, even for a moment.

In relation to questions of conscience it is clear—as has already been stated—that individual cases are much simplified owing to the separation between the functions of the Church and the State ; to the substitution for a theocracy of other forms of government, monarchical or republican ; to the distinction in modern times between sinfulness and criminality ; * and the

* It is important to note the distinction between a *sin* and a *crime*. A crime is an offence primarily against the law of the land ; a *sin* an offence against the law of heaven ; the *one* is against man, the *other* against God. Of course, one needs not the warrant of the 51st Psalm to enable us to realise that any defect of obedience is ultimately wrought against God, but it is necessary to have a sense of proportion. Unfortunately, it is the tendency of modern legislature to multiply offences, social rather than criminal, such as the failure to send children regularly to school, or to light one's bicycle lamp on a dark night. All this tends to lessen the dread of law-breaking, and to replace moral suasion by coercion.

Conflict of Obligation

elaborate system of justice and equity set up by the legislature in relation to a complicated development of Common and Statute Law. It cannot be denied that thus the demands on the conscience are simplified, that doubt is dispelled, and that the onus and range of obedience are shifted. If it be allowed that one desires to be a good citizen, it follows that one would wish to acknowledge and obey all the laws promulgated by the State. Of course (to repeat what has been already affirmed) to sensitive consciences the law of God would sometimes seem to come into conflict with that of man, and the decrees of the Church with those of the State.

Thus the law of the Church conflicts with the law of the State in regard to marriage with a deceased wife's sister and the re-marriage of divorced people. Again, bishops are found whose conviction compels them to enforce law and custom against the use of incense, of vestments, of the reservation of the consecrated elements of bread and wine ; even as priests are found who (in spite of their oath of canonical obedience) refuse to submit to their ecclesiastical superiors on certain points ; whilst, on the other hand, ultra-Protestant clergy disdain to have daily matins or evensong, refuse to bow at the name of Jesus, and deny baptismal regeneration. Lastly, broad churchmen scruple to use the Athanasian Creed, and claim the right to interpret the articles and formularies in a modern sense.

Numerous illustrations are found in similar régimes. The members of the Society of Friends disapprove of war, refuse to pay taxes in support of an army or navy, and joyfully endure the spoiling of their goods as a

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satisfaction to their conscience. Again, there are citizens who disapprove of vaccination, of the payment of church rates or tithes, or of taxes, some portion of which would go to the support of denominational schools ; finally, some women refuse to pay the king's taxes because their sex cannot vote for the election of members of parliament who impose these taxes—and so on through a long series of illustrations.

As has been said, "casuist" has become a term of reproach. This contempt it shares with other words, such as *priestcraft*, originally of good import. This is most unfortunate. Could not something be done within the limits of the Anglican Church to get rid of this stigma ? *Craft* is a word of worth, signifying, in its origin, *strength*. It is generally used in a good sense. Thus we have : *Handicraft*, *statecraft*, *woodcraft*, *stage-craft*, *mother-craft*, *leech-craft*, *the gentile craft*, (fishing), *members of a craft*, *the craft*, or brotherhood, of freemasonry, *craft-brother*, *craft-guild*, *craftsman*, etc., etc. On the other hand, *crafty* has the connotation of *cunning* (in a bad sense), *deceitful*, *wily*. How sad that words of good family should suffer such declension, that they should partake of the evil and deterioration inbred in man's nature and be soiled and degraded by common use !

In the instance before us—*priestcraft*—one fears the reason of its declension to be that the art of the confessor has been frequently lowered by puerilities, sullied by prurient suggestions, and prostituted to subserve the base ends of the ministrant or the church to which he belonged. Whether, in a particular instance, it is due to the celibacy enjoined upon the Roman

“ Priestcraft ”

clergy, or whether it is inseparable from the practice of auricular confession and would be equally rife in the case of a married priesthood, opens out a very pertinent question.

If a person be sick he calls in a physician, one who has studied and practised the art and science of healing ; if a person want legal assistance he goes to Lincoln's Inn or some similar place where lawyers congregate, and there obtains the best advice from a skilled and learned advocate. In like manner, and for more cogent reasons, when an individual is troubled in conscience and finds his peace and happiness at stake, why should it not be assumed that the legitimate thing to do would be to confide in an expert who had made a careful study of the snares and pitfalls which beset the path of every man and woman born, and who (by experience as well as study) could be said to be both learned and discreet ?

“ Not so,” says the average Briton, “ I have a perfect horror of priestcraft ” ; in plain language, if the naked truth were confessed, of those fruits of study, reflection, and spiritual experience which should ever go to form the character and illuminate the practice of the true priest of God !

One is fain to admit that in Continental countries, at all events, the power of the priesthood has been exercised very far in illegitimate directions ; although it is permissible to hope that much exaggeration has taken place in charges sometimes made. One has heard it said, for instance, that if, in Italy, a priest were seen to leave the house of any lady, that lady's character would be open to suspicion. One cannot help thinking,

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however, that such a conclusion would value the courage and perspicacity of Italian manhood at a very low rate.

It would seem that in England, and especially in Ireland, the morals of the Roman priesthood are above reproach. Were it otherwise, depend upon it the bloodhounds of the Church Association—who seem to find a strange delight in traducing their neighbours—would be upon the track of the offenders. Doubtless isolated cases of misconduct transpire, and there are other instances where unpleasant facts are hushed up ; but many such events occur even in our own communion, and will occur again so long as priests are also sons of Adam.

The consideration of the subject of casuistry and confession is much affected by the view taken of the ministry of Penance as a sub-sacrament generally : of the charge laid upon the clergy and the functions assigned to them. What is the theory of Episcopacy ? What is meant by the power conferred upon the priest at his ordination to bind and to loose ? Is it declaratory and confined merely to the imposition or remission of purely ecclesiastical censures, or is it to be understood in its fullest spiritual significance ? Whatever view be adopted, but few thoughtful persons would deny that the absence of clear thought and decision on this subject is responsible for much evil, and that the absence of any system and form of discipline in the National Church indicates a laxity which is as demoralizing as unfortunate. Doubtless it would be open to the individual rebuked or excommunicated to desert the Anglican Communion and join some Nonconformist

Director and Penitent

body, but no good churchman would begrudge that particular society a convert received under such circumstances. We are concerned with this matter here only in relation to our subject, viz., whether the practice of confession followed by appropriate penance would not supply that measure of discipline, the lack of which so many thoughtful Christian folk earnestly deplore.

Entering sympathetically on the practical side of the question, one would say that a director, dealing with a penitent, would be required to regard, at least, three matters :

- (a) The eliciting of a complete confession.
- (b) The imposition of a penalty for the offence laid bare.
- (c) The measures taken to provide against a repetition of the fault.

(a) A good confessor should be a man of mature and untarnished life ; having carried out a wide study of books and men ; possessing a large experience of life in its various phases ; a keen observer of the workings of the human mind and heart ; sympathetic, yet not impulsive or easily moved to praise or blame, *i.e.*, a man with something of the mind, heart, and will of the Master !

- (b) Why should penance be enjoined ?

This opens out a wide question as to the *raison d'être* of any punishment ; and, generally, as to the necessity and utility of those punishments—ranging from fines to the last penalty of death—enjoined by the State. However, so far as our immediate purpose is concerned, it is sufficient to state that : firstly, penance is

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necessary to accentuate the heinousness of the fault, to hinder its repetition, and also to act as a deterrent to other folk, liable to fall into the same sin ; secondly, as far as may be, penance should fit the fault and aim at substituting reflection for impulse, humility for pride, restitution for dishonesty, submission for rebellion, and devotion for laxity.

No words of disapproval could be too strong to characterize the imposition, by way of penance, of customary acts of devotion, as, *e.g.*, amongst Romans, the repetition in wearisome iteration of the *Ave Maria* or the *Pater noster*. Such acts of devotion should be reserved to be spontaneously tendered by way of loving obedience on the part of a child to its Heavenly Father.

(c) The measures taken to secure amendment of the specific fault.

The least part of the director's office is accomplished when the kind and duration of the penance have been assigned. It would appear that this is not sufficiently recognized, whereby the science of casuistry has acquired a bad name. Penance may fulfil its function in marking the offence and rendering that offence odious ; but it cannot atone for the offence, or provide against its repetition. Oftentimes the carrying out of the assigned penance is looked on even as a merit, so that the penitent hugs his chains and rejoices in the repetition of the acts enjoined (as in the Middle Ages)—even to the extent of flagellation, wearing of sack-cloth, carelessness as to cleanliness, and the like.

There is a fatal facility in the going to a priest to confess and atone for a sin. It is almost as easy as going to God. The great difficulty, which apparently is not

Warnings

met in the confessional, is to induce the wrong-doer to go to the neighbour he has wronged, confess his fault, and humble himself to seek forgiveness. The reason of this backwardness is, that the sinner learns to hate the individual against whom he has sinned. The natural man likes to *forgive*, but hates to *be forgiven*.

The chief cases of inquiry which comes before the clergy have reference to admission to the Holy Communion. The writer has had to take notice of a case in which a woman who had pilfered from a stall at a village sale, presented herself; also of another case where two people knelt side by side at the Holy Table, who were at enmity one with another.*

All such cases require a very tender touch. It is a most difficult thing to keep one's temper, to rebuke lovingly, to shew anger for the sin but sympathy for the sinner. Doubtless the fact that we are conscious we are angry with ourselves for being angry, and that, with the best intentions, we are spoiling a good case and making bad worse, renders us more angry still, and places us at a further disadvantage.

When properly developed, conscience is a wonderful and beautiful faculty, but it is occupied only in determining the dividing line between good and evil, between what is enjoined and what disallowed. It is largely mental, material, obediential and judicial; but something more is needed, viz., *the subjection of the will*, so that one may not only know what is right—what is commanded by the Higher Power—but (aided

* The admission of unconfirmed persons and Nonconformists under normal conditions in England, or in the mission field, is also brought into consideration.

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by the affections) may be enabled to place one's own will under the direction and control of the Divine Will, so as to realize that sinners are saved and regenerated not so much by *knowing* as by *believing* and *doing*. It is because this truth is not apprehended that "direction" through confession so frequently tends to become futile ; inasmuch as it looks backward instead of forward ; diverts the attention from the sin to the penalty ; and stops short just at the point when an advance into new ground should be made.

On a review of the whole subject certain conclusions may be framed :

- (a) That the absence of formal Direction in the Anglican Church is to be regretted.
- (b) That it is desirable a measure of discipline should be restored.
- (c) That the study of philosophy and casuistry should form part of the preparation of candidates for ordination.
- (d) That it is expedient selected men should be granted authority to exercise Direction.

APPENDIX A

Plato.—Plato's philosophy is usually treated under the three heads of dialectic (logic), physics and ethics. But these divisions did not exist for Plato himself, nor had he (strictly speaking) a *system* of philosophy. His philosophy may be regarded as a development of the teaching of Socrates. Aristotle's philosophy is again a development of Plato's on original lines.

Knowledge is not *sensation* (which differs in the individual), nor *opinion*, which has no certainty, but such "ideas" as are permanent and universal. The way from the life of the senses and of mere vague opinion to the highest or philosophical Knowledge is through the (mathematical) sciences, Mathematics being the type of science in general.

The Cosmos, or order of the universe, is the one only-begotten image of God, its father and creator.

The Creator was good and wished to make the world as like him as possible ; but no created or visible thing can be perfect. The material out of which the orderly world is made introduces imperfections into it. (Foundation of Gnosticism).

The Creator could not make the world eternal like himself, and so, in making it, made Time, "the moving image of Eternity."

The human soul has three elements : (1) the rational, (2) the "spirited", (3) the appetitive. The rational element is immortal.

To Plato, philosophy is not mere intellectual speculation, but a habit of mind and a manner of living.

The highest of the ideas is "the good," and this is the aim of his teaching.

The four "cardinal virtues" are : (1) Wisdom, the virtue of the reason, (2) Courage, (3) Moderation, the virtue of the lower parts in their relation to the higher, (4) Justice.

Appendix A

Locke, in his Essay, presents the philosophical foundation of the right of individual thinkers to follow freely the findings of experience. Its design is "to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." Whatever any man can know or reasonably believe, or even conceive, is dependent on human experience. Knowledge cannot in any degree be consciously *infuse* in each man, for it must be, in all cases, a gradual growth, dependent upon experience, in which we are liable to error. Therefore, the chief exercise of a human understanding must be the balancing of probabilities, and comparing the relative weight of objections alike in the physical sciences and in common life.

Descartes.—Doubt the starting point or solvent of all beliefs and opinions. Treating everything with this intellectual doubt, he found the only thing that could not be doubted was that he existed. *Cogito, ergo sum*.

Hence, his *Criterion of certainty*. Whatever is clearly and distinctly thought must be true.

Amongst these clear and distinct thoughts he recognized the idea of God, as the absolutely Perfect Being. This idea could not have been formed in our minds by ourselves, for the imperfect cannot originate the perfect; therefore, it must be implanted in us by the Perfect Being himself. Hence from the existence of the idea of perfection he inferred the existence of God as the originator of it—he inferred it also from the mere nature of the idea because the idea of perfection involves existence—the *ontological argument*. If God exists we have a guarantee of the truth of our consciousness, for God, the Perfect Being, cannot deceive, and therefore whatever our consciousness clearly testifies may be implicitly believed. His fundamental principle is the essential difference or *dualism* of spirit and matter. Mind is pure consciousness, and matter is mere extension, and these can be united only through the intervention of God.

Spinoza (developed from Descartes) took as his starting

Appendix A

point "Cogito, ergo sum" in order to establish a pure Monism, of which the sole foundation is *substance*—"that which is in itself and is conceived through itself." Extension and thought become attributes. Extension is visible thought; thought is invisible extension; and this explains the dual existence of body and mind and the relation between them. God is the "immanent idea," the One and All, the *natura naturans*; the world, *natura naturata*, is one complete whole, and one peculiar aspect of God's infinite attribute of extension.

Leibnitz.—Intermediate between the dualism of Descartes and the monism of Spinoza.

His foundation for argument is the *principle of sufficient reason*—e.g., there is a sufficient reason why the world should be the best of all possible worlds, and there is no sufficient reason why it should be otherwise. The primary and essential quality of all substance is *active force*. Substance exists only in the form of atoms or monads. All monads possess two intrinsic properties, *perception* or the capacity of mirroring the universe, and *introspection*—but both in different degrees.

All the monads, from the highest (God) to the lowest, are in complete accord and harmony. God is the primary, supreme, perfect monad. From Him all others proceed as radiations. Since God was the contriver of the universal harmony, this world must be the best of all possible worlds.

Kant.—*Every change must have a cause.* Hume agreed: change can only be known by experience; without experience it would not be known; therefore it is a fact of experience, and, like every such fact, we know that it *is*, but not that it *must be*. On the contrary, said Kant, we really do attribute to any appearance of change a perfect certainty of necessity, a necessity absolute, not an iota less true than we attribute to an axiom in Mathematics. That the shortest line is a straight line does not depend upon our experience (*a posteriori*), but is due to the nature of space and is *a priori*, i.e., dependent on necessity. So with space and everything else. From which sprang the various categories.

Appendix A

Summary by our own pessimist :

Our little systems have their day,
They have their day, and cease to be.

Truth never contradicts itself,
All systems of philosophy contradict each other
Therefore no system of philosophy is true !

(This contribution has been sent to the Author by a friend).

APPENDIX B

A fact of importance in the History of Philosophy is the establishment in Cambridge in 1683 of a Chair of Casuistry by a Dr. Knightbridge, Fellow of Peterhouse. The subjects treated of by succeeding occupants of the Chair have been extended to include Mental, Moral, and Religious Philosophy.

This Chair has been filled by many distinguished men,* as the following list will show :

1683	T. Smoult.
1707	J. Colbatch.
1744	R. Walker.
1764	E. Law.
1769	R. Plumptre.
1788	G. Borlase.
1809	R. T. Cory.
1813	F. R. Barnes.
1838	W. Whewell.
1855	John Grote.
1866	F. D. Maurice.
1872	T. R. Birks.
1883	H. Sidgwick.
1897	J. Ward (Mental Philosophy and Logic).
1900	W. K. Sorley (Moral Philosophy).

There are also two chairs of Moral Philosophy at Oxford ; the Waynflete (T. Case) and the Whyte (J. J. Stewart).

APPENDIX C

Paley stands forth as a prominent advocate of the Theory of Design. His *Moral and Political Philosophy* admittedly embodies two presuppositions :

- (1) That God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of His creatures.
- (2) That adequate motives must be supplied to virtue by a system of future rewards and punishments.

The second presupposition depends, according to him, on the credibility of the Christian religion (which he treats almost exclusively as the revelation of these "new sanctions" of morality). The *Evidences* and the *Horæ Paulinæ* were intended as a demonstration of this credibility. The argument of these books, however, depends in turn upon the assumption of a benevolent Creator desirous of communicating with His creatures for their good ; and the Natural Theology (by applying the argument from design to prove the existence of such a Deity) becomes the foundation of the argumentative edifices. By placing Paley's facts in a new light, the theory of evolution has deprived his argument of its force, so far as it applies the idea of special contrivance to individual organs or to species. Paley's idea of *contrivance* is applicable only if we suppose a highly-developed organism to be dropped suddenly into foreign surroundings. But the relation of an organism to its environment is not of this external nature, and the adaptation of the one to the other must be regarded as the result of a long process of interaction in the past history of the species. In thus substituting the operation of general laws for Paley's continual invocation of a supernatural cause, evolution passes no judgment on the question of the ultimate dependence of the laws upon intelligence ; but it evidently alters profoundly our general conception of the relation of that intelligence to the world.

APPENDIX D

Bearing in mind the importance of the subject, it may be desirable to set out formal definitions of these two important terms, Deduction and Induction.

Deduction, in logic and reasoning, is the operation of discovering and proving general propositions, and also the process of inference in which we pass from general principles to particular conclusions or consequences; and is thus contrasted with *Induction*, in which we pass from particular data to the general principle that underlies them. In proportion as any science, originally inductive, attains to highly general, or fundamental, principles, which can then be made the basis of deductive inferences, the science is said to pass from the inductive to the deductive stage. But logicians are tending to regard deduction and induction as essentially the same logical process, operated, as it were, from opposite ends. To put it concisely, Deduction is the method of reasoning from generals to particulars, as Induction is from particulars to generals. To give an illustration—by Induction we establish the law that heat expands bodies, by Deduction we apply it to explain why a clock goes slower in summer than in winter, owing to the changes effected by temperature in the length of the pendulum.

The process of Induction, in physical science, may be represented as passing through the corresponding stages of framing a hypothesis assumed to be true, deducing conclusions from it, and then, by comparison of these conclusions with the data from which we started, verifying (or disproving) the truth of the hypothesis.

Putting these definitions together, we may thus discriminate: Induction is the mode by which all the materials of knowledge are brought to the mind and analysed; Deduction, the process by which the knowledge thus acquired is utilized, and by which new and more complicated inductions are rendered possible. Thus, every step in a deduction is also an induction.

APPENDIX E

Various definitions of Casuistry are set out below :

The word Casuistry is derived from *L. casus*, case. Hence a casuist is a person, especially a theologian, who lays down the application of ethical rules to special cases, weighs conflicting obligations, classifies exceptions, and draws distinctions. Thus Casuistry decides what is right or wrong in respect of doubtful points. It is significant that—in many quarters—the term has come to signify a *sophist*, a *quibbler*.

Again, Casuistry is the application of general moral rules to particular cases, but the word is specially limited to the consideration of cases of possible dubiety, since it is only where difficulty exists that formal treatment is necessary. Any important development of casuistry can only take place under a government by law expressed in definite precepts ; but the development may have its origin in either of two opposite causes, or in a combination of the two—in the desire, namely, to fulfil the laws, or in the desire to evade them, or in a conflict of these desires.

To define still further : Casuistry is the doctrine and science of conscience and its cases, with the rules and principles of resolving the same : drawn partly from natural reason or equity, and partly from the authority of Scripture, the Canon Law, the Councils, the Fathers, etc. To Casuistry belongs the decision of all difficulties arising about what a man may lawfully do or not do ; what is sin or not sin ; what things a man is obliged to do in order to discharge his duty, and what he may let alone, without breach of it.

Confessors, in their relations with penitents, are brought face to face with problems, which they could not solve off-hand, and perhaps could not solve at all without guidance. These difficult questions, therefore, have all been considered by experienced confessors, and a complete system of Casuistry has been built up.

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